jet of the war, he denied that a reftoration of the abufes of the old government in France formed any part of the plan of minifters, though they certainly wished to have one to treat with, in which there fhould be no jacobin principles. It would certainly, he stated, have been very imprudent in minifters to have fued for peace after the campaign of 1794, the unfortunate event of which turned againft us upon as narrow a point as, he believed, ever occurred. Inftead of minifters giv ing way to alarm at this period, they had fent out expeditions to capture the Dutch fettlements, which we might either reftore to the stadtholder if he was restored, or retain for ourselves. Had terms been then offered, would they have been better than at préfent? It would certainly have been advantageous to have prevailed upon Spain and Pruffia to continue the war till the enemy was brought to terms: but before any blame could attach to minifters upon this ground, it would be neceffary to fhew, that, prior to their defection, terms were propofed to us which we rejected. The cabinet of Great Britain had certainly no fhare in the treatment of M. La Fayette, nor were minifters warranted in interfering with our allies on the fubject. Without entering into an extended detail of the comparative fituation of the English and French finances, Mr. Pitt ftated that the derangement of the French armies at the latter end of the last campaign, the exhausted state of their magazines and ftores, and their ul timate retreat before the allied pow ers, furnished a convincing proof that the rapid decline of their fi nances began to affect in the greateft degree their military operations. With refpect to the argument

fhould go to war to prevent the partition of Poland, which, how ever wrong, certainly had no effect in deftroying the balance of Europe The attempt to prevent the partition of Turkey, which at that time was fo much inveighed againft, was, he faid, to prevent the partition of Poland. Revert ing to the provocations from France, Mr. Pitt noticed the offenfive decree of the 19th of November, and the welcome reception met with in France by feditious perfons from this country. The whole conduct of the French towards the people of Holla nd was, he contended, in direat oppofition to their former declarations. The allowed continuance of M. Chauvelin here as long as the king had a fhadow of power, and the communication afterwards between the British minifter at the Hague and general Dumouriez, afforded many opportunities for conciliation, which were neglected by them, and fucceeded by an open declaration of war. With refpect to what had been urged of our averfenefs to treat for peace under both profperous and adverfe circumftances, he would ask whether it was reafonable, when a just hope was entertained of increafing our advantages, to rifk the opportunity which thofe advantages would procure of making better terms; or was it reafonable, when we experienced great and deplorable misfortunes, to entertain a juft apprehenfion of obtaining a permanent and honourable peace, on fair conditions? He allowed we had met with ferious and bitter misfortunes in the war, but we had, he contended, gained confiderably by a continuance in the conteft, by the exhauftion of the trade and the finances of the enemy, by the capture of her foreign poffeffions, and the deftruction of her navy. With refpect to the ob

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drawn from the diftance of time between his majefty's fpeech and the fubfequent declaration to parliament, relative to a want of fincerity in the meffage delivered to the French minister at Bafle, neither the meffage nor declaration profeffed any intention in the British government to be the firft in making pacific propofals. Neither could any argument of this nature be drawn from our not having acted in concert with the allies refpecting the proposals for negotiation. A ready intercourse could not at that time be held with them: but this ftep was not taken without previous communication. As to no acknowledgment being made of the republic, that was a circumftance which the French did not think neceffary, fince the directory had answered the note without adverting to it. They muft, indeed, have been a ware that the propofal to treat implied a recognition. Denmark had not recognized it till the prefent year. To have propofed terms to the enemy before the affurance of their willingness to treat, would, he thought, have been abfurd. As to not having empowered the minifter at Bale to negotiate, was it ever known that the perfon employed to found the difpofition of a belligerent party was confidered as a proper minifter for difcuffing all the relative interefts, and concluding a treaty? Mr. Pitt ftrongly infifted upon feveral other topics, to prove the fincerity of minifters in the negotiation. So far from the enemy rifing in their demands on account of their belief of the infincerity of ministers, Mr. Pitt obferved, that if they really believed this, their policy would have lain in making juft and moderate demands, which, if rejected, would prove that want of candour, and that appetite

for war, which had been attributed to minifters. With refpect to the abrupt clofe of the negotiation, and the open communication of the refult, the terms propofed by the enemy cut fhort all further treaty, and the communication of the refult would have at least the important confequence of dividing the opinions of France, and uniting thofe of England.

Mr. Fox, in reply, asked whether the infamous partition of Poland was, in any refpect, to be compared with the circumstances of Turkey, at the moment spoken of: the Turks, after unprovoked aggreffion, were humbled by the power of the emprefs; and he had, he faid, then reprobated the idea of the arrogant interference of this country, to prevent her from obtaining a just indemnification. The principle advanced, that, no matter for the injuftice, fince the balance of power remains the fame, was, he said, terrible. The effect of the motion was not; he contended, humiliating for the country, but for minifters. He thought, that if the minifter would reafon from effect to cause, he would find that the French fi nances were not deranged to the degree fuppofed, or that they were now re-established. The defence which had been fet up of the fincerity of minifters, was, he contended, the best defence of the conduct of the French. Was it to be expected that any regard would be paid to a man who had no authority from the allies with whom we were connected, no authority to make fpecific propofals? or would the correfpondence with Mr. Wick ham, which was of a private na ture, or any private communication, have been published, had the defire of pacification been fincere? He ftill confidered the recognition of

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the prefent expences with what was then expended, and with the expences of the American war; and it will appear that the prefent expences exceed those to a degree that will aftonish the houfe, though the profufion prevailing at that time is well known." He proceeded to fhew that we were in that war matched with nearly all Europe, befides the vaft and diftant continent of America. There we had an army of 40,000 men, whilft we fupported a vigorous war in the Eaft and West Indies, and at Gibraltar braved the u ted forces of France and Spain. Yet in fix years of that war, conducted as it was with acknowledged prodigality and lavifh profufion, we had incurred only a debt of fixty-three millions. He might, he faid, be told, that a war like the prefent called for great expences; and this he allowed: but fuch expences called for a comparison between the fervice and amount of the debt, with thofe of former wars. In the last three years there had been (fpeaking in round numbers to avoid confufion) incurred a debt for the navy of fifteen millions two hundred thousand pounds; for the army, feventeen milTions fix hundred thousand pounds; for the ordnance, two millions fix hundred thousand pounds. Thefe fums were all voted upon eftimate; the real expence was much greater. In addition to this, enormous fums of money had been expended without the confent of parliament. The first article to which he called the attention of the house was the navy. In 1782, the fpeech from the throne, for which the prefent mipifter, as he then held his prefent fituation, must be confidered as refponfible, fiated the defire, that an establishment fhould be made with refpect to future debt, which fhall 7

improve the mode of payment; and recommends to their attention the navy and the ordnance, the dif count upon navy bills having prov ed them a ruinous expedient. This had been confirmed in 1783, when the minifter had asked for a loan of four millions eight hundred thousand pounds; and faid he had made ample provifion for an extenfive fcale of expence.

At the beginning of this war the minister had pledged himself, as far as he was able, to keep down the extraordinaries of the navy, and to prevent the accumulation of unfunded debt, as it had been fuffered to accumulate in preceding wars. By the accounts on the table, the navy debt was Rated at 10,788,cool. to this must be added other fums, and it would appear that the excess of expenditure beyond the votes would amount to 13,700,ocol. With all this, Mr. Grey contended, that the British trade had been more fubject to depredation in the prefent conteft than in any other; and that, with refpect to the army, we were not in a better fituation. The extraordinary expence for this branch of fervice, above the eftimate, exceeded 9,000,000l. and the vote of credit was more than double that of any former period: the whole fum expended under this head, not specifically voted for that purpose, amounted, he faid, in rea lity, to upwards of 14,000,000l. over which parliament had no controul; for the items had not been previously fubmitted to it. This fyftem, he obferved, had been strongly reprobated under lord North, and that in a committee of which the prefent minister was a member. He was ready to admit that the increafed expences of wars would be in proportion to the increafe on other expences; but no advance had taken

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place which could justify the difference of expenditure between this. and former wars. In the war of king William, which lafted nine years, the amount was 1,200,000l. In queen Ann's war, which lafted eleven years, it was 2,000,000l. together they did not amount to one half of the extraordinaries of the prefent year. Yet even in William's time, a jealous houfe of commons had inveftigated public expences. And what was our comfort under this expence? not even a single victory. Nor was it true that there was vaft difference in the neceffary expences: many then were precifely the fame as now, and many now were added which were unnecef-. fary. The extraordinaries and the votes of credit in the years 1778, 1779, and 1780, did not amount to within 3,200,000l. of the prefent. Let us compare too the fervices performed in the American war and now. We had then an army of 40,000 men acting offenfively we acted vigorously in the Weft Indies: our fuccefs at Gibraltar was brilliant. What were the victories of our armies last year? We had a continental army which came home without achieving any thing. We had an army at Ifle Dieu and Quiberon in the Weft Indies had we an army even to act upon the defenfive? In the ordnance, we are told, there had been a great reform and reduction of expence: for this fervice 2,608,000l. was vot ed on eftimate; and from the accounts, the extraordinaries amounted to 2,964,000l. To this deficiency every obfervation made upon the army and navy would apply with equal propriety. This mode of increafing public expenditure was unconftitutional, condemned by parliament, recommended in

the king's fpeech to be altered, and condemned by the minifter, by his repeated promifes that he never would yield to fuch a fyftem; yet this fyftem, fo reproached and condemned, was increased every year by that very minifter. The total of fums expended without the confent of parliament, he stated at 31,280,000l. and with the fus voted by parliament amounted to 66,800,000l. funded in the three and four per cents. and spent in three years in the prefent war of difcomfiture, defeat, and difgrace. Befides the unconftitutional mode of obtaining money without the confent of parliament, already mentioned, there were other unconftitutional practices on the part of the executive government: a principal one was the erection of barracks. It was alarming enough to raise money for any purpofe without the confent of parliament; but when that practice was growing into a habit, and made ufe of to invade the rights and privileges of the people, it was not only a breach of duty in a minifter to incur fuch expence, but a ftill greater breach of duty in that houfe to fuffer it. Since 1790, 1,100,000l. had been expended for barracks. This was, however, not the whole; and he had confequently afked for the expence intended to be incurred, and a fomething to that effect had been laid before the houfe; and he wished to know whether a greater infult could be offered to it than that of calling upon them for 227,850l. more to be advanced on this account? After recapitulating what had been advanced on a former occafion refpecting barracks, Mr. Grey obferved, that the opinions of our beft writers were clearly againft their erection, and that they were with propriety termed by judge

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