REG. v. DAVIS. 1881. Defence of delirium tremens. to be thoroughly responsible for his actions. And with regard to that I must explain to you what is the kind or degree of insanity which relieves a man from responsibility. Nobody must suppose and I hope no one will be led for one moment to suppose that drunkenness is any kind of excuse for crime. If this man had been raging drunk, and had stabbed his sister-inlaw and killed her, he would have stood at the bar guilty of murder beyond all doubt or question. But drunkenness is one thing and the diseases to which drunkenness leads are different things; and if a man by drunkenness brings on a state of disease which causes such a degree of madness, even for a time, which would have relieved him from responsibility if it had been caused in any other way, then he would not be criminally responsible. In my opinion, in such a case the man is a madman, and is to be treated as such, although his madness is only temporary. If you think he was so insane-that if his insanity had been produced by other causes he would not be responsible for his actions-then the mere fact that it was caused by drunkenness will not prevent it having the effect which otherwise it would have had, of excusing him from punishment. Drunkenness is no excuse, but delirium tremens caused by drunkenness may be an excuse if you think it produces such a state of mind as would otherwise relieve him from responsibility. A person may be both insane and responsible for his actions, and the great test laid down in McNaughten's case (10 Cl. & Fin. 200; 1 C. & K. 130 n.) was whether he did or did not know at the time that the act he was committing was wrong. If he did-even though he were mad-he must be responsible; but if his madness prevented that, then he was to be excused. As I understand the law, any disease which so disturbs the mind that you cannot think calmly and rationally of all the different reasons to which we refer in considering the rightness or wrongness of an action-any disease which so disturbs the mind that you cannot perform that duty with some moderate degree of calmness and reason may be fairly said to prevent a man from knowing that what he did was wrong. Delirium tremens is not the primary, but the secondary consequence of drinking, and both the doctors agree that the prisoner was unable to control his conduct, and that nothing short of actual physical restraint would have deterred him from the commission of the act. If you think there was a distinct disease caused by drinking, but differing from drunkenness, and that by reason thereof he did not know that the act was wrong, you will find a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity; but if you are not satisfied with that, you must find him guilty either of stabbing with intent to murder or to do grievous bodily harm. The jury returned a verdict of Not Guilty on the ground of insanity. The prisoner was ordered to be detained during Her Majesty's pleasure. SOUTH-EASTERN CIRCUIT. IPSWICH ASSIZES. Thursday, Feb. 3, 1881. (Before Sir H. HAWKINS, J.) REG. v. HUBBARD. Evidence-Declarations under sense of impending death-Subsequent hope of recovery. A declaration made under a belief of impending death was held admissible in evidence, even though the declarant at a later period of the day took a more cheerful view of her position, and thought that she should recover. URDER. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of his wife, Priscilla Hubbard, at Ipswich, on the 21st day of December, 1880. Carlos Cooper and Blofield were counsel for the prosecution; and Sims Reeve and Haggard, for the prisoner. In support of the case for the prosecution, the counsel for the Crown tendered in evidence certain declarations of the deceased woman, as dying declarations made by her on the day preceding her death. A body of testimony was adduced which satisfied the learned Judge that the declarations tendered were made by the deceased on the 29th day of December, under the solemn belief that her death was impending. For the prisoner two witnesses were called, who proved to the satisfaction of the learned Judge that later in the day, after the making of the declarations in question the deceased took a more cheerful view of her condition and thought she would recover. Upon this evidence the counsel for the prisoner contended, upon the authority of Rex v. Fagent (7 Car. & P. 238) (a) and Rex v. Megson (9 Car. & P. 418) (b) that the hope of recovery which the (a) Reg. v. Fagent. Indictment for manslaughter. The deceased expressed an opinion (sic) that she should not recover, and made a declaration, and subsequently, on the same day, asked her nephew if he thought "she would rise again." Held, per Gaselee, J., after consulting with Lord Denman, C.J., that this declaration was not admissible. (b) Rex v. Megson. Indictment for murder. Two days before the death of the deceased the surgeon told her that she was in a very precarious state; and on the day before her death, when she had become much worse, she said to the surgeon that she found herself growing worse, and that she had been in hopes she would get better, but as she was getting worse she thought it her duty to mention what had taken place. Immediately after this she made a statement. Held, per Rolfe, B., that this statement was not receivable in evidence as a declaration in articulo mortis, as it did not appear clearly that at the time of making it, the deceased was without hope of recovery. REG. v. HUBBARD. deceased entertained after making the declarations rendered those declarations inadmissible. HAWKINS, Sir H.-I think the declarations are admissible. 1881. Their admissibility depends on the state and condition of the Evidencedeceased at the time those declarations were made, and if they Dying would, as they clearly would, have been admissible had the woman declarations. died the instant after they were made, their admissibility is not affected by the fact that subsequently to making them and before she died she had entertained an opinion she would recover. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Tuesday, March 15, 1881. (Before GROVE and LINDLEY, JJ.) SWAN (App.) v. SAUNDERS (Resp.). (a) Criminal law-Cruelty to animals-Parrots consigned by railway -Non-supply of water during journey-Parrots not primá facie domestic animals-Jurisdiction of justices-Conviction12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 26; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 3; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 70; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 45, s. 46. Cruelty to an animal, to be within the statute, must cause substantial and unnecessary suffering to the animal. Without evidence of such suffering, to keep parrots for a few hours without water is not an act of cruelty upon which a conviction can rightly follow. Six young parrots were consigned by railway by S. from L. to a customer at D. They were inclosed in a box, in which some Indian corn but no water was put. About ten hours after leaving L. they were found at H., an intermediate place, by the respondent, in a condition which led him to think that they were suffering from being too closely packed, and were generally in a bad condition. The birds were alleged to have drunk a considerable quantity of water when offered to them, and to have seemed refreshed and relieved from pain after the draught. S., the appellant, was summoned before a police magistrate having jurisdiction at H., and was convicted of cruelty to the birds on (a) Reported by W. P. EVERSLEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. the ground that he had failed to supply them with water for their journey from L. to D. Held, on appeal from the decision of the magistrate, that the conviction was wrong, that the mere non-supply of water for the birds was not sufficient evidence upon which to found a conviction for cruelty; and further, that in default of evidence to that effect, young parrots were not domestic animals within the statutes passed to prevent cruelty to animals. Quære, whether the justices at H. had jurisdiction to try the case. HIS was a case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. THIS On the 1st day of October, 1880, at the Lambeth Police Court, an information was preferred by the respondent against the appellant under sect. 2 of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, for that he on the 10th and 11th days of September, 1880, within the district of the Lambeth Police Court, did ill-treat, torture, and cause or procure to be cruelly ill-treated and tortured, six parrots. On the 14th day of October the matter of the same information came on to be heard in due form, and upon the hearing it appeared as follows: That the appellant was the foreman to one Cross, a wholesale dealer in foreign birds, &c., in Liverpool. On the 10th day of September the appellant superintended the packing in a wooden box of six young parrots at Liverpool. The birds were afterwards despatched by his direction by the train leaving Liverpool at 11 p.m., consigned to the purchaser at Dover, Kent, the train for which place would leave Herne Hill station at 10.26 on the morning of the 11th day of September. Some Indian corn was placed in the box in which they were consigned. At 9.15 on the morning of the 11th day of September the respondent, who was employed by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, observed the box lying on the platform at Herne Hill station. He observed, through a crevice on the top of the box, that the birds were much torn about, and, as he described, perspiring very freely, and that the three birds at the bottom of the box were being trampled on by the others, and were in a most exhausted condition. He caused the birds to be removed from the box into a larger one, and after they had been supplied with water they seemed to revive, and were forwarded to their destination. He considered that they were too closely packed. A porter at the Herne Hill station, whose attention had been called to the birds by the respondent, proved that he heard them sqeaking and making a peculiar noise, and that one of the servants of the railway company gave them some cold water, of which they drank about two saucers-full with a relish, and did not cry out afterwards, but seemed to be quite happy and contented. SWAN v. SAUNDERS. 1881. Cruelty to animals. SWAN v. SAUNDERS. 1881. Cruelty to animals. Upon these facts it was contended, on the part of the appellant, that there was no evidence of cruelty upon which he should be convicted; that these, being foreign, unacclimatised parrots, were not animals within the meaning of the said statute; that no offence had been committed by the appellant within the jurisdiction of the Lambeth Police Court; and that the appellant had not committed any offence. The magistrate held that the box was of a sufficient size and proper construction, and that the birds were not too closely packed; but he was of opinion that an offence had been committed, and that it was cruelty to send birds during hot weather in the box used by the appellant, without water, on a journey of several hours, and convicted the appellant of the offence, and adjudged him to pay a fine of 10s., together with 28. for costs. The magistrate held that the parrots were animals within the meaning of the statute, and that the appellant had committed an offence within the jurisdiction of the said court. The opinion of the Court was asked whether the above contentions of the appellant were right in point of law, the Court to make such order as to costs as it deemed fit. By 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2: If any person shall, from and after the passing of this Act, cruelly beat, ill-treat, over-drive, abuse, or torture, or cause or procure to be cruelly beaten, ill-treated, over-driven, abused, or tortured, any animal, every such offender shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay a penalty not exceeding five pounds. By sect. 14: Every complaint under the provisions of this Act shall be made within one calendar month after the cause of such complaint shall arise; and every offence committed against this Act may be heard and determined by any justice of the peace within whose jurisdiction such offence shall be committed in a summary way, upon the complaint of any person, and without any information in writing; and it shall be lawful for any such justice, in all cases where any person complained of shall not be in custody, to summon such person to appear before such justice, or before any other justice of the peace, at a time and place to be named in such summons; and, on the appearance of the party accused, or, in default of such appearance, upon proof of the service of such summons, the said justice, or any other justice who shall be present at the time and place appointed for such appearance, shall proceed to examine into the matter. By sect. 29: The word "animal" shall be taken to mean any horse, mare, gelding, bull, ox, cow, heifer, steer, calf, mule, ass, sheep, lamb, hog, pig, sow, goat, dog, cat, or any other domestic animal. By 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 3: The words and expressions to which a meaning is affixed by the Act of the twelfth and thirteenth years of Her Majesty, and which are introduced into this Act, shall have the same meaning in this Act; and the word "animal" shall, in the said Act, and in this Act, mean any domestic animal, whether of the kind or species particularly enumerated in clause 29 of the said Act, or of any other kind or species whatever, and whether a quadruped or not. By 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 46, sub-s. 3: Where the offence is committed on any person, or in respect of any property in or upon any carriage, cart, or vehicle whatsoever, employed in a journey, or on board any vessel whatsoever employed in a navigable river, lake, canal, or inland navigation, |