defendant's loss of time in procuring materials and conveying them to the plaintiff, superintendence of the work, sorting the goods, payment to a boy for winding yarn, &c. &c. There was no written contract. It was held that the agreement to pay plaintiff's wages with these deductions was not a contract to pay part of such wages otherwise than in the current coin within sect. 1, nor was a contract in writing under sect. 23 necessary to legalise such deductions.

The decision of the Court of Queen's Bench in Archer v. James was appealed against and argued in the Exchequer Chamber. The six judges were equally divided, and consequently the judgment of the Court below was affirmed.

In the case of Cutts v. Ward (4 Cox's Magistrates' Cases, p. 328), it appeared that the plaintiff was engaged as a collier, and had signed certain rules, one of which provided that all rents of houses due to the owner of the works, and all charges to which a workman should be liable for wood, tools, or working materials obtained from the stores, and for medicine and medical attendance and all other lawful stoppages, should be deducted from the earnings of each workman before payment thereof. Certain wages having become due to the plaintiff, stoppages were made, (1) for rent; (2) for wood used by him belonging to the defendant to support the mine; (3) for subscriptions to a club established by defendant to afford medicines and medical attendance to the men in sickness. It was held that the first and third deductions were lawful as being within the 23rd sect. of 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. xxxvii., but that the second was not lawful as not being within it.

Again, if an artificer receive of his own accord goods at a shop kept by his employer, and the amount is afterwards deducted from his wages at the next settling, this is a payment in goods which comes within the statute. Wilson v. Cookson (32 L. J. M. C. 117, and 13 C. B. Rep. 496). And if payment of wages has been made in goods no subsequent payment of the same cash can purge the offence, because the payment is made void, not voidable, by the statute.

In the case of Smith v. Walton (L. R. 3 C. P. 109), an artificer in a trade within the Truck Act, having by bad work damaged a piece of cloth, his employers delivered to him that cloth in lieu of such wages as they deemed equivalent to the value which, according to their assessment, the cloth would have had if it had been undamaged. The justices dismissed the information under the Truck Act. But on appeal it was held that it was substantially a payment of wages, otherwise than in the current coin of the realm. Mr. Justice Lindley said: "To understand the substance of the transaction, it is necessary to look at the mode in which the two weeks' wages were adjusted. The appellant had earned at the end of one week 18s. 81d., and at the end of another £1 2s. 6d., making £2 1s. 3d. When they settled, the employers paid him 20s. in cash, and no more, leaving £1 1s. 3d. unpaid. How was it made up? The employer said: 'I will not give you that sum; I have paid it you in goods you have spoiled, which we value at £1 1s. 3d.' So they squared accounts by deducting that amount. If that

is the transaction, it is within the Truck Act." A more recent case throws light upon stoppages from wages. In the case of Pillar v. The Llynvi Coal

Company (L. R. 4 C. P. 752), an employer stopped part of the wages of an artificer as a contribution to funds established by the former to provide medicine and medical attendance and schools without any written agreement. It was held that the artificer might recover the whole amount so deducted. The Court said "these stoppages were made, and there was no consent in writing. We think that upon a right construction of sects. 23 and 24 such a written consent was necessary to enable the company to make the deductions, and we are obliged to hold that the plaintiff may recover the whole." But in the case of Cutts v. Ward, previously referred to, the principle was established that if the contract of service specifies generally the deductions to be made, although the exact sums are not fixed, the contract will still be valid if the deductions are such as are comprised in sect. 23.

The evil of truck chiefly arises from the power which employers might use were it not for the statute -to induce workmen to take goods in payment at an undue profit to the former, or of inferior quality, or for which the workman has no particular need. If, indeed, the goods were excellent and the price fair, no great harm would ensue. But, if any advantage should ever arise to the workman from payment in goods, it would depend wholly on the justice, care, and benevolence of the employer. It has generally been found that it places the man at the mercy of the master, without any countervailing benefit to the former. The Act is a highly beneficial one to the working classes, and ought to be strongly enforced on their behalf.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONSPIRACY, MOLESTATION, AND STRIKES.

THE Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, has made important alterations in this branch of the law since the last edition was printed. It amended the law relating to conspiracies, by the 3rd sect., as follows: "An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do, or procure to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employer and workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if such act, committed by one person, would not be punishable as a crime." And a "crime" means, in this connection, an offence punishable on indictment or summary conviction, for the commission of which the offender may be imprisoned, either at once or as an alternative for some other punishment. But the Act does not exempt from punishment persons guilty of a conspiracy for which a punishment is awarded by an Act of Parliament; nor does it extend to riots, unlawful assemblies, breaches of the peace, sedition, &c.

Sect. 5 contains a very important enactment : "Where any person wilfully and maliciously breaks a contract of service or hiring, knowing, or having

reasonable cause to believe, that the probable consequences of so doing will be to endanger human life, or cause serious bodily injury, or expose valuable property to destruction or serious injury, he shall, on conviction, be liable either to pay a penalty not exceeding £20, or be imprisoned not exceeding three months."

The clauses just quoted are important; but the clause which is most likely to be brought into operation from time to time is the seventh. 'Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing, or to do, any act which such other person has a legal right to do, or abstain from doing wrongfully and without legal authority, (1) uses violence to or intimidates such other person, or his wife, or children, or injures his property; or, (2) persistently follows such other person about from place to place; or, (3) hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof; or, (4) watches or besets the house or place where such other person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place; or, (5) follows such other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly manner in or through any street or road, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding £20, or to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months. But attending at or near a house, &c., in order merely to obtain or communicate information shall not be deemed a watching or besetting within the Act."

Procedure. When a person is accused before a Court of summary jurisdiction of any such offence, he