that the act may be either one of omission or commission, and if there is also a correlative duty owed to the injured party, the injury and negligent act combining would furnish him a cause of action.1 § 446. Same - Natural and artificial agencies. There is, generally, no responsibility for injuries, resulting from accidents due to natural causes, in themselves beyond the control of man, and though a mine owner's acts may have conduced to produce the injury, if his acts have been without default or negligence, no recovery could be had, but where the injury results from natural causes, aided by human agency, to the extent that the injury would not have resulted from natural causes alone, negligence might, in such case, be imputed to the author of such injury and a recovery therefor be allowed.3 § 447. Who can maintain action. Generally any one to whom there is a duty owing can maintain an action for injury sustained against the party whose negligence caused the injury, and there is no difference in degree between the liability for one's own negligence or want of skill, whether it is a stranger or an employee who is injured; 4 but without a corresponding duty owing to the party injured there could be no recovery and for this reason a mere 5 1 Armour v. Golkewska, 95 Ill. App. 492. 2 Fletcher v. Smith, 5 M. M. R. 78; Reiter v. Winona Co., 75 N. W. Rep. 219; Olsen v. McMullen, 24 N. W. 318. 3 Robinson v. Black Diamond Co., 14 M. M. R. 93. 4 Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 10 M. M. R. 669. Buswell Per. Inj. 87-91. "If an independent contractor, going upon the premises of another to perform work under a contract with the owner, is injured from defects known, or which by fair care ought to be known to the owner, and unknown, or which by fair care cannot be known to the contractor, the owner is liable; but, under the reverse of these circumstances, he is not liable." Sesler v. Rolfe Coal & Coke Co., 41 S. E. Rep. 216 (W. Va. 1902). trespasser 1 or licensee 2 could not maintain the action. The duty may either be one owing by virtue of the relation of the parties which the law recognizes, as arising therefrom, or one created by statute, such as actions for injuries resulting in death of employees, from the employer's negligence." Unsafe place. On ac § 448. Injury to employee count of the hazardous nature of mining operations the duty of the employer to furnish a reasonably safe place for the employee to work, is particularly applicable to mines, and the employer is liable to his emyloyee for an injury resulting from the dangerous nature of the place, if he has failed to take proper and reasonable precaution to provide for the safety of the place where the injury occurred; 1 Tully v. Phil. &c. Co., 5 Del. Sup. A. 95. One operating a cable to haul coal cars from his mine held not liable for injuries to trespassing child. Uthermohlen v. Bogg's Run Min. & Mfg. Co. (W. Va.), 40 S. E. Rep. 410. 2 Buswell Per. Inj. 87, 91. No duty is placed by the law upon a master to furnish a servant a guard to protect him from a body of strikers. Lewis v. Taylor Coal Co. (Ky. 1901), 66 S. W. Rep. 1044. 3 The failure to perform a statutory duty does not, usually, prevent the defense of contributory negligence. Queen v. Coal Co., 95 Tenn. 465; Krause v. Morgan, 53 Ohio St. 26; Christner v. Coal Co, 146 Pa. St. 67. But see Odin Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 Ill. 413; s. c. 84 Ill. App. 190. 4 Lake Superior Co. v. Erickson, 10 M. M. R. 39; MacSwinney Mines, etc., p. 611; Hamman v. Coal Co., 156 Mo. 234; Smith v. Coal Co., 75 Mo. App. 177; Wright v. Compton, 2 M. M. R. 189; Buswell Per. Inj. 202. Servant entitled to rely on presumption that master has made place reasonably safe, in absence of notice that it is not safe. Himrod Coal Co. v. Clark, 99 Ill. App. 332; 197 Ill. 514. The rule of safe place does not apply where the employee is employed to do work specially hazardous, as to repair known defects. Wahlquist v. Maple Grove Coal and Mining Co. (Iowa, 1902), 89 N. W. Rep. 98. But this rule does not preclude recovery by employee, helping to repair roof, where superintendent had failed to provide temporary props. Idem. 1 and the duty to furnish a safe place to work cannot be delegated by the employer to an agent or servant, so as to excuse him from responsibility to one injured, as a result of working in an unsafe place.1 § 449. Same Knowledge of defect bars recovery. But the rule which holds the master liable for injuries from permitting a servant to work in an unsafe place is not without some limitation, necessary to prevent an abuse of the doctrine from too broad an assertion of the rule. If 1 Trihay v. Brooklyn Co., 15 M. M. R. 535. Duty to properly timber cannot be so delegated as to avoid liability from unsafe roof, from want of timbers. Con. Coal Co. v. Lundak, 196 Ill. 594; 63 N. E. Rep. 1079. Mine owner must keep reasonably safe entries for means of ingress and egress and mine employee has right to presume it is so kept. Wellston Coal Co. v. Smith (Ohio), 10 Amer. Neg. Rep. 445; decided June, 1901. Liability was predicated upon failure to provide safe place to work, in the following cases: Mellors v. Shaw, 1 B. & S. 437; 9 W. R. 748; Carter v. Clark, 78 L. Y. N. S. 76; Bethlehem Iron Co. v. Weiss, 100 Fed. Rep. 45; Mullin v. Cal. Mining Co., 105 Cal. 77; Gibson &c. Min. Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321; Steele Co. v. Shields, 146 Ill. 603; Graham v. Newburg Coal Co., 38 W. Va. 273; Trihay v. Brooklyn Lead Co., 4 Utah, 468; Iron Co. v. Elkins, 90 Va. 249; Iron Co. v. Pace, 101 Tenn. 476; Vanesse v. Coal Co., 159 Pa. St. 403; Schlacker v. Ashland Iron Co., 89 Mich. 253; Haminan v. Coal & Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232; Fisher v. Lead Co., 156 Mo. 479; Carlson v. Coal Co., 9 Wash. 395; Kelly v. Min. Co., 16 Mont. 484; Lexington Min. Co. v. Stephens (Ky.), 47 S. W. 321; Blondin v. Quarr. Co. (Ind. App.), 39 N. E. 200; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 56. See also Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. And where negligence consists in violation of statute, for safety of employees see, Myers v. Hudson Iron Co., 150 Mass. 125; Com. v. Elk Hill Coal Co., 4 L. L. N. (Penn.), 80; Sangamon Coal Co. v. Wiggerhous, 122 Ill. 279; Odin Coal Co. v. Dedman, 185 Ill. 413; s. c. 84 App. 190; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 Ed.) 59; Durant v. Coal Co, 97 Mo. 62. Nor would the plaintiff's knowledge defeat recovery. Idem. But employer must know that statute is violated. Leslie v. Coal Co., 110 Mo. 31. See, however, as to necessity of employer's knowledge, Herbert v. Mound City &c. Co., an able opinion, by Goode, J., 90 Mo. App. 305. And see, also, Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Rowatt, 196 Ill. 156; 63 N. E. 649. the servant knows of any defects in the condition of his place of work, or if he has equal or superior information in regard thereto than his master,2 and continues his work, without objection, until his injury, he cannot recover, for to hold the master liable in such cases would be to make him an insurer of his servants, for injuries resulting from their own folly. As a § 450. Same—Injuries from falling bodies. general rule those engaged in making excavations, where the dangerous nature of the work is open to common observation, assume the risk of injuries from falling earth and rock, caused by the excavations. To hold the master 1 Watson v. Coal Co., 52 Mo. App. 366; Berning v. Medart, 56 Mo. App. 443; Pioneer Min. Co. v. Thomas, 32 So. Rep. 15. 72 2 McArthur v. Nordstrom, 87 Ill. App. 554; Lawless v. Laclede Co., Mo. App. 679; Money v. Lower Vein Co., 10 M. M. R. 56; Island Co. v. Greenwood (Ind ), 4 Amer. Neg. Rep. 146. Whether a boy of fourteer has such intelligence as to be guilty of contributory negligence in taking a place of danger in driving a mule in coal mine, is for the jury to determine. Boyer v. Northern Pac. Coal Co. (Wash. 1902), 68 Pac. Rep. 348. Notice that roof was not propped a few hours before injury does not bar recovery. Cushman v. Carbondale Fuel Co., 88 N. W. 817. Not only knowledge of the defect but also the danger resulting therefrom is usually necessary to prevent recovery. Hamilton v Coal Co., 108 Mo. 364; Conroy v. Vulcan Iron Works, 62 Mo. 35; Hamman v. Coal Co., 156 Mo. 232; Fox v White Lead Works, 84 Mich. 676; Graham v. Coal Co., 38 W. Va. 273; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 Ed.), 123. 3 As cave-in of gravel pit. Allen v. Logan, 37 Pac. Rep. 496; Naylor v. C. & N. W. Co., 27 N. W. 24; Buswell Per. Inj., Sec. 205, p. 343. Or falling rock in quarry. Mielk v. C. & N. W. Co., 79 N. W. 22. Cave-in of ditch. Brown v. Chat. Co., 47 S. W. 415; Vincennes Co. v. White, 24 N. E. 745; Swanson v. Lafayette, 33 N. E. 1033. Of falling earth or clay. Griffin v. Ohio &c. Co., 24 N. E. 888; Pederson v. Rushford, 42 N. W. 1063; Olsen v. McMullen, 24 N. W. 318; Rassmussen's Admr. v. R. R. Co, 21 N. W. 583; see Rieter v. Winona &c. Co. (Minn.), 75 N. W. 219, where it is said: "Under the rule, recently stated in Swanson v. Railway Co. (Minn.), 70 N. W. 978, that servants, while performing their duties, are bound to take notice of the operation of liable in such a case would be to make him an insurer, not only of the place, but also of the work of his employee, as the place itself is continuously changed by the prosecution of the work.1 The law presumes not only that its own shifting doctrines are known to every man, but that every one is familiar with the immutable laws of nature and this being true, an injury from coming in contact with a body subject to the force of gravitation is a risk incident to one's service, for which no recovery can be had.2 familiar natural laws, and to govern themselves accordingly, it is held that the complaint herein failed to state a cause of action." For additional cases of injuries from falling earth and scales, see: Con. Coal Co. v. Schreiber, 167 Ill. 539, s. c. 65 Ill. App. 304; Con. Coal Co. v. Bokamp, 181 Ill. 9; s. c. 75 App. 605; Mellors v. Shaw, 30 L. J. Q. B. 333; West Coal Co. v. Ingraham, 70 Fed. Rep. 219; Taylor v. Star Coal Co., 110 Iowa, 40; Dewesse v. Meramec Iron Co., 128 Mo. 423; s. c. 54 App. 476; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. (2 Ed.), p. 58. For other cases holding no liability where nature of work continuously changes the place, see: Porter v. Silver Cr. Co., 84 Wis. 424; Durst v. Steele Co., 173 Pa. St. 165; Diamond State Iron Co. v. Giles, 7 Houst. (Del.) 556; Bradley v. Chicago &c. Co., 138 Mo. 293; Kennedy v. Grace &c. Co. 92 Fed. Rep. 116; Finalson v. Utica Min. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 507; 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. (2 Ed.), 57. Where the evidence as to negligence is conflicting, it is error to instruct that the mine owner is liable for the act of agent in charge, from injury due to falling slate. Carson v. Coal Co. (Iowa), 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 230; Ewell v. Mining Co. (Utah), 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 639. In an injury from falling coal it is error to instruct that the sole question is whether it would have fallen of its own weight, if not braced, as the real issue is whether the defendant, with reasonable care, could have anticipated and avoided the injury. Freeman v. Coal Co. (Mont.), 64 Pac. Rep. 347. 1 Aldrich v. Furnace Co., 78 Mo. 559; O'Donnell v. Potter, 117 Mo. 13, 18; Olson v. McMullen, 34 Minn. 94; Rassmussen v. C., R. I. & P. Co., 65 Iowa, 236; Con. Coal Co. v. Young, 31 Ill. App. 417; Beach Con. Neg. (2 Ed.), Sec. 360, p. 464; Minneapolis v. Lunkin, 58 Fed. Rep. 525; Finalson v. Utica M. & M. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 507; Curley v. Hoff, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 668; Syndicate v. Murphy (Ky.), 60 S. W. 182; Quinn v. Baird, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 712; West Stove Co. v Musiad, 85 Ill. App. 82. But see Bradley v. R. R., 138 Mo. 293. 2 Ante, idem. Also Regen v. Polo, 5 Am. Neg. Sidghardt, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 78. But see Larson v. App. 512. Rep. 63; Golden v. |