Reformed Logic: A System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy with an Entirely New Method of DialecticSwan Sonnenschein, 1892 - 233 strani |
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abstract idea animal antecedents appears application argue argument Aristotle arithmetical artificial asso associated believe Ben Nevis Berkeley's body Caesar called causation cause classification Cloven feet colour conclusion concrete consciousness consists cosmic dialectic dialectician doubt effect energy excited exist experience explain external fact fallacy fallacy of accident fallacy of division figures generalisation gism ideal imaginary imagine imprint individual inference inherence intellect J. S. Mill judgment knowledge language logic logicians Manx cat matter means memory ment mental merely metaphysical mind moods natural group never nominalists notion noumenon objects observation perceive perception perspective philosophy plasma position precedent predict premises principle properties proposition qualities rational realistic reason recollection relation resemblance sense sentiment sequence Sir William Hamilton sort species specific gravity substance substantialism supposed syllogism syllogistic theorem theory things thought tion true truth tyrant valid vase Whately words
Priljubljeni odlomki
Stran 50 - Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell : for myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Stran 47 - It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object.
Stran 50 - To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated : or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid.
Stran 31 - Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Stran 225 - If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently of Scripture in jest ; and if he were good, he would not do so in earnest ; but he does it either in jest or earnest; therefore he is either not wise, or not good*.
Stran 31 - The truth is that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts ; and in general one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than another, because the whole of human language is accommodated to the one, and is so incongruous with the other, that it cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth. The real stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the fact, but in the...
Stran 168 - to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments.
Stran 52 - Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the SAME SORT.
Stran 52 - To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method, of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length, this which in itself is a particular line is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; for that what is demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all lines or, in other words, of a line in general. And as that particular line becomes...
Stran 50 - ... body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear;...