JAMES CARLISLE BASKIN v. THE UNITED
[95 C. Cls. 455; 316 U. S. -]
Right to sue for salary where employment was terminated on charges.
Decided January 5, 1942; petition dismissed. Ante, p.
Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court April 27, 1942.
ACCEPTANCE OF BID.
See Contract XXX.
ACCOUNT STATED.
See Taxes II, III.
ACT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1863.
See Indian Claims XX.
ACT OF JULY 15, 1870.
See Indian Claims XXI, XXII.
ACT OF JANUARY 12, 1923.
See Pay and Allowances II.
ACT OF JUNE 25, 1936.
See Pay and Allowances VI.
ACT OF JUNE 9, 1937.
See Pay and Allowances V, VII.
ADDITIONAL WORK.
See Contracts XII.
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION.
See Pay and Allowances XV.
ADVERTISING FOR BIDS.
See Contracts VII.
AFFILIATED GROUP.
See Taxes I, II, III.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT.
I. Where, under a Marketing Agreement between
plaintiff, a nonprofit organization, and its mem-
bers, on the one hand, and on the other, the United
States, acting through the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, for the disposal of the wheat surplus in 1933,
entered into in accordance with the provisions of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the plaintiff,
with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture,
as required by said act, sold certain shipments of
flour to the United States Government, packed
and sealed for shipment to and for use in the
Philippine Islands; and where all the transactions
by the plaintiff with the Government, in connec-
tion with which the instant claim arose, were pro-
posed and carried out by plaintiff and its members
concerned with the knowledge and consent of the
Secretary of Agriculture through his authorized
representatives; it is held that said sale comes
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT-Continued.
within the provisions of sections 10 (f) and 17 (a)
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act defining ex-
portations of agricultural products to include
exportations to the Philippine Islands, and plain-
tiff is accordingly entitled to recover. North
Pacific Emergency Export, 430.
II. Where plaintiff, a manufacturer of hosiery, filed a
claim for refund of floor stocks tax paid under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, and where said
claim was rejected by the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue on the ground that the claim did
not comply with the requirements of the Revenue
Act of 1936, under which act said claim was filed,
and that said claim did not comply with the
applicable Treasury Regulations under said act;
and where plaintiff in filing its claim or at any
other time did not submit to the Commissioner
any evidence in support of said claim, as required
by the statute and regulations; it is held that, no
proper claim having been filed with the Commis-
sioner in compliance with the statute and per-
tinent regulations, the Court of Claims is without
jurisdiction and plaintiff's petition is accordingly
dismissed. Morristown Knitting Mills, Inc., 552.
III. The requirement that a claim for refund be filed with
the Commissioner before litigation may be insti-
tuted "is a familiar provision of the Revenue
Laws." United States v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 283
U. S. 269, cited; also Factors & Finance Co. v.
United States, 73 C. Cls. 707. Id.
AIRPLANE LANDING MECHANISM.
See Patents XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII,
XXIII.
ALLOTMENTS TO FREEDMEN.
See Indian Claims XII, XIII, XIV, XV.
ALTERNATIVE CLAIM.
See Indian Claims IX.
AMORTIZATION.
See Taxes IX.
ANTICIPATION.
See Patents XVI, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI.
ARMY OFFICER, PROPERTY OF.
I. Where a commissioned officer in the Regular Army
of the United States was retired for disability inci-
dent to the service; and where under proper orders
he was relieved from assignment and duty at his
then post and directed to proceed to his home;
ARMY OFFICE, PROPERTY OF-Continued.
and where in the shipment of his household goods
and other personal property from said post to his
home said household goods and property were
damaged; it is held that plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover under the provisions of section one of the
Act of March 4, 1921 (41 Stat. 1436; U. S. Code,
title 31, section 218). Brabson, 187.
II. An officer acting under military orders is "in the
military service" within the provisions of the Act
III. In the instant case the plaintiff was traveling "under
orders" and his property was being "transported
by the proper agent or agency of the United States
Government." See Regnier v. The United States,
92 C. Cls. 437. Id.
AUTOMOBILE ACCESSORIES.
See Taxes XXIII, XXIV.
CASH AND NOTES AS INCOME.
See Taxes IV, V, VI, VII.
CHANGES IN PLANS.
See Contracts XXIV.
CLAIM TIMELY FILED.
See Taxes VIII.
CLAIM VOLUNTARILY TRANSFERRED.
See Cotton Linters Contract I, II.
"COMMERCE" AND "INDUSTRY."
See Taxes XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX.
CONFLICTING PROVISIONS IN STATUTE.
See Pay and Allowances III.
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
See Dredging Of Navigable Channel I, IV; Taking Of Private
Property I, II, III.
CONTRACTING OFFICER.
See Contracts XIV, XIX.
CONTRACTS.
I. Under the facts disclosed by the record, the provi-
sions of plaintiff's contract, the representations of
the defendant's contracting officer as to the period
during which the general construction work
would be performed, and the statements and
representations in the specifications and drawings
relating to all work upon the entire project, upon
all of which plaintiff had a right to rely, and did
rely, in making its bid for furnishing and installing
plumbing, heating, and ventilating equipment at
the Veterans' Administration Hospital Building at
Togus, Maine; it is held that plaintiff is entitled to
recover $9,349.95 of the total excess cost of $26,-
044.64 incurred by reason of delay due to defend-
ant. Rice and Burton, Receivers, 84.
II. Time was an essence of plaintiff's contract with
defendant, and nowhere in the contract or specifi-
cations for the work covered by said contract nor
in defendant's contract and specifications for con-
struction of the building in which plaintiff was to
perform its work was the defendant relieved of
responsibility for a liability to plaintiff for excess
costs by reason of delay for which plaintiff was in
no way responsible. Wood et al. v. United States,
258 U. S. 120, and similar cases distinguished. Id.
III. The fact that a condition encountered, which causes
delay, is unforeseen or unanticipated does not
render the delay unavoidable and is not enough
to relieve the contracting party, whose contractual
duty it is to overcome it, from responsibility for
damages to the other party from the delay caused
by such conditions. Carnegie Steel Co. v. United
States, 49 C. Cls. 403, affirmed 240 U. S. 156,
cited. Id.
IV. Where plaintiff entered into a contract with the
Government to furnish all labor and materials
and to perform all work required for the construc-
tion of a complete steam-generating plant, to be
known as the Central Heating Plant for Public
Buildings, in the District of Columbia; said con-
tract including furnishing and installing all
necessary electrical wiring, as set forth in the
specifications, and for which electrical work plain-
tiff contracted with a subcontractor, which sub-
contractor based its bid on wiring and insulation
approved by the National Electrical Code, as
called for under one paragraph of the original
specifications; and where said original specifica-
tions were carelessly written and contradictory;
and where under amended specifications plaintiff
was required to install, and did install, a more
expensive insulation; it is held by the court that
the ambiguity in the original specifications should
be resolved in plaintiff's favor, and plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Rust Engineering Co., 125.
V. Where the specifications are carelessly written and
ambiguous, contractor is not licensed to disregard
such portions as are plain. Id.
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