that it was written all at one time, and was to be construed as a single instrument expressive of the will of the testator. [3] ID. CONSTRUCTION OF TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENCY OF INSTRUMENT. Such instrument, as construed by the trial court to read: "4/12/17th. "Maude Clark, 351 Jones Street, Brookfield Apartments, Apartment 201, I leave her $2000.00 more, cash money. "My mind is clear. I leave her all. "JACK OLSSEN. "JACK OLSSEN." was a sufficiently intelligible and properly executed writing to constitute an olographic will, and was properly admitted to probate. APPEAL from an order and decree of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco admitting an olographic will to probate. Thomas F. Graham, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Ambrose Gherini, Edwin H. Williams and J. Edwin Lyons for Appellants. Samuel M. Shortridge and J. E. Harper for Respondent. RICHARDS, J.-This is an appeal from an order and decree admitting the olographic will of one Jack Olssen to Probate upon the petition of the devisee named therein. The following is a copy of the document in question: "4/12/17th. "mod clark 351 jones st progfeeld Apa Aparmass 201 I leev hore $2000.00 more cash mony "My my is cleere i leev hore alle "JACK OLSSEN "JACK OLSSEN." The trial court in its findings construed the above document, with the proper spelling of the words therein, to read. as follows: 3. Necessity and sufficiency of attestation of olographic will, notes, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1305; 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 968. Rule that olographic will must be found among "valuable papers," note, 5 Ann. Cas. 636. 42 Cal. App.-42 "4/12/17th. "Maude Clark, 351 Jones Street, Brookfield Apartments, Apartment 201, I leave her $2000.00 more, cash money. "My mind is clear. I leave her all. "JACK OLSSEN. "JACK OLSSEN." To this reading the appellants offer no particular objection, but insist that the original document, even with this reading, has not the qualities of an olographic will, and is otherwise too indefinite as to its intent to be given effect. [1] The first arrow of the appellants is aimed at the date of the instrument, but we think this assault is sufficiently met by the decision of the supreme court in the matter of the Estate of Chevallier, 159 Cal. 161, [113 Pac. 130], in which the figures "4-14-07" were held to amount to a sufficient dating of an olographic will. The appellant insists that the addition of the letters "th," in connection with the figures at the head of the instrument in question here, renders their meaning uncertain, but we think that this is a hypercriticism, and that no real distinction can be found between the two cases. [2] The appellants' next contention is that even if the instrument shall be held to be sufficiently dated, and signed, as to the first portion thereof, the closing clause of the document must be regarded as an undated codicil. This question, however, must be determined by the circumstances under which the instrument was drawn, as revealed by the testimony in the case, from which it appears that the testator was on the date which the document bears a patient at the St. Francis Hospital, in San Francisco, where he died five days later, and that, being then on his deathbed, he was observed by his nurse attempting to write something upon a piece of newspaper, and was asked by her if he would like to have some writing paper, and upon his nodding his head affirmatively, she went out and got him a desk pad of writing paper, whereupon he asked her to telephone to the proponent, Maude Clark, which she did within the next ten or fifteen minutes, during which he was writing upon the piece of paper which the nurse identified. He had practically completed such writing when she returned to the room, and, folding up the paper, he put it away. Within a half hour thereafter the proponent of this will came to the room of the testator, when he gave her the folded paper, telling her to take care of it, and not lose it, for it meant a whole lot to her. The folded paper, in the precise form in which the said proponent received it, was produced in court. From these facts we think the trial court was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the instrument in question was written all at one time, and was to be construed as a single instrument expressive of the will of the testator. [3] As such we are satisfied that the reading thereof adopted by the trial court renders it a sufficiently intelligible and properly executed writing to constitute an olographic will, and hence that the trial court was not in error in admitting same to probate. The order and decree are affirmed. Waste, P. J., and Langdon, J., pro tem., concurred. A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgement in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on October 9, 1919. All the Justices concurred, except Olney, J., who was absent. [Civ. No. 3065. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-August 13, 1919.] EDNA I. BARNABEE, Appellant, v. ROBERT H. HUNSTOCK, Respondent. [1] APPEAL-JUDGMENT-ROLL AS RECORD-AUTHENTICATION BY CLERK.Where the issue presented on appeal depends upon the judgmentroll alone, the clerk's certificate is sufficient to authenticate the record. [2] ID.-ORDER SUBSEQUENT TO JUDGMENT CERTIFICATION BY JUDGE NECESSARY.-Where the order appealed from is subsequent to the judgment and arises on a record outside the judgment-roll, it is not for the clerk, but for the judge who determined the motion, to certify the papers and proceedings on which the order appealed from was made. [3] ID.-INSUFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION OF RECORD AFFIRMANCE OF ORDER. Where the record presented on an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment is not properly authenticated, the proper procedure is to aflirm the order appealed from. APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denying a motion to vacate a judgment. Russ Avery, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Frank C. Hoyt for Appellant. G. C. De Garmo for Respondent. SLOANE, J.-The plaintiff in this action appealed from an order of the trial court denying her motion to vacate a judgment against her. The matter is presented at this time on respondent's motion to affirm the order appealed from, on the ground that the record on appeal contains no bill of exceptions, nor reporter's transcript certified by the judge who tried the cause and made the order, as is provided by section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure. The record on appeal presented here consists of a clerk's transcript containing the judgment-roll, together with certain papers and records purporting to have been used in the proceedings subsequent to judgment on the motion to vacate. These additional records consist of plaintiff's notice of motion, minutes of the court reciting that "plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment heretofore entered herein having been heretofore argued and submitted is now denied," and notice to clerk to prepare a transcript, which requests that, in addition to the judgment-roll, there be inserted therein "a copy of plaintiff's notice of intention to move for vacation of judgment therein, and the proceedings and order, of court denying said motion." This transcript is certified by the clerk, but not by the judge. The grounds of the motion to vacate, as set out by notice. of motion to vacate, are specifications of the insufficiency of the findings of fact made on the trial to support the conclusions of law and judgment. The point in controversy is the sufficiency of this transcript. [1] It is conceded that if the issue presented on the appeal depended upon the judgment-roll alone, the clerk's certificate would be sufficient to authenticate the record. But respondent urges that there is no authority of law, under the procedure prescribed by section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure, to add any portion of the record of proceedings outside the judgment-roll without the approval and certification of the judge before whom the proceedings were had. Such seems to be the plain interpretation of this section. After providing for the stenographic reporter's transcript of the trial, which is required to be authenticated by the judge, the section cited goes on to say: "If the judgment, order or decree appealed from be not included in the judgment-roll, the party desiring to appeal shall on the filing of said notice specify therein such of the pleadings, papers, records and files in said cause as he desires to have incorporated in said transcript in addition to the matters hereinbefore required and the same shall be included." This language clearly refers to the transcript to be presented to and approved and certified by the judge. It is inconsistent with the limitation appellant seeks to place upon it, namely, that "the only transcript which the judge is required or authorized to certify is that containing the testimony and other proceedings which are had in the trials. of issues of fact." The language quoted, and the decision from which it is taken-and on which appellant reliesarose on the record of an appeal taken upon the judgmentroll alone. (Jaques v. Board of Supervisors, 22 Cal. App. 627, [135 Pac. 686].) [2] Where the order appealed from is subsequent to the judgment, and arises on a record outside the judgment-roll, it is not for the clerk, but for the judge who determined the motion, to certify the papers and proceedings on which the order appealed from was made. (Thompson v. American Fruit Co., 21 Cal. App. 338; [131 Pac. 878]; Credit Clearance Bureau v. Weary & Alford Co., 18 Cal. App. 467, [123 Pac. 548]; Totten v. Barlow, 165 Cal. 378, [132 Pac. 749]; Richmond v. Julian Con. Min. Co., 176 Cal. 600, [169 Pac. 356].) [3] That an order affirming the order appealed from is the proper procedure on this motion is held on authority of Hibernia Sav, & Loan Soc. v. Doran, 161 Cal. 118, [118 Pac. 5261, and Knox v. Schrag, 18 Cal. App. 220, [122 Pac. 969]. The order appealed from is affirmed. Finlayson, P. J., and Thomas, J., concurred. |