partmental activities has resulted in the passing of sections in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, and the Gas Regulation Act, 1920, under which special orders may, in the case of electricity, be made by the Electricity Commissioners and confirmed by the Board of Trade, and, in the case of gas, be made by the Board of Trade, for purposes which previously would have been effected by Provisional Order confirmed by Act of Parliament in pursuance of procedure laid down in the Electric Lighting Act, 1882, and the Gas and Waterworks Facilities Act, 1870. Parliament has however reserved a measure of control over these special orders. In the case of electricity the order does not come into force unless and until approved, either with or without modifications, by a resolution of each House of Parliament. In the case of gas the Board of Trade has to lay the draft of the proposed order before Parliament, and may not actually make the order until a resolution has been passed by each House of Parliament approving the draft with or without modifications or additions.

ROYAL CHARTERS.-There still subsists a power in the Crown to authorise certain public service undertakings by Royal Charter or Letters Patent. Little use is now made of the power and its place has been taken almost entirely in modern times by parliamentary legislation and departmental action authorised by Parliament. But in ancient times Royal Charter was a common form of procedure and many undertakings exist whose privileges depend, for their origin at any rate, on Royal Charter or Letters Patent. Markets and Fairs and Ferries are the most noteworthy examples.

GENERAL ACTS.-There are certain cases in which the general law authorises the carrying on of public service undertakings without the necessity of special sanction under any Act, Order or Charter. An instance of this is the power given by the Public Health Act, 1875, to local authorities to establish and carry on water undertakings for the supply of their own districts where there is no company or other body having parliamentary powers for that purpose and able and willing to give a proper and

sufficient supply, and the power given by the same Act to urban local authorities to establish and carry on gas undertakings for the supply of their own districts where there is no company or other body having parliamentary powers for the purpose.

Legal Principles Applicable. Thus far we have been obtaining a general idea of the public service undertakings with which we have to deal, the undertakers by whom they are conducted, and the way in which the undertakings are authorised and the undertakers obtain their special powers. Next we shall have to deal with legal principles applicable more or less generally to such undertakers and their undertakings, when established, and afterwards we shall have to turn our attention to particular classes of undertaking.

It will readily be understood that the inquiry into general legal principles cannot be an easy or simple matter when it is remembered how much the principles to be applied in any given case are liable to be affected by the special legislation governing the particular undertaking concerned. Those who deal with the legal position of any public service undertaking have always to be on their guard against the danger of applying some common legal rule concerning, we will say, the use of landed property, or some provision usually applicable to undertakings of the same class, when in fact a search of the Special Acts relating to the particular undertaking may disclose the existence of some enactment expressly, or perhaps only by indirect implication, excluding that principle or provision. Experience of this kind makes one inclined in reply to the question, "what are the general legal principles governing public service undertakings?" to say "there are no such principles; everything depends on the legislation governing the individual case and any generalisation is rash." I think however this would be going too far. Something in the way of generalisation can be attempted and is worth while, although the possibility of a plentiful crop of exceptions must always be admitted.

CHAPTER II.

THE SCOPE OF PURPOSES AND POWERS.

WHEN We come to deal with questions of legal principle connected with public service undertakings one of the most important matters to consider is the scope of the purposes for which an undertaking is established and the effect thereof upon the powers and responsibilities of the undertakers.

For the definition of those purposes, powers, and responsibilities you will look primarily to the legislative instrument under whose authority the undertaking is established, be it special Act or general Act of Parliament or Provisional Order confirmed by Parliament or whatever else it may be ; and you will remember that whatever the Legislature has directed in unambiguous terms holds the field. Thus, suppose that an Act of Parliament incorporates a company for certain purposes defined in general terms. Suppose that the Act then proceeds to invest the company with some specific power which goes beyond the scope of the purposes so defined. The company will be able to exercise the specific power, and to that extent its purposes will be inferentially enlarged and carried beyond the scope of the general description. Suppose, on the other hand, that by an express enactment it is precluded from doing some specific thing which would otherwise come within the range of the defined purposes, then the specific thing will be beyond the company's powers, and the scope of the company's purposes will to that extent be inferentially restricted.

But the express provisions of an Act of Parliament may be far from affording complete guidance as to the extent of the purposes, powers and responsibilities of a company

which the Act establishes and regulates. It is a legal principle of great importance that where an Act gives the power, and still more where it goes further and imposes a duty, to do some particular thing it impliedly gives power to do everything else which is absolutely necessary to enable that particular thing to be done. The implied powers may, in a given case, be just as essential as the express powers for securing the due attainment of the main purposes of the undertaking.

While, on the one hand, the express powers cannot be taken at their face value as indicating a rigid limit of power which cannot be stretched, it is equally the case, on the other hand, that they cannot be taken at their face value as giving a charter to do everything the words may cover without regard to surrounding circumstances; for it is also an important legal principle that special statutory powers must be exercised reasonably and in such a way as not to infringe upon the ordinary rights of other persons in a greater degree than is absolutely necessary for effectuating the object of the powers.

Let me enlarge upon these matters a little further. But first let me call attention to a slight difference in the attitude the law takes towards the construction of Acts according to whether they are passed at the instance of a body of adventurers, seeking profit, or at the instance of a public authority, having no interest to serve except the public welfare. In the former case the powers will be construed rather more strictly against those who exercise them. Although the purposes to be carried out are such as to benefit the public, the fact that the motive of gain is operative upon the minds of the undertakers makes the law more jealous in guarding against the risk that the privileges granted may be abused, and the tendency is to confine the undertakers rather strictly within their statutory purposes and authority. Where, however, the motive of profit is absent, the tendency is to give a wider latitude and discretion to the undertakers in deciding how they shall exercise the powers granted. Take, for example, the common case of the grant of special powers to enable public

service undertakers to acquire by compulsion, for the purposes of their undertaking, lands owned and occupied by private persons. There may well be considerable difference of view in a particular case as to what area of land is absolutely necessary for carrying out the authorised purpose, and whether or not the undertakers should be allowed to take some area with the object of using it for a subsidiary purpose which they think (though the owner does not) comes reasonably within the scope of the main purpose. The law will be more astute to keep the undertakers narrowly within the limits of their charter if they are a profit-making company than if they are a purely public authority.

Nevertheless the law will not cut down powers which are given clearly and in precise terms, whether they are entrusted to private adventurers or public authorities. Thus, if an Act clearly entrusts to a company a discretion to take and use land either for one purpose or for another, as they may choose, the courts will not interfere so as to limit or prejudice the company in the bonâ-fide exercise of that discretion.

It is a rule in the construction of statutes that you must not construe provisions so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the Legislature. But if the Legislature authorises something the doing of which is physically inconsistent with the continuance of an existing right, and authorises the thing to be done at all events and irrespective of its possible interference with the existing right, then the right is at an end.

A fact that is often taken as assisting to indicate whether or not the Legislature intends an existing private right to be overridden is the inclusion or omission of a provision for compensation. As a rule the Legislature does not take away private rights without providing for compensation to the parties interested, and the absence of a provision for compensation may serve to show that words in the Act should be construed in such a sense as will preserve the