law should embrace but one object which should be expressed in its title, was merely directory. (Washington v. Page, 4 Cal. 388; Pierpont v. Crouch, 10 Id. 315.) San Francisco v. S. V. W. W., 54 Cal. 571.

The prohibition against local or special laws only applies to prospective legislation. The act of March 25, 1874, (Stats. p. 614) defining powers and duties of the state board of education of Nevada school district was valid when enacted, although section 1593, Political Code, provided that the number of school trustees, "except where city boards are otherwise authorized by law, shall be three." The constitution of 1849 did not prohibit local or special legislation. (Meade v. Watson, 67 Cal. 591; Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6.) Nevada School Dist. v. Shoecraft, 88 Cal. 372.

An examination of the whole section shows conclusively that the intention of the framers of the constitution and the people in adopting it, was to prohibit the legislature from passing local or special laws which should in anywise affect questions of taxation, or the liens of taxes, or the practice in courts of justice. All these must be provided for by general and uniform law. People v. Cen. P. R. R. Co., 83 Cal. 393.

Section 300 of Penal Code, as adopted in 1872, (Sunday Law) was not a special law, nor was it otherwise unconstitutional. Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6.

The legislature has the power to determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected in incorporated cities. (Article VI, section 11.) There is no limitation of this power in article XI, nor section 25, article IV. Bishop v. City of Oakland, 58 Cal. 572.

The act of April 16, 1880, (Stats. p. 313) for the funding of county indebtedness is a general law and is not special legislation. Statutes should not be declared unconstitutional unless there is a clear repugnance between the act and the constitution. University of Cal. v. Bernard, 57 Cal. 612.

SECTION 25. The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to

say:

FIRST. Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police judges and of constables.

SECOND. For the punishment of crimes and misdemean

ors.

THIRD. Regulating the practice of courts of justice. FOURTH. Providing for changing the venue in civil or criminal actions.

FIFTH. Granting divorces.

SIXTH. Changing the names of persons or places.

SEVENTH. Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or vacating roads, highways, streets, alleys, town plats, parks, cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned by the state.

EIGHTH. Summoning and impaneling grand and petit juries, and providing for their compensation.

NINTH. Regulating county and township business, or the election of county and township officers.

TENTH. For the assessment or collection of taxes.

ELEVENTH. Providing for conducting elections, or designating the places of voting, except on the organization of new counties.

TWELFTH. Affecting estates of deceased persons, minors, or other persons under legal disabilities.

THIRTEENTH. Extending the time for the collection of

taxes.

FOURTEENTH. Giving effect to invalid deeds, wills or other instruments.

FIFTEENTH. Refunding money paid into the state treas

ury.

SIXTEENTH. Releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation or person to this state, or to any municipal corporation therein.

SEVENTEENTH. Declaring any person of age, or authorizing any minor to sell, lease or encumber his or her property.

EIGHTEENTH, Legalizing, except as against the state, the unauthorized or invalid act of any officer.

118 306

119 521

sub.1 120 401 sub.3 120 304

sub1 121 267

NINETEENTH. Granting to any corporation, association or 118 306

Individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or im-
munity.

TWENTIETH. Exempting property from taxation.
TWENTY-FIRST. Changing county seats.

TWENTY-SECOND. Restoring to citizenship persons convicted of infamous crimes.

TWENTY-THIRD. Regulating the rate of interest on money.
TWENTY-FOURTH. Authorizing the creation, extension or

Impairing of liens.

roads.

TWENTY-FIFTH. Chartering or licensing ferries, bridges or

TWENTY-SIXTH. Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures.

TWENTY-SEVENTH. Providing for the management of com mon schools.

118 305

TWENTY-EIGHTH. Creating offices, or prescribing the pow ers and duties of officers in counties, cities, cities and counties, townships, election or school districts.

TWENTY-NINTH. Affecting the fees or salary of any of

118 306

ficer.

THIRTIETH, Changing the law of descent or succession. THIRTY-FIRST. Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children.

THIRTY-SECOND. For limitation of civil or criminal ac

tions.

Kenning's Const. (2nd ed.) p. 168.

SECTION 25%. The legislature may provide for the division of the state into fish and game districts, and may enact such laws for the protection of fish and game therein as it may deem appropriate to the respective districts. [Amendment adopted November 4, 1902.]

domain is suscepture di peng piUNU..
erned by general law applicable to all persons alike.
While the legislature is authorized to classify munici-
pal corporations for the purpose of incorporation
and organization, the mode of exercising the right
of eminent domain must apply to all alike. It is
unconstitutional to discriminate by applying condi-
tions for the exercise of this right to cities of fifth
and sixth classes, which are not made applicable to

all classes. City of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238.

It is clearly the intention to emancipate municipal governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by the legislature, and this is the more apparent from the fact that a charter framed by freeholders and ratified by the people cannot be amended by the legislature. (Secs. 8, 13, 14, Art. XI; Sec. 25, Art. IV.) People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618.

Paragraph 1. The act of March 7, 1881, (Stats. p. 75) creating an additional court, known as the Police Judges Court, No. 2, in San Francisco, is not in contravention of either sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 28 or 29, of section 25, article IV, constitution. Ex parte Jordan, 62 Cal. 464.

Paragraph 2. The consolidation act of San Francisco conferred ample power upon the supervisors to pass an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to visit gambling places, and is not unconstitutional. The constitution only prohibits the legislature from itself passing such local laws. (Distinguishing Earle v. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 489, declaring the Traylor act unconstitutional.) Ex parte Chin Yan, 60 Cal. 79.

Sections 300, 301, Penal Code, as existing in 1881, known as the "Sunday Law," are not unconstitutional, as being "special legislation." Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal.177. (McKinstry, Sharpstein and Ross, JJ., dissenting.)

The act of April 16, 1880, (Stats. p. 80) making it a misdemeanor for persons engaged in the baking of bread for sale to carry on said business between the hours of 6 P. M. on Saturday and 6 P. M. on Sunday, is a special law and unconstitutional. Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal, 550.

The act of 1878, (Stats. p. 953) providing for sentence of persons convicted of felonies or misdemeanors to the house of correction in San Francisco, is not special or local legislation, either as to the punishment or as to practice of courts. Ex parte Lizzie Williams, 87 Cal. 78.

Prior to adoption of the present constitution, section 340 of the Penal Code prohibited pawn brokers from demanding or receiving more than four per cent. per month as interest. By amendment of 1881 the rate was reduced to two per cent. per month. This restriction was held constitutional as a general law applicable uniformly to a certain class of business, under the former constitution, in several cases. (Jackson v. Shawl, and cases there cited, 29 Cal.267.) Held, the code provision does not violate subdivisions 2 or 23 of section 25, article IV of present constitution. Ex parte Lichenstein, 67 Cal. 359.

Referred to in Ex parte Jordan, 62 Cal. 464. Paragraph 3. The act of the legislature (Stats. 1889, pp. 157, 168) making certificate of street assessment prima facie evidence is constitutional. McDonald v. Conniff, 99 Cal. 386.

The act of 1871-2, (Stats. p. 533) requiring plaintiff in an action for slander to file an undertaking with sureties, and which act was passed at the same session by which the codes were adopted, and subsequent to their adoption, is not repealed by the constitution, and is not a local or special law. Smith v. McDermot, 93 Cal. 421; citing Ex parte Burke, 59 Cal. 6; School Dist. v. Shoecraft, 88 Cal. 372.

The act of March 12, 1885, (Stats. p. 114) to facilitate the giving of bonds required by law, and authorizing corporations to become sole sureties on bonds and undertakings, is a general law, and is not void as regulating the practice of courts of justice. Cramer v. Tittle, 72 Cal. 12.

The act of March 16, 1864, (Stats. p. 183) relating to foreclosing street assessments in Sacramento provided that such actions should be brought in the name of the people of the state of California. The act is constitutional. The legislature had power to regulate pleadings in that class of actions. Sullivan v. Mier, 67 Cal. 264. [The decision is not controlled by the present constitution.]

Referred to in Ex parte Jordan, 62 Cal. 464.

The provisions of section 3670 Political Code, prescribing form of complaint to recover delinquent railroad taxes cannot control the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly devoted to the