fectly fimilar. There was fcarcely any other difference than that Great Britain, in confequence of her fucceffes fince that time, acquired more than the then demanded: but still the general idea, on which the acquired, was the fame. With regard, indeed, to fome of her allies, the principle of the two treaties was greatly varied; but this change was fufficiently juftified by the alteration which happened in the affairs of Germany, during the interval between both. Thofe, who conducted the negociation in 1761, were steady in rejecting every propofition, in which they were not left at liberty to aid the king of Pruffia with the whole force of great Britain: thofe, who concluded the peace in 1762, paid lefs attention to the ambitious or interested views of that monarch, though they did not neglect his fafety. At the beginning of the year, and before they had entered into this negociation, they refused to renew that article of the annual treaty, by which his Britannic majefty would have been engaged to conclude no peace without the king of Pruffia; though, at the fame time, they declared themselves willing to affift him with the usual fubfidy. He, on his part, refufed the fubfidy unconnected with that article; and a coolnefs was fuppofed to take place between both courts for fome time after.

XIV. The adjustment of affairs in the empire did not form any material obstruction to the progress of the treaty. Both parties readily agreed to withdraw them. felves totally from the German war. They thought, and rightly, that nothing could tend fo much to give peace to their respective allies, as mutually to withdraw their affiftance from them; and to ftop that current of English and French money, which, as long as it ran into Germany, would be fure to feed a perpetual war in that country. The conduct of the two courts upon this occafion, though very different from what they had held in the year 1761, was much more politic in itself, as well as perfectly defenfible, from the change of circumftances. This will appear evidently from a view of the ftate of the German war at both periods. XV. When

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XV. When the former negociation was on foot, the affairs of the king of Pruffia were at the lowest ebb: he was overpowered by the whole weight of Austria, of Sweden, of the empire, and of Ruffia, as determined as ever in her enmity, and then fuccefsful; to say nothing of France. It would have been ungenerous, on the part of Great Britain, to have deferted him in that fituation. But, at the time of making the last treaty, the condition of his affairs was abfolutely reverfed. He had got rid of the most powerful, and one of the most implacable of his enemies. He had alfo concluded a peace with Sweden. The treaty itfelf freed him from all apprehenfions of France. He had, then, none to contend with, but a nominal army of the empire, and one of Auftria, which, though fomething more than nominal, was wholly unable to oppofe his progrefs. His fituation, from being pitiable, was become formidable. It was, perhaps, good policy to prevent the balance of Germany from being overturned to his prejudice: it would have been the worst in the world to overturn it in his favor. Thefe principles fufficiently explain and juftify the British miniftry for fo remarkable a change in their behaviour towards the king of Pruffia.

XVI. The conduct of France upon both thofe occafions may be accounted for, nearly in the fame manner: She had very justly excepted to the demand of the evacuation of Wefel, Cleves, and Gueldres, when made by Mr. Pitt in the firft negociation; because he refufed to put an end to the German war. In this laft treaty, the French affented without hefitation or difficulty, to the very fame demand; because we agreed, in common with them, to be neutral in the difputes of the empire. Thus the peace of Germany, fo far as it depended on Great Britain and France, was paid a due regard to; and the other contending powers, being left to themselves, foon terminated their differences.* XVII. As

*The fubftance of the treaty, concluded at Hubertfburg between his Pruffian majefty and the emprefs queen, was no

more

XVII. As the Bourbon confederacy had no pretext for the quarrel with Portugal, but the advantages which Great Britain derived, from her friendly intercourie with that country during the war, the article relating to his most faithful majesty did not admit of the least altercation. Any of his territories, or poffeffions in Europe or in any other part of the globe, which had fallen into the hands of the French and Spaniards, were to be evacuated by their troops, and reftored in the fame condition they were in when conquered.

XVIII. After the concerns of the allies were provided for, the most important part of the treaty ftill remained, which was to adjuft every thing that related to the fettlements and commerce of Great Britain and of the Bourbon courts. The circumftance, which fo much impeded this adjustment in the preceding negociation, was the intervention of the claims of Spain. The attempt of the Bourbon powers to intermix and confound their affairs at that juncture, had a share in making the war more general: on this occafion it had a contrary effect. As the whole was now negociated together, it facilitated the peace, by affording eafier methods of regulating the fyftem of compenfation, and furnishing more largely to the general fund of equivalents.

XIX. The great object, and the original caufe of the war, had been the establishment of precife boundaries in America. This was therefore the very first point to be now attended to; and it must be obferved, that it was fettled much more accurately, than it promifed to be in the negociation of the foregoing year. For the French, not having afcertained the limits between their own poffeffions with greater exactness, than they had those which feparated them from the British poffeffions, it was not clear in ceding Canada, how much they really gave up. Difputes might have arifen, and, in fact, did immore than that a mutual reftitution and oblivion fhould take place, and each party fit down at the end of the war in the fame fituation in which they began it.

mediately

mediately arife upon this fubject. Befides, the weltern limits of the fouthern British colonies were not mentioned; and thofe limits were extremely obfcure, and subject to many difcuffions. Such difcuffions contained in them the feeds of a new war. In the prefent treaty, it was agreed, that a line drawn along the middle of the river Miffifippi, from its fource to the river Iberville, and thence along the middle of this river, and the lakes of Maurepas and Pontchartrain, to the fea, fhould irrevocably fix the bounds of the two nations in North America. This line included a very large tract of country, which formerly made a part of Louifiana, in addition to what was properly called Canada; and these newly acquired territories of Great Britain, were farther enlarged and completely rounded by the ceffion of Florida, on the part of Spain. As the northern boundaries had been long fince fettled by the treaty of Utrecht, all occafions of limitary difputes feemed to be effectually cut off; and the British poffeffions in America were as well defined, as the nature of fuch a country could poffibly admit. The advantages, which were expected to flow from fo great an increafe of empire on that continent, will be prefently examined in a fummary of the chief arguments that were urged both for and against the treaty.

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XX. The Newfoundland fishery was another point of infinite importance, and a fubject of much controversy. In a commercial view it is certainly of great eftimation: but it has been confidered as even more material in a political light. That fishery is the fole fupport of many maritime places, which would otherwife be of no fort of value it is a grand nursery of feamen, and confequently one of the principal refources of the marine. Scarcely any object could be of more importance to two nations, who contended for a fuperiority of naval power. more clearly, therefore, it was the intereft of Great Britain to acquire the exclufive exercife of this fifhery, the more ftrongly and evidently it became the interest of France to oppofe fuch a pretenfion. Not only a large part of her foreign trade depended on the fishery; but a

The

great

great part of her domeftic fupply. Befides, every hope of the ftrength, and almost of the existence of her naval power, must have vanished with the furrender of fo ineftimable a right. The English miniftry knew very well, thar France would rather run all the hazards of war, than totally relinquish this object. But though they defpaired of driving the French entirely from the fifhery, they endeavoured as much as poffible to diminish its value to them. In this refpect they followed the plan of the former negociation, except that fome improvements were added.

XXI. In the first place, that article of the treaty of Utrecht was established, by which the French were admitted to fif, and to dry their fifh on the north-east and north-west parts of Newfoundland, from Cape Bonavista to Point Biche; and were excluded from the rest of the ifland. They were alfo permitted to fish within the Gulf of St. Lawrence; but with this limitation, that they fhould not approach within three leagues of any of the coafts belonging to England. This precaution was ufed, not only with a view of abridging their fifhery of dry cod, but principally in order to prevent their landing, and, on that pretence, forming fettlements on thofe exe-. tenfive deferts, which furround the gulf. Otherwife the privilege might become a means of exciting new difputes

between the two nations.

XXII. The fecond restriction impofed on the French fishery was, that it fhould not be exercised but at the dif tance of fifteen leagues from the coafts of the ifland of Cape Breton, which was ceded to England. In return for this, the French obtained the full right of the fmall iflands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, his moft Chriftian majefty engaging not to erect any fortifications on there iflands, nor to keep more than fifty foldiers there to enforce the police. In this article the plan of the former negociation was purfued: but the idea of a refident commiffary, and the occafional vifitation by a fhip of war, were omitted, as regulations which were in truth more VOL. I. humiliating

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