republican ideal in that it affords the opportunity to the worthy untrained workman to make the most of himself. The operative in the mill may here have the privilege of acquiring any branch of the textile industry and studying any particular machine in which he is interested or any special process at nominal cost.

Too much, however, must not be expected of the textile school. The school practice is not intended to give that complete mastery and rapidity of execution which can only be acquired in the factory. It must be held in mind that the textile school is an institution for trade-teaching, where efficient workers of intelligent self-activity and high initiative may be produced-workers who can at once find employment and satisfactorily fill responsible positions, owing to the skill and knowledge there acquired. The time may be anticipated when every important manufacturing center of America will have these supplementary technical schools for purposes of special culture in the manual professions.

The New Bedford Textile School is the outcome largely of the development of the cottonmanufacturing interests in the South, as well as of European example and enterprise in textile education. The far-seeing manufacturers of New England foresee the time when the manufacture of the cheaper and coarser goods must from economic advantages be preëmpted by the South, and have seized the opportunity to take an advance step. The whole trend of the textile industry in New England to-day is toward the production of finer and more artistic material, for which is required skillful and intelligent workmanship of the highest grade, such as special textile training in a well-equipped institution may be expected to provide.

Though competition with the South in cottonmanufacturing is a comparatively new feature in the textile industry, it is not feared, but rather hailed, by the wise manufacturer for its bearing on national prosperity. The advance of the South in this direction involves a broadening of the whole industry, an expansion of foreign commerce, and a growth in our exports of manu!actured goods. It is a fact that only one-third of the raw cotton now produced remains in this Country; the other two-thirds go to Great Britain and other European countries, to be manfactured and by them exported in various directions. With Southern mills for coarser prodlets and Northern mills for finer grades, the United States may be expected to take its place beside the larger exporting countries of the world. Neither is there any serious apprehension

THE NEW BEDFORD TEXTILE SCHOOL.

among New England manufacturers over the prophecy that the South will soon be using all its raw-cotton product, and have none for Northern mills. This is on a par with the dread of coal exhaustion. When there is a demand for more cotton, more cotton will be grown. And there is no doubt in the North that the South could as well produce 20,000,000 bales of cotton where it now produces 10,000,000 bales.

In

Atmospheric conditions are strong and gov. erning motives in the textile manufactures. this regard New England will always have a peculiar and telling advantage over the South, where artificial apparatus for humidifying must be largely employed. New Bedford especially is exceedingly well located to receive the influence of the Gulf Stream.

It is fully realized by New England manufacturers and legislators that industrial progress must keep pace with the constantly growing call for products of higher excellence in design and finish. This involves a trained body of workers, and more especially educated superintendence. Native ingenuity is not sufficient. Hence the existence of the textile school, out of which is to come trained craftsmen and educated experts. Systematic instruction in school and shop, furnishing an inspiration for original and inventive ideas, is a necessity to the modern textile industry.

THE

HE constitution of the new commonwealth of Australia naturally claims attention and challenges criticism as the latest development in federal constitution making among people of Anglo-Saxon race. Its authors had before them the experience of this country and of Canada; and they have evidently used that experience freely, both in what they have imitated and in what they have rejected. Their task was not an easy one, in spite of this wealth of material-partly, it may be, from something of an embarrassment of riches, but even more because the circumstances of Australia made agreement between its component parts unusually difficult. A people

for the most part of strongly democratic instincts, they had freely exercised their untrammeled powers of self-government, and were generally reluctant to give up any part of the control of their own affairs which could be retained consistently with any scheme of federation whatever. When to this is added the fact that in the case of Australia there was not even the suspicion of any external pressure rendering union imperative, it is not difficult to understand why the process of Australian constitution-making was the slowest on record.

THE PROBLEM OF FEDERATION.

In approaching the examination of what has been done, it is therefore necessary not only to remember the experiences of other countries which the authors of the Australian constitution had before them, but the circumstances of the island continent itself, which in some respects complicated the undertaking. It is necessary to remember that the object was to consolidate into one six nearly sovereign states, varying in population from 150,000, to nearly 1,500,000, and occupying territories the area of which varied from 1.000,000 to 26,000 square miles; and, above all, that there was no very pressing reason to be alleged why they must federate at all. a matter of fact, the constitution as it exists is very largely made of compromises. It repre sents, not the conceivable best, but only the best possible, under conditions which taxed to the utmost the mutual forbearance of the delegates to the federal convention. The result is that the constitution of the new commonwealth has

As

many things in common with our own; others that bear more resemblance to that of the Dominion of Canada, and still a third class which very materially differs from both. For the sake of clearness, it may be well to consider it shortly under three heads: What the federal government is to deal with; how its legislative powers are distributed; and in what way the executive force of the commonwealth is to be exercised. It may be said generally that, as to the first head, the new constitution most resembles that of the United States; as to the second, that it departs largely from all existing precedents; and as to the third, that, as might have been expected from its position as a part of the British Empire, it resembles the constitution of Canada.

POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

The federal government of Australia will have large powers. In its hands will be vested exclusive control of customs taxation, together with power to impose all such other taxes as may be required for the public service, with the sole limitation that they shall be so imposed as in no case to discriminate between states, or parts of states; the sole control of all matters of defense; the management and control of the postal, telegraph, and telephone services of the country; questions of immigration, naturalization, and interstate trade and commerce; the maintenance of lighthouses, beacons, and buoys; all external affairs, including the influx and extradition of criminals, and all questions of conciliation and arbitration extending beyond the limits of any single state. Banking and insurance, coinage and currency, weights and measures, laws relating to bills of exchange and promissory notes, bankruptcy, patents, copyrights, and companies, are also vested solely in the commonwealth. In addi

tion to these questions, which are, for the most part, familiar to Americans as subjects of federal legislation, there will vest in the federal parliament the sole right to deal with the law of marriage, divorce, and matrimonial causes, and all questions relating to parental rights and the custody and guardianship of infants, and also all public provisions for old age and invalid pensions. To the commonwealth is reserved the right to make use of all the railroads belong

ing to any state (in Australia practically all railroads do belong to the states) for defense purposes, and also, with the consent of any state, to take over and operate the state railroad or railroads on terms to be arranged; and, with the like consent, to construct other railroads. The power to control and regulate the navigation of rivers flowing through more than one state is also reserved to the federal parliament, but only so far as interstate interests are directly affected.

These are the principal powers reserved to the commonwealth-so far, at least, as its internal affairs are concerned; and it will be observed that they embrace only such questions as are necessarily important to the commonwealth and its citizens as a whole. They include, therefore, all matters of commerce extending beyond the states; matters of social order, such as the entire armed force of the country, with the legal control of the means of its removal and concentration; of social morals, including the conservation of marriage and the protection of the young; of social stability and equality, as affected by trade disputes, and by provisions for the aged and infirm. It will be seen at once that these provisions extend the powers of the federal government in several respects considerably beyond anything yet attempted by the Constitution of the United States, though it may be questioned whether they any where go beyond the limits which experience in this country has suggested as very desirable extensions of the central authority.

THE LIMITATION OF FEDERAL POWERS.

All powers of borrowing money on the secu rity of the revenue of the commonwealth are, of course, reserved exclusively to the federal government, as well as every question involving the external relations of the country, such as the laws affecting external trade, commerce, and navigation. On the other hand, the management of harbors, and of internal though navigable rivers and waterways, and the management and control of the lands of the country, at present by far the largest and most important asset of Australia, are left to the states. The present state debts are to be taken over by the commonwealth, and the interest provided for out of the customs taxation, with the further proviso that for a fixed period of five years the balance of revenue thus raised, after payment of the expenses of the federal establishment, shall be repaid to the states in pro. portion to population. These latter provisions, it will be observed, confine the federal government within narrower limits in some material respects than those of our own Constitution, and represent compromises insisted on by the states as the sole conditions on which they would give up

their present complete autonomy. The circum. stances of the country are accountable, as will readily be seen, for most of them. As a matter of fact, very few Australian rivers run through or between different states; and the question of the land and mining laws already in force is that on which more diversity prevails than any other -a diversity which is held by the people to be essentially necessary, owing to widely different conditions.

It is only necessary to allude to the essential difference in principle which pervades this constitution and that of the Canadian Dominion. In Australia, as in the United States, it is the contracting colonies that are the substantial basis of the scheme. It is they who give up certain definite rights and powers for the sake of union; and only such as they give up can be assumed by the commonwealth. In the case of Canada it is the provinces that are limited to the exercise of such powers and rights as are specifically reserved; and therefore, in the very nature of things, the march of events must tend more and more to the consolidation of all real power in the hands of the Dominion government, and the gradual degradation of the provinces to the level of municipal governments on a large scale. Νο such scheme of federation would ever have been listened to in Australia, where the widely separated state populations have always been strongly attached to the independent exercise of all the functions of government that most immediately affect themselves.

THE LEGISLATURE.

The legislative powers of the Australian Commonwealth will be exercised by a federal parlia ment, consisting, like our own Congress and the Dominion Parliament of Canada, of two chambers. At this point, however, any close imitation of either existing constitution may be said to cease. In the case of Australia, it was at this point that the constitution ran its greatest risk of rejection. The less populous colonies insisted upon the security which a senate on the principle of equal state representation, on the model of this country, would give; the more populous states insisted upon such a preponderating influence on behalf of population as should make it impossible for a conceivably small minority of the whole people to dictate legislation. The ultimate compromise arrived at was that of giving equal state representation in the Senate, and providing that the House of Representatives should never contain more than twice as many members as the Senate; but, on the other hand, providing that the Senate should not only have no initiative power in respect of money appropriations, but

should not be at liberty to amend a money bill at all. With respect to other laws, also, it is provided that, in case of a deadlock between the chambers continuing after a dissolution and reelection, held expressly to ascertain public opinion on the subject, both chambers shail sit together, and the vote of a simple majority shall prevail.

SENATORS CHOSEN BY POPULAR VOTE.

These provisions bring into strong relief the conditions under which the new constitution was arrived at. The Senators-in the first instance six from each state-will be elected by the vote of the electors of each state. and not through the medium of state legislatures-differing, in this respect, both from the United States and from Canada. Every adult male will have the right to vote for Senators, as for Representatives; and in states where the women already have votes, they also will have votes, and it is left to the state legislatures to determine whether the state shall be divided or vote as a single electo. rate. This arrangement represents the strong democratic feeling of the Australian people, which would consent neither to a senate of cabinet nominees nor to one that might be made the subject of party bargains in state legisla tures. The House of Representatives will consist of twice as many members as the Senate-the number being, from time to time, allotted to the various states in proportion to population. It will have supreme control of the finance of the federation, and the confidence and support of a majority of its members will be the essential condition of any cabinet remaining in power. members of the representative chamber will be elected for three years; those of the Senate for six, with the condition in both cases that their chamber may be dissolved by proclamation of the governor-general, on the advice of the cabinet, at any earlier date. The divergence between this provision and that of this country for keeping the Representatives in touch with public feeling need hardly be pointed out; nor, of course, its still greater contrast with that of Canada in respect of the Senate.

AN EXECUTIVE WITHOUT PATRONAGE.

The

The executive of the Australian Commonwealth will, like that of Canada, vest nominally in a governor-general, appointed by the British

Government, but really-except in a very few exceptional cases-in the hands of the federal cabinet, appointed. like that of Britain herself, from among the members of the Parliament, and possessing the confidence and support of a major. ity of its members, or at least of the members of the representative chamber. A certain vague. ness exists as to the precise powers of the governor-general, exactly as in the case of the English sovereign; but custom, now well established by usage in the Australian colonies, has decided that in practice the governor must act on the advice of his cabinet in every case, unless the measure which he is called upon to sanction is one which manifestly affects the interests of other parts of the empire, or may affect the treaty rights of foreign nations. In either of these cases, he may reserve an act passed by the legis lature for the assent of the crown-which means, of course, of the imperial cabinet. The gov. ernor-general will enjoy a salary of $50,000, but will have absolutely no patronage in Australia.

A SUPREME COURT LIKE THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

The only point in the new constitution that has met with opposition from the British cabinet is that which provides for the federal court, to which is assigned the position of a practically final court of appeal on all questions involving the interpretation of the constitution, and all questions arising between different states, or between the commonwealth and a state, or between residents of different states. The provisions are such as to render so difficult as to be nearly impossible the exercise of the long-established right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, still preserved in Canada. After long negotiation, the representatives of the colonies in London have prevailed, in fact, by consenting to a change in the language of the act, which leaves it in the power of the federal legislature so to curtail the subjects of possible appeal to the crown as to make the High Federal Court's decisions really final. It is hardly likely that, for the pres ent, full effect will be given to this provision; but there can be little doubt that there will be an increasing tendency to render the autonomy of Australia absolutely complete by shutting out the idea of any reference to an external authority upon questions that are specially its own.

IN

HON. EDMUND BARTON.

(Federal Delegate from New South Wales.)

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION.

N the North American Review for June, the Australian statesman, Edmund Barton, writes on the newly established federation of the Australian colonies. In the course of his article, he brings out some interesting points of comparison between the constitution of the new commonwealth and that of the United States. The arrangement provided for a federal capital, for example, is similar to that which located our national seat of government in the District of Columbia.

THE CAPITAL OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH.

"The seat of government of the commonwealth is to be determined by the Parliament. It must be within territory granted to or acquired by the commonwealth, in which it is to be vested. In short, it will be federal territory, and the federal Parliament will have the exclusive power to make laws for its government, and to determine the extent of its representation in either house of that Parliament. It is to be within the state of New South Wales; and, in

return for that concession, it is to be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney, the state capital. The area is not to be less than one hundred square miles. Any crown lands which it may contain-probably a considerable area are to be granted by the state to the commonwealth without payment. The Parliament is to sit at Melbourne, until it meets at the seat of government. It will be seen that the law as to the seat of government will follow that of the United States rather than that of Canada, inasmuch as the area containing the capital will be exclusively under the federation and not under the jurisdiction of any state. There can be very little doubt that the representatives of New South Wales in the federation will lose little time in urging the early choice of this territory. As the legislatures of the several states sit generally in the winter, and as a member of a state legislature is not excluded from sitting in the federal Parliament, if elected, it is probable that convenience will be on the side of summer sessions. In that prospect, it is likely that the area chosen will be at a sufficient altitude to give the advantage of a good summer climate; and, happily, several such areas are open for choice in New South Wales."

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

The constitution may be altered much more easily than that of the United States.

house.

"A bill for the purpose must first, in ordinary cases, be passed by an absolute majority in each It is afterward to be submitted in each state to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members in the House of Representatives. This is to be done not less than two nor more than six months after the passage of the bill through both houses. If, however, an amendment passed by an absolute majority of one house fails to pass the other, or is passed with an amendment as to which the two houses differ, and if, after an interval of three months, a similar difference occurs, the amendment may be submitted to the popular vote, just as if it had secured an absolute majority in both houses. In order to become law, the amendment must, at the referendum, secure a majority of the electors, who vote, and it must also secure majorities in a majority of the states. The difficulty which will exist because in South Australia women as well as men have a vote is met by prescribing that, until there is a uniform suffrage throughout the commonwealth, only half the electors voting for and against the amendment may be counted in any state in