in the morning, of having that morning told his father of the meeting, and of his father laughing and crying because of his happiness at its outcome. The son testified that one Reva, a former wife of his brother, was present at the meeting. In the same letter the plaintiff wrote that he "did not tell Otto or Reva anything, just to see what they would say, and they both said, 'I hope you and Sadie go back together. I'm so happy I don't know which way to turn.' In this and numerous other letters he urged his wife to burn the letter. It is inconceivable that if the father and Reva were present at the meeting he should have told his father about it on his return to Willows the next morning or that Reva did not know all about what took place.

In this case the plaintiff had also alleged acts of extreme cruelty on the part of his wife, upon which a very large amount of extremely noisome evidence was introduced by and on behalf of the plaintiff. The trial court found that the charges of extreme cruelty were not sustained. The plaintiff's statements under oath in support of those charges were corroborated in many particulars by the evidence of members of his family. If his statements were true, the charges were amply proved. The finding of the court that they were not proved irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff, considered as a witness, was within the rule that a witness false in one particular is to be distrusted in others. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2061, subd. 3.) It is not necessary to proceed further with an analysis of the evidence. If the errors at law did not require the reversal of the judgment, this court would be compelled to sustain the appellant's attack upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.

The judgment is reversed.

Langdon, P. J., and Haven, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on September 11, 1919, and a petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on October 9, 1919, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:

THE COURT.-The application for a hearing in this court, after decision by the district court of appeal of the first appellate district, division two, is denied.

In denying the application we withhold our approval from that portion of the opinion dealing with the question of the admissibility of the deposition of one "EM" referred to therein. The determination of this question is not essential to the reversal of the judgment.

All the Justices concurred, except Olney, J., who was absent.

[Civ. No. 2772. First Appellate District, Division Two.-August 12, 1919.]

ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. MIDLAND COUNTIES PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION (a Corporation), Appellant.

[1] NEGLIGENCE- GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRICITY DUTY TO MAKE WIRES SAFE.-The duty of a public service corporation engaged in the business of generating and transmitting electricity is not an absolute duty to insulate or make its wires safe in any particular manner; its duty is to make the wires safe under all the exigencies offered by the surrounding circumstances. [2] ID.-BREAKING OF GUY WIRE

- ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIESDUTY TO ANTICIPATE ACCIDENT-ELEMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED.—In an action for damages for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, a public service corporation engaged in the business of generating and transmitting electricity, in failing to take proper precautions against the breaking of its guy wires in such a way as to convey electricity from its live wires to a person on the ground, in determining whether the accident was

1. Duties and liabilities of electric companies, notes, 100 Am. St. Rep. 516; 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 587.

2. Liability of one maintaining electric wires over private property, as distinguished from public highway, for injuries received by adult coming in contact therewith, notes, 21 Ann. Cas. 374; Ann. Cas. 1918C, 594; 46 L. R. A. 97.

one which the defendant should have anticipated and guarded against, the jury should take into consideration the nature of the country in which the pole was situated, the occupations of the persons living thereabouts, the usual precautions taken by electric companies under similar circumstances, and such matters.

[3] ID. EXERCISE OF PROPER CARE PRESUMPTION THAT JURY FOL LOWED INSTRUCTION-VERDICT.-Where, in such an action, the jury was instructed that the owner or operator of an electric plant is not an insurer against injury to other persons; that it has done all the law requires it to do if it has exercised the care in the matter of the construction and maintenance, operation, and inspection of its plant necessary so that the same will not be a source of danger or injury to persons lawfully in the pursuit of their business or pleasure, and that the care which the law exacts from any corporation engaged in operating such an instrumentality is always in proportion to the degree of danger reasonably to be apprehended from the use of the means employed, the appellate court must presume that the jury followed such instruction and, it having rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, that it found that the breaking of the guy wire in question was a danger reasonably to be apprehended.

[4] ID.-DUTY TO ANTICIPATE ACCIDENT.-In this action, in view of the testimony concerning the known ways and means of so insulating guy wires as to eliminate danger to persons on the ground and the use for farming purposes of the field in which the pole was situated, the jury were justified in concluding that the defendant should have anticipated that the guy wire might be subjected to sufficient strain by contact with the usual instrumentalities employed in farming operations to cause a breaking or tearing away of the strands of the wire and a consequent sagging of the wire, and should have insulated its guy wires so as to avoid danger to others in the event of such occurrence.

[5] ID.-ACCIDENT DUE TO INTERVENING CAUSE-DUTY TO ANTICIPATE -PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY.-Where the negligence of the defendant in failing to properly insulate its guy wires would not have caused the injury but for the entanglement of the horse in such wire, but this latter event, in view of the physical conditions of the country where the pole was situated and the use to which the land was put, was one which the defendant should have anticipated, its negligence and not the entanglement of the horse was the proximate cause of the injury.

[6] ID. RIGHT TO ASSUME GUY WIRE SAFE.-A person working around such a guy wire has a right to assume that it is safe, either by reason of its strength or by reason of proper insulation.

5. Proximate cause and intervening condition, note, 1 Ann. Cas, 230.

[7] ID.-ACTION BY INSURANCE COMPANY - ALLEGATION OF STATUS OMISSION OF IMPLIED ALLEGATION.-In an action by an insurance company on a subrogated claim for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, an allegation that prior to the date on which the accident happened the plaintiff, by its policy of insurance in writing, did insure a certain employer and its employees (which included the injured person) at the time of the making of the policy; that said policy was written under and in conformity with the terms of a certain act of the legislature, designated as the "Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act," etc., carries with it an implied allegation that the plaintiff is an insurance carrier. The omission of an allegation necessarily implied from other allegations is immaterial.

[8] ID. INSUFFICIENT EXECUTION OF POLICY-RATIFICATION BY PAYMENT RIGHT TO SUBROGATION.-In this action by an insurance company on a subrogated claim for personal injuries, were it true that proof of the execution of the policy was insufficient, there was sufficient proof that the company ratified its policy and paid the money to the injured employee under said policy. In either event the claim would be lawful, and the insurance company would be entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. H. Z. Austin, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Short & Sutherland and Carl E. Lindsay for Appellant. Everts & Ewing and M. K. Wild for Respondent.

LANGDON, P. J.-This is an appeal from a judgment rendered on a verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of thirteen thousand dollars. The plaintiff claims to be subrogated to the rights of one A. J. Bellah to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been received by him. by reason of the negligence of the defendant. The injured man was a farm-hand and was in the employ of one Max Flentge at the time of the accident. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the employer and employee were within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and that the plaintiff was the insurance carrier of the employer and paid the claim of the employee and in consequence succeeded to his rights against the defendant.

The facts of the case, in so far as they involve the merits, are as follows: The defendant was a public service corporation engaged in the business of generating and transmitting electricity in the county of Fresno and elsewhere. It had a line of poles running along the county highway into the town of Coalinga, on which poles ran the high-power lines of the company. The pole involved here was situated on the land leased and cultivated by the employer and along the line of the county road about eight or ten feet inside the line. It was guyed by wires running from a point near the top of the pole to the ground on either side. Some of the wires on this pole were dead, but the lower wires, with which we are concerned here, were carrying a load of ten thousand volts of electricity. The guy wires were insulated at a point where, had they broken near the ground and fallen in a perpendicular line from the top of the pole, the insulation would have been below the lowest live wire and the electricity could not have traveled down their length to the injury of anyone upon the ground. On the day of the accident A. H. Bellah, the injured man, was working in company with another man, Wagner, in mowing around the edge of a field of barley. He had a team of horses, as also had his companion. Desiring to eat their luncheon at the place where they found themselves at the noon hour, they unhitched their horses and allowed them to graze, and retired themselves to the shade of the wagon to rest. One of Bellah's horses was a "snorting" colt, and he hitched it to an older horse. The older horse in some way got astraddle of the guy wire of the defendant. Bellah attempted to back it off of the wire. There is conflicting testimony regarding the amount of strain put upon the wire by the horse during Bellah's attempt to release it. One witness testified that the horse was plunging and kicking, but Bellah testified that he was not plunging. But, at any rate, while Bellah was attempting to push and back the horse off of the wire, and had placed the bit in its mouth and was holding on to the ring thereof, several of the strands of the guy wire became detached from the top of the pole, causing the guy wire to sag and come in contact with a live wire at a point below the insulation; the electricity was conveyed down the guy wire into the body. of the horse, which was killed by the shock, and Bellah, who was holding on to the bit, received a severe shock, which