p. 183) funding the floating debt of San Francisco is a contract with its creditors. Thornton v. Hooper, 14 Cal. 9.

A special act of the legislature may authorize town trustees to levy a tax for local improvement, in excess of the limit of tax provided in the original act of incorporation. Kelsey v. Trustees of Nevada, 18 Cal. 630.

At the time of the rendition and entering of a judgment the law did not allow any time for redemption from sales under execution. Prior to a sale under the execution the law was changed by allowing six months for redemption. Held, the sale was effected by the latter act, and that this was not an ex post facto law, the judgment not being a contract in the sense that the legislature might not alter the conditions resulting from a sale to be thereafter made thereunder. Moore v. Martin, 38 Cal. 428, and authorities there cited, including Tuolumne Redemption Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 516, as to redemption under statute, and subsequent equitable redemption from redemptioner.

Citing 1 Kent Com. 455, Held, "a retrospective statute affecting and changing vested rights is very generally conceded in this country, as founded on unconstitutional principles. * * * But this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not impair contracts or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy by curing defects, and adding to the means for enforcing existing obligations. The act of April 3, 1863, (Stats. p. 165) validating sales by attorneys in fact of married women where the husband had not joined in the execution of the power, is not unconstitutional. Prior to 1863, married women, in this state had no power to constitute an attorney in fact to convey her separate property. Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 142.

There is no difference in the inviolability of a contract arising from a grant of property to a municipality and a like grant to an individual. A legisla

tive grant is an actual contract, and it cannot be divested or destroyed by any subsequent legislative enactment. Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 607. See note under section 37, article IV. But it was held in Meyers v. English, 9 Cal. 341, that this section refers to contracts between individuals, and not to contracts between the state and individuals.

This court has not decided that a voluntary appropriation, by public act, of property or its proceeds, by a municipal body, when not associated with a contract as part of its obligation or sanction, removes such property or proceeds from control of the municipality or the legislature, or that the terms of the act making the appropriation are unalterable. Even where such appropriation is connected with a trust, the municipality would have the equity of redemption, and could dispose of the subject of the trust subject to the rights of the creditors or of their trustees, or the legislature could authorize such disposition. (Citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; People v. Supervisors, 11 Id. 206; Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 Id. 220;) City and County of S. F. v. Biedeman, 17 Cal. 444.

Where the state grants to persons performing the work of reclaiming swamp land one-half of the land reclaimed, and parties enter upon the work in accordance with the act, they acquire a vested right to proceed to the completion thereof, and a subsequent act attempting to destroy this right is unconstitutional. Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 196.

The legislature may from time to time change the remedy, but may not materially affect the right. Whenever it so far alters the remedy as to render the right scarcely worth pursuing, it necessarily impairs the obligation of a contract upon which the right is founded. An act which divests the lien of the judgment creditor, exempts the property of the debtor from execution, places it in the hands of trustees with power to sell as they think proper, and compels the creditor to fund his scrip at a less rate of interest, and submit to a delay of twenty years without any guaranty that he will then be paid, and ren

ders his right worthless by withdrawing his remedy, is unconstitutional. Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 525. Approved in Thorne v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 148; Heydenfeldt v. Hitchcock, 15 Id. 514; Wheeler v. Miller, 16 Id. 125; Ellis v. Eastman, 32 Id. 448.

For decisions under Legal Tender Act, see Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 254.

SECTION 17. Foreigners who are or who may hereafter become bona fide residents of this state, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and inheritance of property as native born citizens.

A non-resident alien can acquire property in this state by purchase, but not by descent or other operation of law. Norris v. Hoyt, 18 Cal. 217. The statute permitting bona fide resident aliens to inherit is not unconstitutional. The rights of resident aliens may be enlarged by the legislature, but may not be restricted. State of Cal. v. Rogers, 13 Čal. 159. Also Farrell v. Enright, 12 Cal. 450.

SECTION 18. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crime, shall ever be tolera ted in this state.

SECTION 19. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persous and things to be seized.

SECTION 20. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against it, adhering to its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the evidence of two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court.

SECTION 21. This enumeration of rights shall not be con strued to impair or deny others retained by the people.

SECTION 22. The legislature shall have no power to make an appropriation, for any purpose whatever, for a longer period than two years. [This section was added by amendment rati. fied September 6, 1871.]

ARTICLE II.

RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

SECTION 1. Every white male citizen of the United States, and every white male citizen of Mexico who shall have elected to become a citizen of the United States, und er the treaty of peace exchanged and ratified at Queretaro, on the thirtieth day of May, eighteen hundred and forty-eight, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the state six months next preceding the election, and the county or district in which he claims his vote thirty days, shall be entitled to vote at all elections which are now or hereafter may be authorized by law; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the legislature, by a two-thirds concurrent vote, from admitting to the right of suffrage Indians, or the descendants of Indians, in such special cases as such a proportion of the legislative body may deem just and proper.

The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States does not annul the provision of the state constitution which denies to females the right to vote. Van Valkenberg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43.

SECTION 2, Electors shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest on the days of election, during their attendance at such election, going to and returning therefrom.

SECTION 3. No elector shall be obliged to perform militia duty on the day of election, except in time of war or public danger.

SECTION 4. For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the United States, nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of this state or of the United States, or of the high seas; nor while a student at any seminary of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse, or other asylum, at public expense; nor while confined in any public prison.

The fact of being a soldier in the United States army does not disqualify any one from voting, but

no one is entitled to vote unless he possesses the qualifications as to citizenship and residence in the county required by section one of this article. Mere residence or sojourn of such soldier in the state for the requisite period of time does not make him a citizen nor entitle him to vote. People ex rel. Orman v. Riley, 15 Cal. 49. See also Day v. Jones, 31 Cal. 262, and cases there cited.

SECTION 5. No idiot or insane person, or person convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to the privileges of an elector.

SECTION 6. All elections by the people shall be by ballot.

ARTICLE III.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS.

SECTION 1. The powers of the government of the state of California shall be divided into three separate departments: the legislative, the executive and judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.

[See notes under section 1, article IV.]

Acts of the legislature attempting to validate judgments or probate orders for sale of real estate which are void for want of jurisdiction are unconstitutional as an exercise of judicial functions by legislature. Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388.

The act of March 28, 1874, (Stats. p. 755) directed a vote to be taken of the qualified electors of Siskiyou county as to whether a certain portion of Klamath county should be annexed to Siskiyou, and that if the vote was in the affirmative, Klamath county should be abolished and a portion thereof be annexed to Siskiyou and a portion to Humboldt counties. Held. In matters of purely local concern, it is competent of the legislature to enact that a statute affecting only a particular locality shall take effect on condition that it is approved by a vote