Nomination. notice and pay all contributions due at the end of that period, to the medical society (a). The contributing trade unions or branches do not become members or branches of the society to which they contribute. A dispute between a trade union and such a society cannot be referred to arbitration under the rules of the latter.1 A member of a registered trade union, not being under the age of sixteen years, may, by writing under his hand, delivered at, or sent to, the office of the trade union, nominate any person not being an officer or servant of the trade union (except the husband, wife, father, mother, child, brother, sister, nephew, or niece of the nominator), to whom any moneys (not exceeding £100), payable on the death of such member shall be paid at his decease (b). Such nomination may be partly printed, and, if made in a book kept at the office, is deemed to be delivered at such office (c). If a member of a registered trade union, who is entitled from the funds thereof to a sum not exceeding £100, dies intestate, without leaving any subsisting nomination at the time of his death, such sum is nevertheless payable, without letters of adminstration. The person, to whom this sum is to be paid, is the person who appears a majority of the trustees, upon evidence deemed 1 Snell v. Vine, (1890) F. S. Cas. 313. (a) (1896) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 25, s. 22 (2), (3). (b) (1876) 39 & 40 Vict. c. 22, s. 10; (1883) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 47, to s. 3. (c) (1883) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 47, s. 4. satisfactory by them, to be entitled by law to receive it (a). If a member of a registered trade union, not being under the age of sixteen years, is illegitimate and has died intestate, without leaving any such nomination, the trustees may pay the sum which such member may die possessed of, to the person or persons who, in the opinion of the majority of such trustees, would have been entitled thereto, if such member had been legitimate. If there be no such persons, the deposit must be dealt with as the Treasury may direct (b). All payments made by trustees under these powers are valid against persons claiming as nextof-kin or representative of the deceased. But such next-of-kin or representative may recover money paid by the trustees from the recipients (c). Knight. In Crocker v. Knight,1 it was held by the Court Crocker v. of Appeal (Kay and Lindley, L.JJ.), that section 4 of the 1871 Act prevents the Court from entertaining legal proceedings to enforce the foregoing provisions as to nomination. The plaintiff, the widow of a member of a registered trade union, had been nominated by her husband to receive his funeral money from the society. Lindley, L.J., Lindley, said: "The sum, sought to be recovered here, is 2 L.J. payable under a rule which provides a benefit to a member within section 4 of the 1871 Act. So far, therefore, this action cannot be maintained (a); but section 10 of the 1876 Act is in terms one, which seems to impose a statutory obligation on the trade union to pay to the nominee the amount to which the member was entitled under the rules. The question is whether the words, 'the trade union shall pay,' constitute an obligation which can be enforced by action. Now I think the object of this section was not to depart from the policy of the 1871 Act, but was entirely different, namely, to enable persons of sixteen years of age and upwards, without the necessity of making a will and incurring the expense of probate, to give away any small sums of money, that may be due to them from the trade union. Under section 10, the money recoverable by a member from the trade union is to go to the nominee of that member, even though he may be so young as seventeen or eighteen years of age, and I do not think, looking at the first and other sections of the 1876 Act, that we can find any sufficient indication of any intention to depart from the terms of section 4 of the 1871 Act, so as to alter the policy of the Legislature, which was to prevent the introduction of legal proceedings into the affairs of trade unions, and to save trade unions from being subjected to the expense of litigation." "The question" continued his Lordship, "really turns on the construction of the two Acts. We (a) Infra, Chapter V. are asked to read section 10 of the second Act as overriding section 4 of the first, and to hold that there is, therefore, a distinct statutory obligation on the part of the trade union to pay; but when we are told by the Legislature to read the two Acts as one (a), we must read them in such a way as to make them consistent. In my opinion, the trade union is subject to no more obligation to pay than it was before the Act of 1871 was passed." 1 Kay, L.J., in concurring, said: "If section 10 Kay, L.J. of the 1876 Act had meant to repeal section 4 of the 1871 Act, I should have expected to find in it some such words as 'notwithstanding anything contained in section 4 of the principal Act, such nominee shall be entitled to sue.' In view, however, of subsequent decisions on the construction of section 4 of the 1871 Act, in limiting the jurisdiction of the Courts in inter-union affairs it is extremely doubtful how far Crocker v. Knight may now be regarded as good law (b). change of name and amalga mation. No change of name on the part of a registered Effect of trade union will affect any of its rights or obligations. Any pending legal proceedings may be continued by or against the trustees of the trade union or any other officer who may sue or be sued on behalf of such trade union notwithstanding its new name, and no amalgamation of trade unions will prejudice the right of a creditor of any amalgamating union (c). Liability for interfer CHAPTER III. DIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH THE DISPOSAL OF LABOUR THE execution of the purposes of trade unions involves extensive interference with the free disposal ence with of labour and capital, and certain legal liabilities labour or capital. Individual and have, in consequence, attached to such associations, (1) Liabilities arising from direct interference Direct Interference. With regard to direct interference with the free concerted disposal of labour or capital, two distinct sources of liability arise, namely: inter ference. (a) Liabilities arising from individual interference of one or more persons with the free disposal of labour or capital. 1 Per Holt, C.J. in Keeble v. Hickeringill, (1809) 11 East 574, at pp. 575, 576. (a) Infra, Chapter IV., Restraint of Trade. |