PRESENTATION OF CLAIM.

See ESTATE (PRESENTATION OF CLAIM AGAINST).
PRESUMPTION OF LAW.

See PAYMENT, 1.
PROBATE APPEAL.

See APPEAL (PROBATE).
PROMISSORY NOTE.

See NOTES AND BILLS.
PUBLIC OFFICER.

See OFFICER.

QUO WARRANTO.

1. A proceeding in equity is not an appropriate remedy for the trial of a
title to an office. Such a title can be tried only on a writ of quo war-
ranto or a proceeding in the nature of such a writ. Hinckley v. Breen,

119.

2. The Practice Act has made no change in the law in this respect. Ib.
3. In a controversy between individuals as to the right to the office of
committee-men of a school district, the district has as such no interest
and need not be made a party. Ib.

4. But a proceeding to restrain individuals who are in possession of the
office of committee-men from making contracts in the name of the dis-
trict, should be brought by the district or by persons who are tax-payers
of the district.

RAILROAD.

Ib.

1. The act of 1883 (Session Laws of 1883, ch. 107, sec. 2), provides that
"no new highway or portion of a highway shall be constructed across
a railroad at grade." Held that when a street had been laid out across
a railroad at grade before the passage of the act and partially con-
structed, but had not been actually completed for public use at the
time the act took effect, such crossing could not thereafter be made.
N. York & N. England R. R. Co. v. City of Waterbury, 19.

2. And held to be of no moment that the railroad company had given
permission to construct the crossing at grade. Private contracts can-
not put limitations upon legislative power to protect life. Ib.
RECOUPMENT.

1. The defendants owned a tract of land heavily mortgaged, and sold a
portion of it by warranty deed, with a covenant against incumbrances,
to the plaintiff for $12,500, of which the plaintiff paid $2,500 and gave
notes and a mortgage back for $10,000; the first mortgagee making an
agreement with the defendants to release his mortgage on receiving the
$10,000. The plaintiff failed to pay the notes, and the first mortgagee
foreclosed his mortgage and evicted the plaintiff. At this time the
property had greatly depreciated, and was not worth $10,000. The
plaintiff brought a suit upon the covenants of warranty and against
incumbrances in the defendants' deed, and the defendants pleaded a
set-off of the notes. Held--1. That if there had been no set-off the
plaintiff could have recovered only nominal damages. 2. That the
note could be used by way of recoupment to prevent any recovery on
the part of the plaintiff. Beecher v. Baldwin, 419.

2. The notes, as an independent cause of action, were barred by the stat-

ute of limitations. Held not to affect them when used in recoup-

3. A matter of recoupment grows out of the principal transaction and is
equitably attached to it and applicable in reduction of a claim upon it,
and so long as that claim is in force the matter of recoupment remains
available. Ib.

REFORMATION OF DEED.

See CITY, 8.

RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.

See LESSOR AND LESSEE, 6, 7, 8.
REVOCATION OF WILL.

See WILL, 5, 6, 7.

RIPARIAN OWNER.

1. The owners of land upon a river own the soil to the middle of the bed
of the river, if it is a non-navigable river, and to high-water mark if
it is navigable. Welles v. Bailey, 292.

2. These lines are not fixed ones, like the lines of ownership in lands
covered by a highway, but change with the changing course of the
river, where its bed changes gradually and imperceptibly. Ib.
3. The submerged lines are not necessarily a continuation of the upland
lines from the point where they strike the river, but, in the case of
non-navigable streams, run to the center line of the stream at right
angles to that line, and in navigable rivers the lines to low-water mark
run at the same angle. Ib.

4. Land not originally riparian becomes so when the river has reached it
by gradually washing away all the intervening land. Ib.

5. And when a lot, originally not riparian, becomes so by such change
of the river bed, there attach to it all the incidents of riparian land.
Ib.

6. Among these incidents is that of the right of appropriating to it-
self gradual accretions from the river, where, by a change in the
movement of its bed, it begins to recede and leave soil upon its front.
Ib.

7. And this right of appropriation does not cease when its original limits
have been restored. Ib.

8. The river is a natural boundary, and all rights are determined by its
present relation to the land bordering upon it, where the changes in
its bed have been gradual, without reference to its former relations.
Ib.

9. This principle applied to Connecticut River, at a point where there
had been great, but gradual, changes in its course through the meadows
bordering upon it. Ib.

10. It seems that Connecticut River, between the towns of Wethersfield
and Glastonbury, is a navigable river. Ib.

RIVER.

See RIPARIAN OWNER.

SCHOOL DISTRICT.

1. A school society, in 1808, voted "that J. F. and whomsoever doth at
this time, or shall at any future time, occupy his house, they with
their respective lists shall be set to the first district." At that time
the house of J. F. was a quarter of a mile from the line of the district,

and stood upon a farm, separated from the district by an intervening strip of land. Held that the vote operated to annex the house and the farm connected with it to the first district. Scoville v. Mattoon, 144. 2. The law, at that time, gave school societies full power to establish and alter school districts. Under this authority they had power to annex to school districts territory not contiguous to them. Ib.

3. For more than fifty years the persons owning and living upon the farm had paid taxes as members of the district, their children had attended the school of the district, and they had, in various other ways, acted and been recognized as such members. Held to be too late to call in question a construction of the vote thus adopted and acted upon by the parties themselves. Ib.

4. In the absence of any record evidence, these facts would have afforded a conclusive presumption that the farm had been legally annexed to the district, and that its occupants were members of it. Ib. 5. By Gen. Statutes, p. 134, secs. 1, 6 and 7, towns are empowered, on application of persons interested, to form, alter and dissolve school districts within their limits, with a right of appeal, on the part of any district aggrieved, to the Superior Court, which is to have "the same power to act upon such application as the town had." Held that the court is not limited to an affirming or reversing of the action of the town, but can allow such application in whole or in part according to its discretion. Gravel Hill School District v. Old Farm School District, 244.

6. And the town would not be limited in its action to an allowance or disallowance of the application, but could allow a part of the change asked for and disallow the rest, keeping within the limit of the application and of the warning of the meeting.

SCIRE FACIAS.

See FOREIGN ATTACHMENT, 1. SET-OFF.

1. It is a fundamental principle of the law of set-off that the demand must be due the party in his own right, either as original creditor or as assignee. The ownership must be such that the party could bring a suit upon it in his own name as plaintiff, and would be entitled to the avails recovered for his own use and benefit. Olmstead v. Scutt, 125. 2. A defendant pleaded a set-off of a claim held by him by assignment, and it appeared that the assignment authorized the assignee "to collect the debt in his own name, and account to the assignor for the amount actually collected," and that he was to "re-assign to him any balance that might remain uncollected." There was no consideration for the assignment, and the sole object of it, as understood by both parties, was to enable the defendant to make use of the claim as a set-off against the suit of the plaintiff, if one should be brought. Held that the defendant had not such an interest in the assigned claim as entitled him to the set-off. Ib.

See RECOUPMENT, 1. SHELL FISHERIES.

See OYSTER BED.

SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS.

See INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

STATUTE.

1. As a rule of interpretation all statutes are to operate prospectively un-
less they contain language clearly retrospective. Goodsell's Appeal
from Probate, 171.

2. Repeals by implication are not favored.

v. Himes, 434.

Windham Co. Savings Bank

3. It will not be presumed that the legislature intended to repeal any
portion of an old statute which may well stand with the new, the two
taken together being intelligible and reasonable. Ib.

STATUTES COMMENTED ON.

GEN. STATUTES, tit. 4, ch. 6, sec. 9, (argument limited to one hour), 17.
Id., tit. 11, ch. 5, secs. 6, 7, (alteration of school districts), 244.

Id., tit. 14, ch. 2, sec. 3, (property of married women), 215.

Id., tit. 16, ch. 4, part 1, art. 1, (oyster bed), 263.

Id., tit. 16, ch. 9, sec. 1, (nuisance on highway), 397.

Id., tit. 18, ch. 6, sec. 17, (tenement becoming untenantable), 529.
Id., tit. 18, ch. 7, sec. 2, (foreclosure), 433.

Id., tit. 18, sec. 11, (builders' lien), 261.

Id., tit. 18, ch. 11, part 2, sec. 1, (view to insolvency), 280.
Id., tit. 18, ch. 11, part 3, sec. 24, (allowance to widow), 117.

Id., tit. 19, ch. 1, sec. 2, (attachment of share of estate), 117.
Id., tit. 19, ch. 2, sec. 9, (voluntary associations), 103.

Id., tit. 19, ch. 5, sec. 7, (voluntary associations), 103.

Id., tit. 19, ch. 5, sec. 9, (action against married woman), 397.
REVISION OF 1888, sec. 2011, (coroner), 579.

ACTS OF 1876, ch. 65, (director of corporation), 455.

1878, ch. 24, sec. 1, (oyster and clam bed), 263.

1878, ch. 58, sec. 1, (judgment lien), 130.

1878, ch. 92, sec. 2, (attempt to intimidate), 46.

66

46

66

66

1885, ch. 110, sec. 100, (assignment by insolvent corporation), 455.
1885, ch. 110, sec. 135, (revocation of will by marriage or birth),
171.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. Where a non-resident debtor owns attachable property in this state,
the statute of limitations does not run in his favor. His personal
presence is necessary, so that a judgment in personam could be recov-
ered against him. Waterman v. Sprague Manufacturing Co., 555.
2. The attachment of the property of a non-resident in this state is in the
nature of a proceeding in rem, binding on the property, but not sustain-
ing a judgment against the person of the debtor. Ib.

3. In the suit brought by the plaintiff in Rhode Island the trustee had
moved the court to allow him to appear and defend, that he might set
up the statute of limitations against the claim, but his motion was de-
nied. Held that this fact could not affect the present case, because
(1) the claim was not barred by the statute in this state, and (2) the

Rhode Island judgment was of no importance as the plaintiff could
maintain a suit here on his original cause of action. Ib.

SUPERSEDEAS.

See WRIT OF ERROR, 1, 2.

SURFACE WATER.

1. The owner of land has a right, by alterations of its surface, or other
modes of obstruction, to prevent the inflow upon it of surface water
from rains and snows, although the effect is to turn it or set it back,
upon the adjoining land. Chadeayne v. Robinson, 345.

2. It does not affect the case that the obstruction is by means of a tight
board fence erected on the line between his own land and that next
above him, upon a part of the line that, for the purpose of fencing, had
by the agreement of the parties been set to the adjoining owner. Ib.
TORT.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 5.

TOWN.

1. A town appointed a committee to procure plans and estimates for a
public school-house, and to contract for the erection of the building, at
a cost not to exceed $55,000. Held that the committee had no power by
its contracts to render the town liable for a larger sum. Turney v. Town
of Bridgeport, 412.

2. And held that a person contracting with the committee for the con-
struction of the building was bound to take notice of the limitation on
their power. Ib.

3. The building was erected on land purchased by the town for the pur-
pose, and was occupied by the town as a school-house after it had re-
ceived notice that the builder claimed a larger amount than could be
allowed him under the appropriation. Held not to make the town lia-
ble beyond the appropriation. Ib.

4. The plaintiff was the principal contract or for the erection of the build-
ing, but the heating, ventilation and plumbing were excepted from his
contract, and taken by other parties at an agreed price. Held that, in
making a contract with the committee for additional work and compen-
sation, he was put upon inquiry as to the amount that would be re-
quired for the payment of the other contractors. Ib.

5. The town by a vote, passed while the building was being erected, laid
a tax of two mills on a dollar to be applied on the building account.
Held, in the absence of any other evidence of the intent of the town,
not to be equivalent to a further appropriation for the building. Ib.
6. A ratification of an unauthorized act of an agent of a town must be
made by the town in a lawful manner, and as a rule directly and not
by implication, and with full knowledge of all material facts. Ib.
See DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, 1.

TRESPASS.

1. In trespass to the person the place is immaterial, and an allegation
that it was committed in one place does not preclude the plaintiff from
proving that it was committed in another. Lillibridge v. Barber, 366.
2. The only exception is where the defendant sets up a justification of
his act by reason of the place where it was committed. Ib.

TRUST DEED FOR CREDITORS.

1. The defendant, a manufacturing corporation located in the state of