may have demised the land to another.1 The owner is also liable where the ordinary use of the premises, for the purpose for which they were leased, would constitute a nuisance, or where the same results from a breach on his part of a covenant in the demise; but otherwise the party in possession is liable for the continuance of a nuisance.3

§ 559. For miscellaneous injuries Disturbance of easements. The action of case is the appropriate remedy for the recovery of damages for injuries to all classes of incorporeal rights and property formerly discussed under the head of mining easements. The action would lie for the recovery of damages for the obstruction of a private way; 4 for the disturbance of an easement or privilege over

1 Ante, idem, citing King v. Pedley, 1 Ad. & E. 822; Payne v. Rogers, 2 H. Bl. 349.

2 King v. Pedley, 1 Ad. & E. 822.

3 Cheetham v. Hamson, 4 T. R. 318. See, as to liability of owner for blasting, Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431; contra, Marvin v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y. 538. For fouling stream, Fehr v. Schuylkill Nav. Co., 69 Pa. St. 161; Little Schuylkill Co. v. Richards, 57 Pa. St. 142; obstruction of highway, Iveson v. Moor, 12 Mod. 262; Mor. Min. Dig., p. 249; diversion of water, Parker v. Kilham, 8 Cal. 77; Stiles v. Laird, 5 Id. 120; and see generally as to abatement and damages, Roberts v. Rose, 35 L. J. Ex. 62; L. R. 1 Ex. 82; Mor. Min. Dig. 249. "If a quarry be carried on in such a manner as to result in a nuisance to adjoining landowners, in the absence of a defense in the nature of a presumed grant or easement, the owner must answer in damages." Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431; M. M. D. 248. "A mine owner cannot be restrained from blasting in the night time, as is usual in the mines, because it disturbs the sleep and thus affects the health of the owner of the surface, and his family, or diminishes the value of his estate." Marvin v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y. 538; 14 Amer. R. 322; M. M. D. 248. "The exercise of a right to mine, reserved in a grant, cannot be complained of because it creates a nuisance to the owner of the surface." Marvin v. Brewster Iron Co., 55 N. Y. 538; 14 Amer. R. 322; M. M. D. 248. Where thousands of trespasses have occurred and it is questionable if they will be stopped, an injunction should issue, to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Blondell v. Gas Co., 89 Md. 732; 46 L. R. A. 187.

4 Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 346; Yard v. Ford, 2 Saund. 172.

another's land; 1 for interfering with the right to use a sink or wash place in another's land 2 and for any wrong in regard to incorporeal property, whether the injury result from mere nonfeasance or from some overt act on the part of the wrong-doer. Case is also the proper remedy for injuries to real property by the reversioner, where the land is in the possession of another at the time of the commission of the wrongful act, for the injury results immediately to the party in possession and consequently to the party having the reversion. For instance, the action of trespass would lie on the part of the tenant for an injury to his possessory right, resulting from the erection of a nuisance on the premises and while the reversioner would also have an action for the injury resulting to the property from the erection of the nuisance, case and trespass would be the proper remedy for him to recover damages for the same." It would also be the appropriate remedy for dangerous excavations, in undermining a house; for excavating in such a manner as to interfere with the plaintiff's right of lateral support, and for all other similar injuries to incorporeal property or easements known to the law of real property.8

1 Wilson v. Smith, 10 Wend. 324; Mainwarring v. Giles, 5 D. & A. 361. 2 Mainwarring v. Giles, supra; also Hemlins v. Shipman, 5 B. & C. 221.

3 Taylor's L. & T. (7 Ed.), § 784, p. 666.

4 Taylor's L. & T., § 783, p. 666.

5 Taylor's L. & T., 782-783 and cases cited. Case is the proper remedy for drowning of mine caused by removal of pillars from adjoining land. Firmstone v. Wheeley, 2 Daw. & L. 203. So as to consequential damage to colliery. Howard v. Banks, 2 Burr. 1113. Slandering mine, Paul v. Halferty, 63 Pa. St. 46; and blasting in adjacent mine, Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 432.

6 Smith v. Martin, 2 Saurd. 397.

7 Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 B. & Ad. 871.

8 For additional miscellaneous cases of which trespass on the case is the proper remedy, the reader is referred to Taylor's Land. & Ten., §§

After the

§ 560. Lessee wrongfully holding over. surrender or termination of a lease, either by forfeiture or from lapse of time, the lessee is a trespasser if he remains in possession of the property after notice to quit the same,1 and for any appropriation of mineral or other property belonging to the owner of the land, whether it is annexed to the freehold, or is of a personal nature, the action of trespass de bonis asportatis will lie on the part of the owner. The same rule obtains after the revocation of a license by the licensor, and in sections where mining is carried on under "mining registers," by which those who conduct the mining operations acquire only the privilege of a license, litigation frequently arises in regard to the ownership of mineral, after revocation of the license. As to such mineral as has been removed, both parties are entitled to their per cent, and, as before explained, where there was an absolute sale of the mineral in the ground, with a license to remove the same, the ownership of the minerals could not be subsequently disturbed by a revocation of the license to remove it. But where the licensee does not possess a right of property in the minerals, if he

783, 784, p. 666 (7 Ed.). "After a trespass in breaking through barriers the flow of water is only consequential; the continued flow is not a continuing trespass, and the plaintiff cannot recover further damages after a verdict in a suit for breaking the barriers, and damages ensuing therefrom." Clegg v. Dearden, 12 Q. B. 576; M. M. D. 418.

1 This rule has been held to apply in Missouri, to a licensee holding over, after the termination of his license. Lockwood v. Lunsford, 56 Mo. 68.

2 Lockwood v. Lunsford, supra; Taylor's L. & T., § 767, pp. 655-656 (7 Ed.).

3 DesLoge v. Pearce, 38 Mo. 598; Lockwood v. Lunsford, 56 Id. 68; Rochester v. Mining Co., 86 Mo. App. 447.

4 Lunsford v. La Motte Lead Co., 54 Mo. 426; Rex v. Pomfret, 5 M. & S. 139; Campbell v. Leach, Amb. 740.

5 Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383; Doster v. Zinc Co., 140 Pa. 147; Woodward v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 121 Pa. 344.

continues to act as before and extract mineral after the revocation of the license, he becomes a trespasser as to such mineral as may subsequently be removed, and the same rule obtains in the case of a lessee after a termination of his lease.1 In such case the lessor or licensor is the absolute owner of the minerals, and the measure of damages would be the value of the mineral at the time of the trespass; but where the owner of the minerals taken from his premises, sues for the value of the mineral taken, he thereby waives the tort, and could recover no damage for the trespass.

§ 561. Trespass by corporations. A corporation is generally liable for injuries to the real or personal property of another, resulting from the acts of its agents, committed within the scope of their authority, whenever an action could, under like circumstances, be maintained

1 Doering v. Hornsby, 12 M. A. 571; Chynowith v. G. M. & S. Co. (a leading case), 74 Mo. 173; Lunsford v. La Motte Lead Co., 54 Mo. 426; Dean v. Idem, 59 Mo. 523.

2 United M. C. Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq 432; Wood v. Morewood, 3 Q. B. 440; Wild v. Holt, 9 M. & W. 672. No increased value by reason of the removal can be had. Morgan v. Powell, 2 Q. B. 278. See, as to measure of damage, Austin v. Coal Co., 72 Mo. 535.

8 Cobb v. Griffith & Adams Sand, Gravel &c. Co., 12 Mo. App. 130; Idem, 87 Mo. 90. But if the trespasser knows at the time of removing the ore that he had no right thereto, the owner can recover exemplary damages in addition to the value of the mineral. Barton C. Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1. The rental value of the land is not a proper measure of damage. U. S. v. Magoon, 3 McLean, 171. The trespasser, however, is not allowed any deduction for getting the ore. Martin v. Porter, 5 M. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q. B. 278. But may claim allowance for raising. Phillipp v. Homfrey, L. R. 6 Ch. 770. But see, where trespass is without any fraud, United M. C. Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46.

against an individual for such an injury.1 The same general rules of law govern and determine the liability of corporations, in actions for trespass, that would apply in actions against natural persons for similar injuries and aside from the difference in the manner of obtaining service, the procedure of which is regulated by statute, there is no material difference between actions of trespass against corporations and against natural persons. For an injury

to a third person resulting from the neglect of an agent to properly protect the corporate works, the corporation would be liable, if the agent's work was within the ordinary scope of his employment, even though it did not authorize or have any knowledge of the act complained of; and if the corporation should recognize the act done, in the course of its business, it is no defense in an action for an injury resulting from the negligence of its agent, that the act complained of was not authorized by the corporate charter." And where the negligence of the agent is so gross as to be a reckless disregard of the consequences of his acts, the corporation may be held for exemplary damages.

1 Boone on Cor., § 70, p. 100.

2 See Statutes.

3 Boone on Corporations, §§ 80 and 81, pp. 100-1. A mining corporation, conducting mining on land not its own, is liable for trespass, the same as an individual. Yohoola River M. Co. v. Irby, 40 Ga. 479; also Hays v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain v. Id., 2 ld. 163. 4 Oliver v. N. E. &c. Co., 9 Q. B. 409; Taylor v. Boston Water Power Co., 12 Gray, 415; Boone on Cor., § 82, pp. 103-4.

5 Nor would the fact that the agent had been mistaken affect the liability. Boone on Cor., § 81; Perkins v. Mo. &c. Co., 55 Mo. 201. Also Owsley v. Montgomery &c. Co., 37 Ala. 560.

6 Pittsburg &c. Co. v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 157; Milwaukee &c. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Boone on Cor., § 80, pp. 100-1.