in him in the premises, but of some new arrangement by which he took as a purchaser; and, unless some express undertaking to account for rents or to be responsible for injury to or dilapidation of the property after the first sale was had, no such responsibility existed. The committee do not find that any such undertaking was had, and none is proved. The returns from the proper department show that no rents were in fact received by the United States, and no injury committed to the property other than such as naturally occurred while held by government, which could not exercise over it the careful supervision of an owner who was personally present to superinted his property and protect it from casualties. The committee do not deem it necessary, under this view of the matter, to pursue the inquiry as to what amount of credit would have been allowed if the petitioner had presented his claims and proved them before the suit was commenced, in the same manner as he did subsequently, under the terms of the act of 1847, for his relief. government The act of There is another reason also manifest in the case why the should not be held responsible for damages of this character. 1847, for the relief of the petitioner, opened his account again at the department. Under it items were allowed which could not, at the time of the settlement, have been legally admitted without the benefit of its provisions. The item of $4,940, for advances for extra clerk hire, is an instance. The credits thus admitted were not then such as he would have been entitled to have allowed on a settlement of his original accounts. He received these allowances by special favor of a special act of Congress, permitting credits to be given to him on settlement not otherwise allowable. The final settlement of the petitioner's account in August, 1847, was made on the basis of charging him with the judgment and all disbursements, and crediting him with amounts received from third persons on the sales, moneys collected of the debtor, and such items of charge for advances for extra clerk hire and other expenditures in his official duties as were considered to be proved. The real estate bid in and held by the United States was in this arrangement given up to him. The act extending relief to Mr. Spencer did not necessarily imply that he was to take back the lands of which the United States had become owner by purchase. In the arrangement for the restoration of the lands there was no proposition, on the part of the officers of the government, that the public treasury should respond for rents or damages of any kind. The lands were to be restored and reconveyed to the petitioner in the condition in which they were at the time of the settlement. They had been bid in by the United States at two-thirds of the appraised value, and it was desirable to the petitioner to repossess himself of them. The officers proposed to restore them on certain terms, one of which was that the settlement made on this basis should be a final one between the parties, and that he should release all further demands on the government. He accepted the terms, and executed and delivered a written release. It is true he saw fit to address a communication to some of the officers of the government with whom the arrangement was made, protesting against the effect of this settlement and release, and declaring that he would still urge further claims. The committee cannot, however, but regard the settlement as fully and fairly made; the terms proposed for a final settlement of all claims accepted uncondition ally by him; the consideration of it received by him; and, in fact, himself precluded from further urging the demands which are now presented. The committee have looked through the statement of the several accounts between the department and the petitioner, and they are satisfied that the terms of the final settlement were highly favorable to the petitioner. They cannot find a single item which ought, in their judgment, to be allowed, that was rejected. Indeed, the very large sums for which he obtained credit on the final adjustment, considering the nature of the duties out of which they grew, exhibit, in the opinion of the committee, a marked instance of fair dealing and liberality. It is perhaps due to the petitioner to say, in this connection, that in the investigation of the complicated transactions out of which these claims have arisen, they see no reason to charge a want of honesty of purpose on his part. The duties performed by him were complicated and arduous; they were performed in a new country, and under many disadvantages, and many of them by agents; and the misfortunes which attended them seem to have arisen rather from the magnitude of the transactions and the want of comprehensive business qualifications and experience, and a neglect of that careful attention indispensable to avoid complication and pecuniary disaster. He cannot, however, be entitled to consequential damages arising from a suit which his own conduct made it the duty of the officers of the government to prosecute. The last item in the list above mentioned for which an allowance is claimed, is for commissions on receiving and paying in $2,100,000 received from sales of public lands above the amount on which commissions were allowed by law, amounting to $21,000. This item, it will be perceived, has no connexion with the suit, and implies no improper conduct on the part of any officer of government. The petitioner in this part of his claim simply seeks an allowance by Congress for services performed by him in the course of his official business. The law allowed to the receiver five hundred dollars annual salary and one per cent. on cash received on sales of public lands, but limited his annual compensation to a maximum of three thousand dollars. A sale of two hundred and fifty thousand acres of land in each year would therefore give him the maximum of compensation allowed by law. He alleges that he received while in office, from the sales of the public lands, $2,100,000 more than would give him this maximum compensation. The committee can see no reason for making this allowance. Large sums were allowed to him on the final adjustment under the act of 1847, for his expenses in transporting the specie to the place of deposit, for risk and mileage, for guards and for servant hire, amounting to $16,442 97. It was formerly the custom at the Treasury Department, in such cases of excessive sales, to audit and pay to the receiver the amount actually paid out by him for extra clerk hire, necessary to perform this excessive labor. But such practice was decided by the Attorney General, before the final settlement of the petitioner's account, to be unauthorized by law, and was consequently discontinued. The petitioner's claim for disbursements of this character, amounting to $4,942, was not admissible therefore under the general law, but under the act of 1847, for the settlement of the petitioner's accounts, it was proved and allowed to him. No other compensation in such cases has ever been allowed, and no reason is presented which, in the opinion of the committee, requires or could justify an appropriation for such a purpose in this case. Certainly there is none which would not apply in all other cases of large amounts paid to receivers. The committee recommend the adoption of the following resolution : A. Know all men by these presents, that I, John Spencer, of the town of Fort Wayne, in the State of Indiana, as well for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar to me in hand paid by the United States of America by Ranson H. Gillet, solicitor of the United States' treasury, at and before the sealing and delivering hereof, the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, as for divers other good causes and valuable considerations, have reversed, released, quit claimed and forever discharged, and by these presents for me, my heirs, executors and adininistrators do release, reverse, quit claim and forever discharge the said United States and every department or branch of the government thereof, and all persons claiming under them, of and from all manner of action or actions, cause and causes of action or actions, suits, debts, dues, duties, sum and sums of money, accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialities, covenants, contracts, agreements, promises, variances, damages, judgments, extents, executions, claims, and demands whatsoever in law or equity, or otherwise howsoever, which against the said United States I ever had, may have had, or now have, or which I, my heirs, executors or administrators hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon, or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this twenty-fourth day of August, Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven. JOHN SPENCER. [L. S.] B. WASHINGTON, D. C., August 23, 1847. SIR: Your note of 21st instant was recived this day covering report No. 228, exhibiting a balance of $105 69 against me, instead of my being a creditor as exhibited in the accounts last stated, and which balance arises from the return to me of the notes held by the United States against Rockhill and others and the costs thereon, &c. You are aware that I have uniformly claimed and do still claim on every principle of justice and equity other credits which you decline to allow. With a strong desire to recover back my lands and other property and save them from further damage and dilapidation, as well as to close as many of the complicated features of my accounts as possible, I have paid the above balance of $105 69 to the treasurer as per his receipt, but have done so without the abandonment of any part of my claim to further credits, which I shall state in detail in a supplemental account, and which I shall hereafter prosecute in such manner as my legal counsel shall advise. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN SPENCER. Hon. JAMES MCCULLOCH, Comptroller, &c. |