Co. v. Lockwood, supra; Ex-Mission Land & Water Co. v. Flash, 97 Cal. 636, [32 Pac. 600].) [4] On the retrial, the judgment in which is the basis of this appeal, the plaintiff introduced evidence curing the defect in the first trial, pointed out by the court of appeal, and the record now amply shows that List, prior to August 27, 1908, the date on which he purchased the lots, had knowledge that the corporation desired and intended to purchase the property. The finding of the trial court to that effect is fully supported by the evidence. [5] The trial court found that the fraud practiced by defendant R. D. List on the plaintiff corporation was not discovered by any of its officers or directors until the month of April, 1909. There is ample evidence to sustain this finding, and the finding itself does not appear to be attacked except upon the theory that the recording of the deed. from Withington to List on August 27, 1908, gave notice to the corporation of the fraud. There was no duty resting upon the corporation, or any of its members, on August 27th, to examine the public record of Los Angeles County, nor to anticipate nor to suspect that List would, or even that he was intending to, perpetrate fraud upon the corporation. [6] "Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances 'a prudent man' would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff and he has not availed himself of them does not debar him from relief when thereafter he shall make actual discovery. The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty and the failure to make it a negligent omission. (Bank of Mendocino v. Baker, 82 Cal. 114, [6 L. R. A. 883, 22 Pac. 1037]; Prouty v. Devin, 118 Cal. 258, [50 Pac. 380].) In this case, though means of information were open to the plaintiff, it does not appear that there was any duty devolving upon him to make use of them. Nothing had occurred to excite his suspicion, or to put him upon inquiry, and for these reasons, under the facts of this case, we think the finding of the court sufficient and sufficiently supported by the evidence." (Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 166, [55 Pac. 760].) [7] The fraud was consummated by the execution and delivery of the deed by List and wife to the corporation on the thirty-first day of August, 1908, assuming that it was delivered on the date of its execution and acknowledgment. The present action was commenced on August 31, 1911. It was, therefore, brought within the statutory time of three years, even though the corporation had knowledge from the date of the consummation of the fraud. There is no merit in the appeal. We do not feel it necessary to further discuss the matters raised in the supplemental briefs filed by the appellants. The judgment is affirmed. Richards, J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred. A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on September 18, 1919, and a petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on October 16, 1919. All the Justices concurred. [Civ. No. 2932. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-August 19, WILLIAM SWALL et al., Appellants, v. THE COUNTY [1] ROAD DISTRICT IMPROVEMENT ACT-PERMISSION TO FILE WRITTEN [2] ID.-ESTABLISHMENT OF DISTRICT-LANDS BENEFITED-PRESUMPTION ATTACHED TO ACTS OF OFFICERS.-While the Road District Improvement Act of 1907 does not provide that, in determining the boundaries of the assessment district, the board of supervisors shall include only property which it is considered will be benefited by the public work, as the power to specially tax in the manuer proposed by such act can only be exercised upon the theory that benefits will accrue to the property affected thereby, the presumption of good faith and fair action that accompanies the acts of public officers is entitled to be indulged, and it then must be assumed that the board of supervisors has properly considered and determined that all of the property included within an established district will receive benefits from the doing of the work. [3] ID.-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AD VALOREM ASSESSMENTS.-The Road District Improvement Act of 1917 is not unconstitutional in permitting the assessment of property within the district formed under it according to its value, rather than in accordance with the benefits conferred. [4] ID.-ACTION TO AVOID ASSESSMENT - ALLEGATION OF WANT OF BENEFIT - PRESUMPTION JURISDICTION OF BOARD CONCLUSIVENESS OF FINDING. In an action brought for the purpose of avoiding a special assessment against the lands of the plaintiffs for the construction of cement curbs and sidewalks under the Road District Improvement Act of 1907, an allegation that the property was not benefited by the improvement does not aid the complaint. It will be presumed from the action of the board in including such lands in the district that they determined that all the lands so included would be benefited; and when jurisdiction is given to a board to pass upon the question of benefits, the courts will not disturb their finding, unless there appears a clear and palpable abuse of such discretion. [5] ID. LIMITATION ON POWER OF SUPERVISORS WHEN COURTS MAY INTERFERE-ESTOPPEL BY FAILURE TO OBJECT IN TIME.-There is one limitation on the power of the supervisors, or whatever board is intrusted with the discretion to form an improvement district and determine the lands to be included therein. The discretion granted is not arbitrary. If the conditions shown by the record, or coming within the judicial knowledge of the court, are so unreasonable as to outrage the common sense of fairness and justice, the courts may interfere. An attempt against the will of the owners to curb and sidewalk a remote and unoccupied quartersection of land in the sagebrush, and levy assessments therefor in excess of the value of the property, would be open to attack, 3. Rule that assessments for local improvements must be limited to benefits received, notes, 68 Am. St. Rep. 716; 82 Am. St. Rep. 457; 14 L. R. A. 755. Constitutionality of special assessment in excess of benefits, note, 3 Ann. Cas. 11. irrespective of the closest adherence to the forms of law providing for such "improvement," unless the owners had slept upon their rights and were estopped thereby. [6] ID.-CASE AT BAR-ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOT SHOWN-FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN PROTEST-WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS.-In this action brought to avoid a special assessment, it does not appear from the facts pleaded, nor from the record presented, that the surroundings and conditions of plaintiffs' and other lands of the road improvement district in question were such as to show the action of the supervisors an obvious abuse of discretion in including them in the district as lands to be benefited by the proposed improvement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs having failed to file written protest to the organization of the district, or to make any objection to the inclusion of their lands therein, must be deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the board of supervisors in the determination of the necessity for the improvement for which the district was organized. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. John M. York, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Milton K. Young and W. W. Middlecoff for Appellants. A. J. Hill, County Counsel, and Edward T. Bishop, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents. SLOANE, J.-The plaintiffs brought this action in the superior court of the county of Los Angeles for the purpose of avoiding a special assessment against their land for the construction of cement curbs and sidewalks under the "Road District Improvement Act of 1907," [Stats. 1907, p. 806]. The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground of its insufficiency to state a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained, and plaintiffs declining to amend, judgment of dismissal was rendered. Plaintiffs have appealed on the judgment-roll. The grounds of attack upon the assessment, on which the sufficiency of the complaint depends, are the allegations: (1) "That the lands of plaintiffs derive no benefit whatever from the curbs and sidewalks, but that, on the contrary, the lands, being farming lands, are injured by the curbs and sidewalks; (2) that no allowance was made for the difference in benefits which would accrue to the several par cels of land in the district, and that the supervisors particularly disregarded the question of benefits with reference to the properties of the plaintiffs; (3) that the estimated burden of the tax levied and to be levied under the assessments closely approximates the present assessed value of the land, and amounts to confiscation; and (4) that the Road District Improvement Act of 1907 is unconstitutional. Taking up first the question of the constitutionality of the act: Appellant does not very clearly indicate in what respect the provisions of the Road District Improvement Act in question are violative of any constitutional right. [1] He objects that the act nowhere provides an opportunity for an owner of property within a district to raise an objection concerning the size of the assessment district or the inclusion of his property therein. This objection seems to be sufficiently met by section 5 of the act, which provides for a hearing of objections of land owners, and, specifically, that "in the order of the hearing shall be heard such objections as shall be made to the boundaries of the district as set forth in the resolution of intention. Objections to the grades or to the boundaries of the district may be made by an owner of land lying within the district upon the hearing without any written statement of the same. We do not understand the permission granted by this section to land owners to file written objection to ordering of the work as an entirety, to be a limitation upon filing other objections, but to provide a means by which a majority of the land owners may entirely block further proceedings. (Thomas v. Pridham, 171 Cal. 98, [153 Pac. 933].) Just what may be included in the objections to the boundaries of the district under section 5 is not indicated, but it might reasonably embrace an objection to the inclusion of specific land on the ground that it was not benefited by the proposed improvement. In denying a rehearing in Thomas v. Pridham, supra, the court says: "While the right of protest in writing is limited to owners of record, as defined in the section, this limitation does not prevent all interested persons (including those not of record) from appearing before the board of supervisors and voicing their objections." [2] As to the violation of any constitutional right in failing to make express provision for determining benefits as a condition of including territory within the |