ment to it, accuffoming yourfelves to think and fpeak of it as of the palladium of your political fafety and profperity; watching for its prefervation with jealous anxiety; difcountenancing whatever may fuggeft even a fufpicion that it can in any event be abandoned and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the reft, or to enfeeble the facred ties which now link together its various parts.

For this you have every inducement of fympathy and intereft. Citizens by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of Ameri can, which belongs to you, in your national capacity, muft always exalt the juft pride of patriotifm more than any appellation derived from local difcriminations. With flight fhades of difference, you have the fame religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common caufe fought and triumphed together; the independence and liberty you poffefs are the work of joint councils and joint efforts, of common dangers, fufferings, and fucceffes.

But these confiderations, however powerfully they addrefs themselves to your fenfibility, are greatly outweighed by thofe which apply more immediately to your intereft. Here every por tion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preferving the union of the whole,

The north, in an unrestrained intercourfe with the fouth, prorected by the equal laws of a common government, finds, in the productions of the latter, great additional refources of maritime and commercial enterprife, and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The fouth, in the fame intercourse, benefitting by the agency of the north, fees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand; turning partly into its own channels the feamen of the north, it finds its particular navigation invigorated; and while it contributes in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mafs of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime ftrength, to which itfelf is unequally adapted. The eaft, in a like intercourfe with the weft, already nds, and in the progreffive improvement of interior communica tion by land and water, will more and more find a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The weft derives from the eaft fupplies requifite to its growth and comfort; and what is perhaps of ftill greater confequence, it muft of neceffity owe the fecure enjoyment of indif penfable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime ftrength of the Atlantic fide of the union, directed by an indiffoluble community of intereft as one nat,on. - Any other tenure by which the weft can hold this effential advantage, whether derived from its own feparate ftrength, or from

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an apoftate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinfically precarious.

While then every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular intereft in union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find, in the united mafs of means and efforts, greater ftrength, greater refource, proportionably greater fecurity from external danger, a lefs frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations, and, what is of ineftimable value! they must derive from union an exemption from thofe broils and wars between themselves, which fo frequently affli&t neighbouring countries, not tied together by the fame government; which their own rivalships alone would be fufficient to produce, but which oppofite foreign alliances, attachments and intrigues, would ftimulate and imbitter. Hence, likewife, they will avoid the neceffity of thofe overgrown eftablishments, which, under any form of government, are inaufpicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hoftile to republican liberty; in this fenfe it is that your union ought to be confidered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other.

These confiderations fpeak a perfuafive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibits the continuance of the union as a primary object of patriotic defire. Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace fo large a sphere? Let experience folve it. To liften to mere fpeculations in fuch a cafe were criminal. We are authorised to hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective fubdivifions, will afford a happy iffue to the experiment. 'Tis well worth a fair and full experiment. With fuch powerful and obvious motives to union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience fhall not have demonItrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotifm of those, who in any quarter may endeavour to weaken its bands.

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In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs as matter of ferious concern, that any ground fhould have been furnithed for characterifing parties by geographical difcriminations, northern and fouthern, Atlantic and western; whence defigning men may endeavour to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interefts and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular diftricts, is to mifre prefent the opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot hield yourfelves too much against the jealoufies and heartburnings which spring from these mifreprefentations: they tend to render alien to each other thofe who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our weftern country have lately had an feful leffon on this head; they have

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The alternate dominion of one faction qver another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party diffention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enor mities, is itfelf a molt horrid defpotifm. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent defpotifm. The disorders and miferies which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repofe in the abfolute power of an individual; and, fooner or later, the chief of fome prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continued mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to difcourage and restrain it.

It ferves always to diftract the public councils and enfeeble the public adminiftration. It agitates the community with ill founded jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated accefs to the government itfelf through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the fpirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical caft, patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour, upon the spirit of party. But in thofe of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that fpirit for every falutary purpofe. And there being constant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched: it demands a unifer n vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, instead of warming, it thould confume.

It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country thould infpire caution in thofe entrufted with its admi. niftration, to confine themfelves within their refpective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercife of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft eftimate of that love of power, and proneness to abufe it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reci

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of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of confiftent and wholefome plans, digested by common councils, and modified by mutual interefts.

However combinations or affociations of the above defcription may, now and then, anfwer popular ends, they are likely, in the courfe of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to fubvert the power of the people, and to ufurp for themselves the reins of government; deftroying afterwards the very enemies. which have lifted them to unjuft dominion.

Towards the prefervation of your government, and the permanency of your prefent happy ftate, it is requifite, not only that you fteadily discountenance irregular oppofitions to its acknowledged authority, but alfo, that you refift with care the fpirit of innovation upon its principles, however fpecious the pretexts. One method of affault may be to effect, in the forms of the conftitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the fyftem, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as neceffary to fix the true character of governments as of other human inftitutions-that experience is the fureft ftandard by which to teft the real tendency of the exifting conftitution of a country-that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, expofes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothefis and opinion; and remember, efpecially, that for the efficient management of your common interefts, in a country fo extenfive as our's, a government of as much vigour as is confiftent with the perfect fecurity of liberty is indifpenfable. Liberty itfelf will find in fuch a government, with powers properly diftributed and adjufted, its fureft guardian. It is, indeed, little elfe than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprizes of faction, to confine each member of the fociety within the limits prefcribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the fecure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of perfons and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the ftate, with the particular reference to the founding of them on geographical difcriminations. Let me now take a more comprehenfive view, and warn you in the moft folemn manner againft the baneful effects of the fpirit of party generally.

This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, having its roots in the ftrongeft paflions of the human mind. It exifts under different fhapes in all governments, more or lefs ftified, controuled, or oppreffcd; but in thofe of the popular form it is feen in its greateft ranknefs, and it is truly their worst

enemy. VOL. V.

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The

The alternate dominion of one faction qver another, fharpened by the fpirit of revenge natural to party diffention, which in c'ifferent ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enor mities, is itself a moft horrid defpotifm. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent defpotifm. The diforders and miferies which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repofe in the abfolute power of an individual; and, fooner or later, the chief of fome prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continued mifchiefs of the fpirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to difcourage and restrain it.

It ferves always to diftract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill founded. jealoufies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part against another, foments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated accefs to the government itself through the channels of party paffions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are fubjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the fpirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical caft, patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour, upon the fpirit of party. But in thofe of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that fpirit for every falutary purpofe. And there being constant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched: it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, instead of warming, it thould confume.

It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free country thould infpire caution in thofe entrusted with its admi niftration, to confine themselves within their refpective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercife of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real defpotifm. A juft eftimate of that love of power, and proneness to abufe it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reci

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