logically follows, then, that where the statute provides, as is the case here, for the compensation of a public officer, and further provides that such compensation shall be in full payment for all services of any kind and description rendered by such officer as such, there can be no other meaning to such statute than that the compensation so provided for shall be in full for all services required to be rendered by such officer, regardless of who actually performs the services-whether the officer himself or an authorized deputy appointed to assist him in the performance of the duties of the office, and [9] it also follows that where there is no law providing compensation to be paid to a deputy under a public officer out of the public treasury, such deputy is not entitled to and cannot legally claim compensation to be so paid, nor can his principal claim the right to be paid compensation for such deputy. [10] Neither section 4044 of the Political Code nor, so far as we are advised, any other code section or statute, contains any express provision or authority for the payment of compensation to a deputy or to deputies in the office of the county surveyor of Siskiyou County. The section named merely provides, as stated, for the compensation of the surveyor himself, and section 4290 of said code plainly and unambiguously declares that the compensation so authorized shall be in full for all services of any kind and description rendered by the surveyor. We must hold that these sections mean precisely what their very plain and unambiguous language clearly implies. To hold otherwise, or as appellant construes section 4044, would compel us to import into said section language or a provision which it does not contain, or under a fair and reasonable view thereof, it does not contemplate. Moreover, construed as appellant views its language, said section would violate the provisions of article XI, section 9, of the constitution, in that it would result in increasing the compensation of the surveyor during the term for which he was elected. As above pointed out, even the legislature itself has no power to do this, and in no event could the supervisors legally do such an act, even if the legislature were to attempt to confer upon them such power. (Dougherty v. Austin, supra.) An act which the constitution says cannot be done directly obviously cannot

be done indirectly, and, therefore, the position of the appellant that he, and not his deputies, is entitled to compensation to be paid by the county for services rendered the county by such deputies involves, if by such means the deputies are to be compensated, a proposition sanctioning the doing of an act by indirection which the constitution plainly declares cannot be done directly; and if, on the other hand, the position is that the surveyor himself is entitled to receive more compensation than the maximum amount to which he may, by authority of law and the action of the supervisors, be entitled, then, as already shown, it would involve a proposition diametrically opposed to the mandate of the constitution that the compensation of a county officer shall not be increased after his election or during his term of office.

It would hardly seem necessary to cite cases to support the above construction of section 4044 of the Political Code, nor do we intend to do so at length herein, but the Indiana case of State ex rel. Holman v. Roach, Auditor, 123 Ind. 167, [24 N. E. 106], so closely resembles the instant case in its facts that we feel that no apology should be required for reproducing herein certain observations from the opinion therein which, it will readily be noted, have cogent application to several of the features of this case. Indeed, strange as the coincidence may appear, that case was one in which a county surveyor made precisely the same claim that appellant here makes, viz., that, under a statute in all respects similar to our section 4044 of the Political Code, he was entitled to receive or to be paid from the public treasury a certain specified per diem for each of his deputies, notwithstanding that there was no provision of law expressly or otherwise authorizing the payment of compensation to deputies in the office of the county surveyor from public funds. The court, in that case, after laying down and buttressing by innumerable authorities the elementary rule that "where a public officer claims a compensation for official services, he must show either a statute authorizing such compensation, or a contract with someone who has the authority to bind the county," said: "It follows that, as there is no statute fixing any compensation to be paid deputy surveyors for services rendered to the county,

or to anyone else, the county cannot be required to pay for such services. It is believed to be the universal rule that, where the law fixes no compensation for deputies, they must be paid by the officer who employs them, and not out of the public treasury. To hold that a county surveyor could perform the work required of him under this statute by deputy, and charge per diem fixed by law for each day such deputy served, would be to open the door to the grossest frauds. It would allow the surveyor to employ persons less skillful and competent than himself, at a small compensation, and thus speculate upon the public. If he employed five deputies in one day at $1.50 each and charge three dollars for his own services, he would receive a per diem of ten dollars and fifty cents, instead of three dollars as the law provides. We do not think this law should receive the construction contended for by the relator."

[11] Nor can the surveyor demand the payment of six or ten dollars per diem for services performed by each or any of his deputies upon the theory that such per diem constitutes the expenses necessary for conducting the duties of his office as the law requires. While not a question necessary to be decided here, we may venture the opinion that the surveyors of counties of the class to which Siskiyou is assigned under the legislative classification of counties. are entitled to be reimbursed by the counties for any necessary and legitimate expenses incurred in the discharge of their official duties. But we do not understand that appellant claims such per diem for his deputies as expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of the duties of his office. His position is, as above stated and considered, that the per diem he claims for each of his deputies is compensation for services rendered by him as surveyor through or by such deputies, a proposition which, as we have shown, is clearly untenable.

We have carefully examined the brief of appellant, but we have not thus been convinced that the argument therein advanced sustains his position or that the cases he cites are in point here. [12] It may be true, as counsel suggest, that the compensation allowed the surveyor by section 4044 is wholly inadequate in proportion to the duties required to be rendered by him, but this fact, if it be one, cannot

be made a just basis for a construction of said code section contrary to the plain language of the statute and the manifest intent of the legislature.

The judgment is affirmed.

Burnett, J., and Chipman, P. J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on October 2, 1919.

All the Justices concurred.

[Crim. No. 476. Third Appellate District.-August 4, 1919.] THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. WILLIAM ROSE, Appellant. [1] CRIMINAL LAW- OBTAINING MONEY UNDER FALSE PRETENSES NECESSARY ELEMENTS-INSTRUCTIONS EVIDENCE.-In this prosecution for the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, the court properly instructed the jury that "To constitute the offense charged, four things must concur and four distinct averments must be proved: 1. There must be an intent to defraud; 2. There must be actual fraud committed; 3. False pretenses must be used for the purpose of perpetrating the fraud; and, 4. The fraud must be accomplished by means of false pretenses made use of for the purpose, viz.: they must be the cause which induced the owner to part with his property"; and the jury was warranted in finding from the evidence introduced at the trial that the facts essential to the consummation of the crime charged existed in this case. [2] ID. REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT-RELIANCE UPON EVIDENCE. In this prosecution for the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, there was evidence to justify the theory that the prosecuting witness acted upon the representation by defendant that the check was good for the sum of two hundred dollars, and not upon the assurance of certain other persons that the defendant was a reliable person and that if the check proved "no good" they would indemnify and reimburse him.

[3] ID.-TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICE-SUFFICIENCY OF CORROBORATION.— In a prosecution for the crime of obtaining money under false

2. Giving worthless check as constituting false pretense, notes, 8 Ann. Cas. 1069; 14 Ann. Cas. 510; Ann. Cas. 1916E, 736.

pretenses, the corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice of the defendant need not be by evidence of itself sufficient to support the charge. If slight, but tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged, it is enough.

[4] ID.

REPRESENTATION THAT CHECK IS GOOD-WHAT IMPLIED.-The representation that a check is good necessarily carries with it the representation that the check is good for what it appears upon its face to be worth.

[5] ID.-CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES-REVIEW BY APPELLATE COURT.— The appellate court, even with the added powers vested in it with respect to the review of questions of fact by section 41⁄2 of article VI of the constitution, cannot consider the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the witnesses upon whose testimony the jury presumptively predicated their verdict testified to the truth

or not.

[6] ID.

CONSIDERATION OF TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICE-FAILURE TO INSTRUCT JURY-WHEN ERROR NOT PREJUDICIAL.-The defendant in a prosecution for the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses cannot predicate error on the failure of the court to instruct the jury "that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust," where he did not request the court to give such instruction, and, with the testimony of the alleged accomplice eliminated from the record, or wholly disregarded, the verdict would still have ample support.

[7] ID.-ELECTION TO WAIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL NOT GROUND FOR REVERSAL.-Where the defendant, a man of intelligence and more or less familiar with the general rights of an accused on trial in the courts and with the methods of conducting jury trials, upon being arraigned upon the information, was asked by the court if he had or wanted counsel to conduct his defense, and he replied that he would attend to that matter, and he did not thereafter ask or request the court to appoint an attorney to defend him, but appeared at the trial without an attorney, announced himself ready when the case was called for trial, and himself managed and presented at the trial his own defense, his election to waive the assistance of a lawyer and to manage his own defense cannot be held a ground for reversal of the cause.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, and from an order denying a new trial. Malcolm C. Glenn, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

6. Necessity as to cautionary instruction as to conviction upon uncorroborated evidence of accomplice, note, 15 Ann. Cas. 699.