died in a hospital not long after. The only substantial difference in the testimony as between the witnesses for the prosecution and the defendant was that the defendant testified that after French had retreated through the front door he again advanced upon him (appellant) in a threatening manner and that he (appellant) believed that French was again about to attack him; that so believing, he fired the fatal shots.

[2] The appellant relied for his exoneration upon the claim that he acted in necessary self-defense. This claim was given very full presentation to the jury by instructions as read by the court. We have made a particularly close examination of those instructions and we think that they were not only fair, but exceedingly full, and prepared with a view to thoroughly cover the case. As we read them, they present a full exposition of the law touching the matter of self-defense. Instructions were not wanting in the advice to the jury that if the defendant believed as a reasonable man that he was about to suffer great bodily injury at the hands of French, he would be justified in using his deadly weapon and killing his antagonist. The crime of murder and its degrees were carefully analyzed by the court, as was the offense of manslaughter included therein. To say that the jury would have been altogether justified under the evidence in returning a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, instead of murder of the second degree, does not help the case of appellant on this appeal at all. It was for the jury to determine the degree or character of crime which had been committed. Evidently it concluded, as it had a right to do under the evidence, that French was in retreat and was going away and had abandoned the quarrel when he was shot and killed. There was evidence, as we have noted, to fully sustain such a verdict. On the other hand, had the jury concluded, as appellant insisted, that French was advancing upon him, threatening him with an assault, and that he feared great bodily harm at the hands of deceased, then a verdict of acquittal would have no doubt been rendered. If it had concluded that there was no deliberate intent involved in the act, but that appellant shot upon a sudden and unpremeditated impulse of passion, a verdict of manslaughter might have been rendered. We think it unnecessary to here repeat the

text of the instructions given by the court in the lengthy charge delivered. It will suffice to state again that that charge seems to us to completely cover the case and to present fully all of the propositions important to the appellant's defense. The instructions refused and for which error is claimed either contained matter sufficiently covered by the charge given by the court, or contained matter not clearly material to a sufficient exposition of the law as applied to the case.

The judgment and order are affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., and Shaw, J., concurred.

[Crim. No. 672. Second Appellate District, Division One.-July 29, 1919.].

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. BERNARDINO CASTRO, Appellant.

[1] CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-LIMITATION OF ARGUMENT-ERROR.-In a prosecution for murder, the error, if any, of the trial court in fixing a limitation of two and one-half hours to each side for argument will not constitute sufficient ground for the reversal of the judgment of conviction where, upon objections being made by counsel for defendant, the district attorney gave them one-half hour of his time, and on the argument they used an additional fifteen minutes thereof, and there is no showing that the time actually accorded counsel for argument was inadequate.

[2] ID. REFUSAL OF INSTRUCTIONS-REVIEW-INSUFFICIENT BRIEFS.Alleged error of the trial court in refusing to give certain requested instructions will not be reviewed on appeal where counsel for appellant merely refers to the pages of the transcript where such instruction will be found but does not point out wherein the court's rulings were erroneous, nor cite authorities in support of such contention.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Gavin W. Craig, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

R. J. Adcock and M. G. Phillips for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Deputy Attorney-General, and Jerry H. Powell for Respondent.

SHAW, J.-Defendant was charged with the crime of murder. The trial commenced on April 14th and ended on April 17th, with a verdict convicting him of murder in the second degree.

At the close of the evidence the court, addressing counsel, asked how much time they desired in which to argue the case, to which Mr. Adcock, one of defendant's attorneys, replied that he would like two hours for himself, stating that they had been three days introducing the testimony; and Mr. Phillips, another attorney for defendant, replied that he took two hours at the last trial. Thereupon the court fixed two and one-half hours as the time allotted to each side for argument, saying: "You can apportion it to suit yourselves." No objection other than as stated appears to have been made to the action of the court. Thereafter defendant moved for a new trial and presented an affidavit to the effect that the action of the court in so limiting the time for argument was prejudicial to defendant in that the time was inadequate for defendant's counsel to fairly and properly review the evidence and present argument based thereon in his behalf, on account of which many important things were necessarily omitted which otherwise could have been presented. A counter-affidavit was filed by the district attorney to the effect that when the court fixed the time allotted for argument defendant's counsel announced they would like longer time, and thereupon the district attorney gave them one-half hour of his time, which, together with an additional fifteen minutes they used, thus consuming in all a period of three hours and fifteen minutes in the argument; and, further, that there is nothing in the cause which required a longer period for the proper presentation of the defense.

[1] Under this state of the record, even were it conceded that the limitation of two hours and a half so accorded defendant for arguing the case was an abuse of discretion on the part of the court, there is nothing in the record to show that the additional three-quarters of an hour was not ample and all required by counsel for the purpose of arguing the case; hence, if the court erred in fixing the time,

such error must be deemed to have been cured by the fact that additional time was granted, and, as thus extended, it is not claimed or shown that the time actually accorded counsel for argument was inadequate.

[2] Another point urged by appellant for a reversal is the ruling of the court in refusing instructions requested by defendant. The sole argument upon the point is as follows: "We also urge the point, with emphasis, that the refusal of the court to give each and all of the instructions found in the clerk's transcript on pages 32, 33, 34, 35, 39 was prejudicial error and withdrew a full consideration of the case from the minds of the jury.' To determine whether or not there is any merit in appellant's contention would necessitate an independent examination and inquiry as to the correctness of the ruling, and this we do not feel inclined to make. (People v. Woon Tuck Wo, 120 Cal. 297, [52 Pac. 833].) A sufficient answer to the argument presented is to quote from People v. McLean, 135 Cal. 306, [67 Pac. 770], where it is said: "We again repeat what we have said before, that we will not examine alleged errors presented in this way. It is due to this court from the members of the bar to point out clearly and concisely the rulings complained of as erroneous and the reasons why they are so, with ref erence to authorities, if any. In case counsel will not take the trouble to do so, we shall deem the matter as of not sufficient importance to merit notice in an opinion," To like effect is People v. Ruiz, 39 Cal. App. 593, [179 Pac. 691].

The judgment is affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2145. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-July 29, 1919.].

EUGENE L. KLEIN, Respondent, v. SAN PEDRO, LOS ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAILROAD COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant.

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[1] FLOOD WATERS-IMPROPER CONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGE-DIVERSION OF WATERS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY EVIDENCE. - In this action for damages to real property alleged to have been caused by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant railway company in so constructing a trestle bridge and a rock bulkhead across and within an arroyo as to obstruct the same in time of flood and to cause the water therein to be dammed up and diverted from its regular course and channel over and across the real property of plaintiff, cutting and washing it away, there having been a conflict of evidence on the question as to whether the bridge was constructed with due care and engineering skill, the court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Frederick W. Houser, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

James E. Kelby and A. S. Halsted for Appellant.

Oliver O. Clark for Respondent.

THOMAS, J.-In his complaint plaintiff alleged that he had sustained certain damages to his real property adjacent to and abutting upon the Arroyo Seco, in the city of Los Angeles, by reason of the wrongful acts of defendant in so constructing (1) its railroad trestle bridge, and (2) a certain rock bulkhead across and within said Arroyo Seco, as to obstruct the same in time of flood, and to cause the water therein to be dammed up and diverted from its regular course and channel over and across the real property of plaintiff, cutting and washing it away. There was a verdict for plaintiff for one thousand dollars, and judgment was accordingly entered in his favor. Defendant filed a motion. for a new trial, which was denied. From the order denying said motion, and the judgment so entered, defendant appeals.