Under the hold

to the notary that he executed the same. ing of this court in Anderson v. Aronsohn, 28 Cal. App. Dec. 216, this was sufficient basis for the statement contained in the certificate that the notary knew "that the person making such acknowledgment is the person who is described in and who executed the instrument." The certificate stated the absolute truth, although, according to this. record, Canfield was a liar and a forger. Had "Rabild" come to this notary alone, with the deed already signed, accompanied by no one whom the notary knew, and had asked him to acknowledge the same, another question would be before us. In that case we think the "satisfactory evidence," referred to in the section, would have to be received. This latter evidence, however, was not necessary under the facts as disclosed here. We are confronted in this case with

a condition, not a theory. Such being true, this court will never knowingly mulct any person for telling the truth and acting honestly.

Our attention is called to the case of Joost v. Craig, 131 Cal. 504, [82 Am. St. Rep. 374, 63 Pac. 840], as supporting appellant's position here. We do not think that case in point. In that case the certificate was, in fact, false. In this case it is true. In that case it was said: "If the deed is not genuine, but is false, the notary and his sureties ought to be held for all damages, unless they have taken the precautions expressly required by statute." That, we think, is tantamount to saying that if the deed is genuine the notary, or his sureties, ought not to be held for any damages, even though they have not taken such precautions. In the case at bar, the deed was genuine. True, it was executed by Canfield under said assumed name-Rabild. Under this assumed name, however, as before stated, he opened his bank account at Monrovia. Under this assumed name he was known to the banker. To him he was Mr. Rabild of Monrovia-the very man mentioned in the body of the deed, and, as appellant urges in his brief, who "signed the name. Helmer E. Rabild in the presence of defendant Rives and requested the notary to certify his acknowledgment thereof." This deed was genuine, and the certificate of acknowledg ment attached thereto was true. In such case there can be no liability on the part of the notary, under section 801 of the Political Code, or any other statute. As was sail

in the case of Anderson v. Aronsohn, supra: "The case of Joost v. Craig, 131 Cal. 504, [82 Am. St. Rep. 374, 63 Pac. 840], clearly recognizes a situation in which a notary may comply with the law and yet be honestly mistaken, and injury result to innocent parties by reason of his mistake, and yet the notary not be liable." The same is true here. It is further said in the Joost case: "The certificate here gave assurance that the notary knew of his own knowledge, and not by mere hearsay, that the grantor was Charles A. Anderson of Redwood City. If this was not true, the notary should be held." The foregoing is tantamount to saying, and we think it does say, by a perfectly rational inference to be deduced therefrom, that if the certificate was true, the notary should not be held liable, regardless of whether the information upon which he based such certificate was hearsay or otherwise.

There is no doubt but that the first deed-the alleged deed from Kelsey and wife to "Helmer E. Rabild"-was a forgery. Nor is there room for argument that the second deed the deed from "Rabild" to Brown, plaintiff herewas genuine. The only trouble with this deed was that it conveyed nothing, the grantor having nothing to convey, for reasons that are obvious. To hold that the notary and his sureties were liable, as contended for by appellant, whenever for some reason there appeared some flaw in the title to the property sought to be conveyed by such deed, or because the grantor in such instrument had no title to convey, and under such circumstances as disclosed by the record here, would be so revolutionary an act on the part of this court that it would cause business to quake to its very foundation. Such certainly cannot be the law. The notary public and his bondsmen are in no sense insurers of the title. It is true that without the certificate of acknowledgment to the purported deed from Rabild to plaintiff, the deed could not legally have been recorded; and if not recorded, it follows that the certificate of title thereafter issued could not have shown the title of record in plaintiff. But the fact that the certificate of title did not so show was not because the notary's certificate of acknowledgment was false, as we have already seen. Under these circumstances, if the said certificate of acknowledgment was true, there was no liability. And it was true.

It was urged on the argument, while conceding the legal right to transact business in that way, that no one has the right to adopt a fictitious or assumed name for the purpose of the commission of a crime. This is true. It is also true that if one does commit a crime under such fictitious or assumed name, and causes a second party to suffer damages (as was done by Canfield to plaintiff here), still that fact alone is not the basis, legal or otherwise, for the predication of an action for the recovery of such damages against a third party, who knew absolutely nothing of such fact, and who has acted honestly, and certified correctly, in so far as whatever he did had to do with the case is concerned.

In view of these conclusions we think no other point urged needs consideration.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Finlayson, P. J., and Sloane, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on September 25, 1919, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:

THE COURT.-The application for a hearing in this court after decision by the district court of appeal of the second appellate district, division two, is denied.

[1] We base our denial solely upon the fact that it clearly appears that any negligence on the part of the notary, Rives, was not a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff.

We deem it proper to further point out that in the case of Anderson v. Aronsohn, 28 Cal. App. Dec. 216, which is referred to in the opinion, the decision of the district court of appeal was vacated by this court and the cause ordered to a hearing herein, where it is now pending.

All the Justices concurred.

REPORTER'S NOTE: The decision of the district court of appeal in Anderson v. Aronsohn, referred to supra, was, on hearing in the supreme court, reversed. (See 181 Cal. 294, [184 Pac. 12].)

[Crim. No. 662. Second Appellate District, Division One.-July 29, 1919.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MEYER DIAMONDSTEIN, Appellant.

[1] CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY BY COUNTY— SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION.-An information charging the lar ceny of one electric motor, the property of "Ventura County, a political corporation in the State of California," is sufficient in its allegation as to the ownership of the property.

[2] ID.-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY-VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND PROOF IMMATERIAL.-In a prosecution for larceny, unless there is a material variance between the ownership charged and that proved, the manner in which such ownership is alleged is not important, further than to show that the property taken was not the property of a defendant charged with larceny.

[3] ID.-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP.-In this prosecution for the stealing of an electric motor used in raising water for the sprinkling of public roads, while the testimony of none of the witnesses in words was of the direct import that the motor charged to have been stolen belonged to the county of Ventura, there was testimony from which the jury was authorized to conclude that the ownership was as charged.

[4] ID. GUILT OF DEFENDANT

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In this prosecution for the stealing of an electric motor used in raising water for the sprinkling of public roads, from the facts that the accused took an active part in the sale of the motor and gave evidence at the time of such sale that he was interested in the proceeds, that he and his truck were seen in a neighboring city on the evening previous to such sale in company with another who later confessed to the commission of the crime, that his truck was employed transporting the stolen goods, and the other evidence in the case, the jury was justified in concluding that the defendant was a participant in the commission of the crime. [5] ID. PARTICIPATION BY DEFENDANT-INSTRUCTIONS.-In a prosecution for larceny, an instruction that if the jury should find that the defendant "feloniously" took the property described in the information, or aided or abetted in the taking of the property, they should find him guilty, does not constitute an instruction to the jury that the defendant should be convicted if he is shown to have been in possession of the stolen property after the commission of the alleged crime.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ventura County, and from an order denying a new trial. Merle J. Rogers, Judge. Judgment and order affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Frank Dominguez and Paul W. Schenck for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, Joseph L. Lewinsohn, Deputy Attorney-General, and Jerry H. Powell for Respondent.

JAMES, J.-Appellant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, the particular charge being that he feloniously took and carried away one electric motor, the property of the county of Ventura, of the value of $75. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

[1] It is first contended that the information, was insufficient in its allegation as to the ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen. The language of the information was that the motor was the property of "Ventura County, a political corporation in the State of California." The contention of appellant under this head is that, as the Penal Code, section 484, defines larceny as "the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading, or driving away the personal property of another," it is not sufficient to show ownership in a county. As defined by section 7 of the Penal Code, the word "person" includes a corporation as well as a natural person. While the political subdivision of the state denominated a "county" is not in strictness a corporation, at the same time it requires no stretching of the plain intent of the criminal statute to say that it was designed to make punishable the stealing of personal property from any ownership whatsoever. Appellant's counsel argue that the ownership should have been alleged to be in the taxpayers of the county. If, indeed, it may be said that the taxpayers in their collective capacity do hold the ownership of property used in the conduct of the county government, then we may at once answer that the charging of such ownership as being in the county itself is no different from charging it in the manner suggested, for the term would then mean the same thing. We are only conceding for the sake of the argument that the taxpayers collectively may be said to own the county's property, but think that this is not true as a legal proposition-we think it is not more true that the ultimate ownership resides in the taxpayers than that it may