119 428

111 55i

elected in even numbered years, from the odd numbered districts in 1892, and from even numbered districts in 1894. (Stats. 1891, p. 71, Sec. 4.)

ARTICLE XXI.

BOUNDARY.

SECTION 1. The boundary of the state of California shall be as follows: Commencing at the point of intersection of the forty-second degree of north latitude with the one hundred and twentieth degree of longitude west from Greenwich, and running south on the line of said one hundred and twentieth degree of west longitude until it intersects the thirty-ninth degree of north latitude; thence running in a straight line, in a southeasterly direction, to the river Colorado, at a point where it inter ects the thirty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence down the middle of the channel of said river to the boundary line between the United States and Mexico, as estab. lished by the treaty of May thirtieth, one thousand eight hundred and forty-eight; thence running west and along said boundary line to the Pacific ocean, and extending therein three English miles; thence running in a northwesterly direc. tion, and following the direction of the Pacific coast to the forty-second degree of north latitude; thence on the line of said forty-second degree of north latitude to the place of beginning. Also, including all the islands, harbors and bays along and adjacent to the coast.

Const. 1849, Art. XII, Sec. 1.

ARTICLE XXII.

SCHEDULE.

That no inconvenience may arise from the alterations and amendments in the constitution of this state, and to carry the same into complete effect, it is bereby ordained and declared:

SECTION 1. That all laws in force at the adoption of this constitution, not inconsistent therewith, shall remain in full force and effect until altered or repealed by the legislature; and all rights, actions, prosecutions, claims and contracts of the state, counties, individuals, or bodies corporate, not inconsistent tberewith, shall continue to be as valid as if this

constitution had not been adopted. The provisions of all laws which are inconsistent with this constitution shall cease upon the adoption thereof, except that all laws which are inconsistent with such provisions of this constitution as require legislation to enforce them, shall remain in full force until the first day of July, eighteen hundred and eighty, unless sooner altered or repealed by the legislature.

Const. 1849, Schedule Arts. 1, 3.

The act of the legislature 1871-2, (Stats. p. 533) requiring plaintiffs in actions for slander to file an undertaking with sureties, was not repealed by the constitution of 1879. Smith v. McDermot, 93 Cal.

421.

The effect of this section was, by a single comprehensive provision, to preserve and adopt for the courts created by the new constitution the statutory procedure that was then existing with reference to the courts which were by that instrument abolished, and to authorize that procedure in all rights of action that were to be determined under the new constitution. Wickersham v. Brittan, 93 Cal. 34, 40.

The act of March 25, 1874, (Stats. p. 614) defining powers and duties of board of education of Nevada school district, was valid when enacted, there being then no prohibition against special or local laws, and was not repealed by the constitution of 1879. Nevada School District v. Shoecraft, 88 Cal. 372.

The act of March 29, 1870, (Stats. p. 438) relating to fees of county and township officers, did not cease to be operative on July 1, 1880, and the county recorder of San Luis Obispo county, whose term expired January 1, 1885, was entitled to receive the fees provided in that act during his term. San Luis Obispo Co. v. Darke, 76 Cal. 92.

The adoption of this constitution did not propria vigore repeal or displace all the statutes of the state theretofore in force. It repealed some of them and saved others, and it points out, in its own terms, the effect which its adoption should have upon existing statutes. The county clerk of San Francisco, elected in September, 1879, was entitled to take his office on the first Monday in December, 1879, in accordance

with the provisions of the "consolidation act" of said city and county. In re Stuart, 53 Cal. 746.

This section is referred to in dissenting opinion of McKinstry, J., in Donahue v. Graham, 61 Cal. 279; S. V. W. W. v. San Francisco, 61 Cal. 3, where it was held that the act of 1858, establishing a commission to fix water rates in San Francisco, was superseded by section 1, article XIV, and in Barnhart v. Fulkerth, 59 Cal. 130, where it was held that a motion for change of venue should have been granted in accordance with the law at the time it was made; and in matter of Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, where it is held that section 18, article XX annulled section 306, Penal Code, and ordinance of San Francisco against employment of females in drinking places, and in Ewing v. Oroville M. Co., 56 Cal. 649, where it is held that section 11, article XII repealed section 359, C. C. relating to corporations; and in McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 247.

It was competent for the legislature, prior to 1879, to prescribe the form of complaint to be used in an action for the collection of delinquent city taxes, and the charter of the city of Stockton, of 1872, prescribing such form, is not obnoxious to anything contained in section 6, article XI, of constitution of 1879, and remained in force. City of Stockton v. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. 621.

The provisions of section 13, article XI, of this constitution are prospective, and refer to the legislature created by this instrument. The act of March 25, 1872, (Stats. p. 546) creating a board of commissioners of the funded debt of Sacramento, and requiring the trustees of the city, in levying a special tax, to be governed by the written request of the commissioners, is not inconsistent with this constitution, and was not repealed by it. Commissioners v. Trustees, 71 Cal. 310.

The act of March 30, 1874, (Stats. p. 911) providing for the punishment of misconduct in office, and vesting jurisdiction to try such offense in the district court became inoperative on the 1st July, 1880, when said courts went out of existence. Waiving this, said

act was repealed by section 184 of county government act of 1883. (Stats. p. 299.) Fraser v. Alexander, 75 Cal. 147.

By the act of March 30, 1878, (Stats. p. 645) the mayor and council of Los Angeles were authorized to provide by ordinance for the licensing, regulating, suppressing, etc., of hawkers, peddlers, etc.; to fix amount of license tax and enforce payment. Neither said statute nor an ordinance passed in pursuance of it were abrogated by the constitution. Ex parte Ah Toy, 57 Cal. 92.

The law existing when this constitution went into effect, regulating salary of clerk of Supreme Court, was not inconsistent with the constitution, and was not repealed by it. The same law exists against increasing or diminishing the salary of the incumbent as will exist against increasing or diminishing the salary of his successor during his incumbency. (Sec. 14, Art. VI, constitution.) The legislature by the amendment of 1881 to section 755, Political Code, did not decrease the salary of the incumbent. Gross v. Kenfield, 57 Cal. 627.

The street law of San Francisco, of 1872, which did not require an assessment to be levied and collected prior to the contract for doing the work, was repealed by section 19, article XI. And when that section was amended, the former law was not thereby revived, but said work must be done under the general law of 1885. Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465. But see dissenting opinions in same case.

It seems that the act of April 24, 1862, (Stats. p. 341) amending the charter of Oakland, and authorizing that city by ordinance to require a license to be procured by every person who at a fixed place of business sells any goods, wares or merchandise, and affix a penalty for a refusal to procure the same, was not repealed by the constitution. Ex parte Mount, 66 Cal. 448.

The act of April 1, 1877, (Stats. p. 953) in relation to the house of correction in San Francisco is not repealed by constitution of 1879, and it is applicable to the Superior Courts. Ex parte Flood, 64 Cal. 251.

It was not the intention of the constitution to repeal sections 1183 to 1190, C. C. P., concerning liens of mechanics, and such law is continued in force. Germania B. & L. Asso. v. Wagner, 61 Cal. 349. See Latson v. Nelson, XI Pac. L. J. 589.

The license tax for selling merchandise at a fixed place of business, provided for by section 3360 Political Code, prior to the present constitution, was a tax prohibited by section 12, article XI, and section 3360 became inoperative upon the adoption of the constitution. McKee dissenting, People v. Martin, 60 Cal. 153.

The act of March 27, 1878, (Stats. p. 574) to regulate fees and salaries in Los Angeles county, provided that certain officers of the county should receive salaries for their compensation, and that all fees collected should be paid into the county treasury, but this provision of the act should not affect the then incumbents of said, offices. Held, that the act was a perfect law and was in force at the adoption of the constitution-the proviso that it should not affect certain persons then in office related only to a status, but did not postpone the taking effect of the act itself. (This case is to be distinguished from Speegle v. Joy, 60 Cal. 278; Whiting v. Haggard, Id. 513, and Peachy v. Supervisors, 59 Cal. 548, in which cases the acts referred to were not to take effect until a date subsequent, to the date of the taking effect of this constitution.) County of Los Angeles v. Lamb, 61 Cal. 196.

An act passed March 26, 1878, (Stats. p. 547) in relation to certain officers in Plumas county, portions of which act were, by its terms, not to take effect until March, 1880, never did take effect as to such portions. A law which could not take effect until after the adoption of the constitution, necessarily was not in effect at its adoption. People v. Whiting, 64 Cal. 67. To same effect see Speegle v. Joy, 60 Cal. 278; Peachy v. Supervisors, 59 Cal. 548.

Section 1552, Political Code, relative to salary of county superintendent of schools, was a general statutory provision when the constitution went into