Fred B. Mellman, Metcalf & Black and Aaron Turner for Respondents.

NOURSE, J., pro tem.-Appeal from judgment for defendants in an action to quiet title to real property in Alameda County.

On September 2, 1914, a judgment was recovered in the superior court of San Francisco in favor of Annie M. Cochran, a minor, by her guardian ad litem, and against Anne Marham. On September 5, 1914, a transcript of the docket of said judgment was recorded with the county recorder of Alameda County, Anne Marham being then the owner of the property involved in this proceeding. On October 8, 1914, Annie M. Cochran individually made and acknowledged a satisfaction of judgment, which was filed with the county clerk of San Francisco. On October 22d, of the same year, a transcript of the docket of the county clerk of San Francisco County, showing this satisfaction. to have been filed, was recorded in Alameda County.

On January 12, 1915, Anne Marham, for a valuable consideration, executed a trust deed to the property to secure a loan, and on October 9, 1916, the trustees under this deed conveyed to one of the defendants through whom the other defendants claim.

On August 19, 1915, a notice was filed in Alameda County of the pendency of an action in San Francisco to set aside as fraudulent to creditors the satisfaction given by Annie M. Cochran on October 8, 1914. On January 12, 1916, said satisfaction was set aside by judgment of the superior court in San Francisco as a fraud upon the creditors of Annie M. Cochran. On February 21, 1916, the sheriff of Alameda County sold the property to appellant by virtue of an execution from San Francisco in the action entitled "Cochran v. Marham." This was subsequent to the exccution of the deed of trust of January 12, 1915, but prior to all sales and transfers of title thereunder.

At the time of the trial the action was dismissed as to all defendants other than the actual occupant of the premises and those who held a deed of trust executed November 24. 1916. These all filed cross-complaints, and secured judgment against appellant.

42 Cal. App.-2

The main ground of attack on this judgment is that the recordation in Alameda County of the copy of the docket of the county clerk of San Francisco, showing the filing of satisfaction, was not notice in Alameda County of the satisfaction of the judgment sufficient to relieve the respondents' predecessors in interest of further inquiry into the fact of satisfaction. In support of this proposition, appellant contends that the statute does not provide for such a method of releasing the lien previously placed by the recordation of the transcript of the judgment. In this appellant is technically correct. Section 674 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the filing of a transcript of the original docket of a judgment in another county where real property is situated. Thereupon the judgment becomes a lien on all the real property of the defendant in such county. The same section then provides: "The lien continues for two years unless the judgment is previously satisfied or the lien otherwise discharged."

Respondents urge that the title of the property in Alameda County was cleared of the lien of the judgment when the certified copy of the county clerk's docket, showing the filing of satisfaction, was recorded in that county. But the recording of a copy of this document could not give it greater force than the record of the original docket in the county where made. (Civ. Code, sec. 1218.) [1] Hence, when a transcript of judgment has been filed in another county under section 674 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the lien thereby placed is not discharged by the recordation of a copy of the clerk's docket showing satisfaction. The lien is discharged by the satisfaction itself. [2] Here the case is that the judgment was obtained by the guardian ad litem of Annie M. Cochran, and the satisfaction was signed by her individually on the representation that she had then become of age. If it be a fact that the ward was then of age she was competent to sign the satisfaction, because that fact alone terminated the guardianship. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1760.) The subsequent attack, which was made upon this satisfaction, was confined to the ground that it was in fraud of the creditors of the ward, and at no stage of the proceedings is it suggested that she was not of age and competent to give satisfaction of judgment at the time this document was executed. Such being

the case those dealing with the property in Alameda County were not charged to look further than the fact that the judgment from which the lien arose had been satisfied by the actual plaintiff in the case in a manner and form fully meeting all the legal requirements.

If the ward had not reached her majority, and if the satisfaction had been procured by the defendant or her agents through fraud upon the ward, then the trustees under defendant's deed of trust and those deraigning title through them might be charged with the fraud, but there is no evidence of any such facts in the record. [3] The lien upon the property having been discharged by satisfaction of the judgment it could not be restored except by the recordation anew of a transcript of judgment as required by section 674 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

[4] The filing of notice of the pendency of the new action to set aside the satisfaction as fraudulent to the creditors of the ward was not sufficient to put defendants on notice, as the title had previously been legally transferred by the defendant in the original action. The respondents accordingly took free from the cloud of the proceedings pending in San Francisco County and were entitled to judgment.

For these reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Waste, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred

[Civ. No. 2908. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-June 28, 1919.]

AMY PEMBERTON, Respondent, v. EDWARD ARNY, Appellant.

[1] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-REGULATION OF STREET TRAFFIC-DUTY OF DRIVER TURNING CORNER- - CONFLICT OF ORDINANCE WITH STATE LAW.-A municipal ordinance which provides that "the driver of any vehicle, in turning to the right from one street to another, shall turn the corner as near the right-hand curb as possible," is not in conflict with the provision of the Motor Vehicle Act that "all vehicles approaching an intersection of a street, road

or highway, with the intention of turning thereat shall in turning to the right keep to the right of the center of such intersection." A municipal corporation operating under a freeholders' charter which gives it plenary control over all uses of its streets may by ordinance increase the limitation placed by the state upon the driver's freedom of discretion in handling his machine.

[2] ID.-ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES-INSTRUCTION IN LANGUAGE OF VEHICLE ACT NOT ERROR.-In an action for damages for personal injuries received through having been struck by an automobile driven by the defendant, the giving of an instruction, in the language of subdivision j of section 20 of the Motor Vehicle Act of 1913, that the statute law of the state requires the driver of an automobile before changing his course "to first see that there is sufficient space for such movement to be made in safety" is not error.

[3] ID.-MEANING OF LAW UNCERTAIN-REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION -INSTRUCTIONS-WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS.-If the terms of a statute are ambiguous and open to conflicting constructions, a party not satisfied with the giving of an instruction in the language of the statute may ask the court to interpret it to the jury; and in the absence of any request for an interpretation of the words as used in the legislative enactment, there is no error in incorporating the precise words of the statute in an instruction.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Frederick W. Houser, Judge.

Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Phil M. Swaffield and Roland G. Swaffield for Appellant. Charles W. Fourl and Ingle Carpenter for Respondent.

SLOANE, J.-In this appeal, which involves an automobile accident, we are satisfied that there can be no justification for setting aside the verdict and reversing the judgment on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. The testimony was conflicting, but if the jury believed the story as told by plaintiff and her witnesses, it was justified in finding both that defendant was guilty of negligence and that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, particularly if the traffic ordinance of the city of Long Beach and the instructions relating thereto were properly submitted to the jury's consideration. The only

question requiring examination arises upon the admission and submission of the ordinance and instructions over defendant's objections.

The injury complained of occurred in the city of Long Beach, and was occasioned by the defendant, in the nighttime, driving his automobile to the right, around a corner, into an intersecting street, and running upon the plaintiff on the cross-walk of the street into which defendant turned, at a point near the center of the crossing. The court admitted in evidence that portion of the traffic ordinance of the city of Long Beach which provides as follows: "The driver of any vehicle, in turning to the right from one street to another, shall turn the corner as near the righthand curb as possible." In connection therewith the court gave the following instruction to the jury: "The court instructs the jury that the violation of a city ordinance of itself constitutes negligence, and if such violation proximately contributed to the injury complained of, it warrants a recovery for plaintiff, unless you further find plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence; and if in this case you find that the defendant did turn his automobile to the right from Third Street into said Atlantic Avenue in the city of Long Beach, and did not turn his automobile as near the righthand curb as possible, and that said negligence proximately caused the injury complained of, then you must find for the plaintiff, unless you should further find that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, in which event you will find for the defendant." Appellant assigns as error the admission in evidence of this ordinance and the giving of the instruction predicated thereon.

It is contended that the ordinance in question had been superseded by the state law known as the Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1913, p. 647, sec. 20, subd. g), and which covers the act of driving to the right around a corner from one street to another, in the following language: "All vehicles approaching an intersection of a street, road or highway, with the intention of turning thereat shall in turning to the right keep to the right of the center of such intersection." If appellant is correct in his contention that the city ordinance is in conflict with this provision of the state law, and that the state law controls, we think it clear that the admission of the evidence and giving of the instruction complained of