the meaning or contemplation of subdivision 2 of section 25, article IV, of the state constitution, since it applies to all children under fourteen years of age.

[6] ID.-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW-UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE PUNISHMENT.-Section 288 of the Penal Code is not subject to the objection that it denies to persons prosecuted under its provisions the equal protection of the law contrary to the mandates of the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, upon the theory that, while said section makes the acts therein denounced as criminal a felony, other sections of the Penal Code relating to crimes against children make the acts specified therein misdemeanors only; nor does said section authorize the infliction of unusual punishment within the inhibition in that respect of section 6 of article I of the state constitution. The legislature has authority to fix different penalties to suit different crimes, the penalty in each case being measured or fixed according to the nature of the particular crime and its effect upon society.

[7] ID.-REFERENCE TO "PART TWO" OF CODE-MEANING NOT UNCERTAIN. There is not imparted to section 288 of the Penal Code uncertainty or ambiguity or unintelligibleness as to its meaning or intent by reason of the fact that "part two" instead of "part one" of the Penal Code is therein erroneously referred to as defining crimes involving in their composition, among other elements, that of lewd or lascivious conduct, which specific conduct is by said section excepted from the operation thereof.

[8] ID. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES.-If, by giving to a word or a phrase in a statute its literal meaning, absurd consequences would be the inevitable result, then the literal meaning thereof must be disregarded and such a meaning ascribed thereto, consistent with the general context and the evident object of the act, as will render the act not only consistent in all its parts, but reasonable in its effect, and, therefore, effectual for the purposes for which it was intended.

[9] ID.

OMISSION IN VERDICT AND JUDGMENT-REFERENCE TO INDICTMENT JURISDICTION TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT.-The fact that the verdict and judgment in a prosecution for a violation of section 288 of the Penal Code fails to state or declare that the crime of which the defendant is convicted was committed upon and with the body of the child does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to sentence the defendant to the state prison, where the indictment sufficiently states the offense defined by the statute.

[10] ID.-INDICTMENT NOT INCLUDED IN RECORD ON APPEAL PRESUMPTION AS TO SUFFICIENCY.-Where the verdict recites that the de

7. Effect of mistake in reference in statute to another statute, note, 5 A. L. R. 996.

fendant is guilty "of the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct with a male child under the age of fourteen years, a felony, as charged in the indictment," and the judgment is in similar phraseology, but the indictment is not included in the record on appeal, the appellate tribunal will presume that the indictment sufficiently stated the offense defined by section 288 of the Penal Code by following substantially and in all essential particulars the language thereof.

[11] ID.

SECTION 288, PENAL CODE

- JUVENILE COURT LAW. — Section 288 of the Penal Code has not been repealed by section 28 of the juvenile court law of 1913.

[12] ID. — VIOLATION OF SECTION 288, PENAL CODE - MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PUNISHMENT.-Section 288 of the Penal Code, fixing the penalty for the offense therein defined as imprisonment "in the state prison not less than one year," and section 671 of said code, providing that "whenever any person is declared punishable for a crime by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not less than any specified number of years, and no limit to the duration of such imprisonment is declared, the court authorized to pronounce judgment upon such conviction may, in its discretion, sentence such offender to imprisonment during his natural life, or for any number of years not less than that prescribed," must be read together to ascertain the maximum and the minimum penalties in cases arising under the first-named section.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sacramento County denying a motion to vacate and set aside a conviction and judgment on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Malcolm C. Glenn, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

George D. Collins, Jr., for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and J. Charles Jones, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

HART, J.-On the 16th of October, 1914, defendant, having been convicted by a jury of the crime of "lewd and lascivious conduct with and upon the body of a male child under the age of fourteen years, was sentenced by the superior court of the county of Sacramento to imprisonment in the state prison for the term of fifteen years.

12. Indeterminate sentence as cruel and unusual punishment, note, L. R. A. 1915C, 560.

On the twenty-first day of January, 1919, defendant made a motion "that an order be made and entered herein vacating and setting aside the conviction and judgment for want of jurisdiction in said court." An order to show cause was issued and, after a hearing, the motion was by the court denied and the defendant remanded to the custody of the warden of the state prison. The appeal is by the defendant from the order denying said motion.

It is stated in the grounds of appeal that said order is "contrary to law and that said conviction and judgment are void on the face of the record, for want of jurisdiction in said superior court over the subject matter of the action and that said judgment in said action is also void because in excess of the authority of said superior court to the extent that the sentence therein specified exceeds the term of five years.'

Defendant was tried and convicted under the provisions of section 288 of the Penal Code, which reads as follows: "Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act other than the acts constituting other crimes provided for in part two of this code upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison not less than one year."

Appellant urges the following points as grounds for reversal of said order: That said section 288 is void for the following reasons: (1) That the same, after being amended in the senate, was not read at length in the assembly; (2) That it is in violation of section 24 of article IV of the constitution, in that the subject of the act is not expressed in the title, but on the contrary the act itself explicitly negatives and contradicts the subject expressed in the title; (3) That it is in violation of subdivisions 2 and 33 of section 25, article IV, of the constitution; (4) That it operates to deny to the defendant the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States; (5) That it operates to deprive defendant of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth

amendment; (6) That the act is incurably uncertain, vague and unintelligible in that it cannot be ascertained what lewd. and lascivious acts are prohibited, as the statute refers to part two of the Penal Code, which relates solely to criminal procedure; and that the courts are denied the power to strike out from said section "part two" and substitute "part one"; that so to amend the section is to deprive defendant of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of said fourteenth amendment; (7) That said section. and said judgment are in violation of article I, section 6, of the constitution, in that they inflict unusual punishment; (8) That the conduct of which defendant has been convicted is made a misdemeanor by sections 273 and 273g of the Penal Code and is, therefore, expressly excluded from section 288; (9) That section 288 has been repealed by section 28 of the juvenile court law of 1913; (10) That by section 18 of the Penal Code the maximum penalty for a violation of section 288 is five years, which the defendant has served.

Most, if indeed, not all, of the objections to section 288 of the Penal Code urged here on constitutional grounds have been decided adversely to the position of the appellant by the courts. The objections will, nevertheless, be given some notice.

[1] 1. It has been so often held in this state that it is no longer an open question that the validity of a statute, which had been duly certified, enrolled and approved, and deposited in the office of the Secretary of State, cannot be impeached by a resort to the journals of the legislature, or by extrinsic evidence of any character. (Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, [89 Am. Dec. 93]; County of Yolo v. Colgan, 132 Cal. 265, [84 Am. St. Rep. 41, 64 Pac. 403]; Kingsbury v. Nye, 9 Cal. App. 574, 577, [99 Pac. 985]. See, also, De Loach et al. v. Newton, 134 Ga. 739, [68 S. E. 708]; State of Washington v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, [23 L. R. A. 340, 34 Pac. 201]; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 672, [36 L. Ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495, see also Rose's U. S. Notes].)

[2] This point requires no further consideration herein than such as is involved in the citation of these cases.

[3] 2. The title to section 288 of the Penal Code, as it was enacted by the legislature of 1901 (Stats. 1901, p. 630),

reads as follows: "An act to amend the Penal Code by adding a new section thereto, to be numbered section two hundred and eighty-two, relating to crimes against children." Thus it will be observed that the title of the act states generally that the crimes which the section is designed to punish are those perpetrated upon or against children. It was not necessary, to make the act conform to the requirements of the constitution in that respect, to embrace in its title a specification of the nature of the crimes to which the section relates; and the courts of this state have held that such a title as was contained in the act in question, being an amendment of one of the codes, sufficiently expresses the subject of the act as required by section 24 of article IV of the constitution. (See People v. Dobbins, 73 Cal. 257, [14 Pac. 860]; Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, [29 Pac. 251]; People v. Lovren, 119 Cal. 88, [51 Pac. 22, 638]; Jackson v. Baehr, 138 Cal. 266, [71 Pac. 167]; County of Butte v. Merrill, 141 Cal. 396, 398, [74 Pac. 1036]; People v. Oates, 142 Cal. 12, [75 Pac. 337]; People v. Merritt, 18 Cal. App. 58, [122 Pac. 839, 844].) [4] Nor can we perceive any merit in the contention that the act itself contradicts or is in any wise inconsistent with its title. The title, as we have seen, declares that the subject of the act involves certain crimes against children, and the act itself specifically sets forth the acts constituting the crimes to which the title refers. In other words, the title declares in general terms the nature of the legislation of which it is a sort of preamble and that it has relation to certain crimes against children, and the act itself describes or defines the particular kind of act constituting the crime. thus intended to be included among those provided for in other sections of the Penal Code against the same class of persons and which define as such crimes acts of a different nature from that constituting the basis of the legislation. involved in section 288. It is, therefore, very clear that, when compared to the act itself, no inconsistency between them can be discerned, nor can it be said, when so compared, that the title is misleading or calculated to deceive or convey an erroneous impression as to the subject of the legislation involved in the act.

[5] 3. Section 288 does not involve special legislation within the meaning or contemplation of subdivision 2 of