tion in which it terminated, together with what has since passed between the two governments, both here and at London, were submitted to congress during its late session. Of that reference you were apprized, by the note of my predecessor, of the 4th December last. It has so happened that neither the senate nor the house of representatives has expressed, directly, any opinion on the subject. But, on another convention having the same object, concluded with the republic of Colombia, on the 10th day of December, 1824, which was formed after the model of that which is pending between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, the senate has expressed a very decided opinion. In the Colombian convention, the coasts of America were excepted from its operation, and yet, notwithstanding this conciliating feature, the senate, after full deliberation, in the exercise of its proper constitutional powers, has, by a large majority, deemed it inexpedient to consent to, and advise, the ratification of this convention. The government of his Britannic majesty is well acquainted with the provision of the constitution of the United States, by which the senate is a component part of the treaty-making power; and that the consent and advice of that branch of congress are indispensable in the formation of all treaties. According to the practice of this government, the senate is not ordinarily consulted in the initiatory state of negotiation, but its consent and advice are only invoked, after a treaty is concluded, under the direction of the president, and submitted to its consideration. Each of the two branches of the treaty making authority is independent of the other, whilst both are responsible to the states and to the people, the common sources of their respective powers. It results from this organization, that, in the progress of the government, instances may sometimes occur of a difference of opinion between the senate and the executive, as to the expediency of a projected treaty, of which the rejection of the Colombian convention affords an example. The people of the United States have justly considered that, if there be any inconveniences in this arrangement of their executive powers, those inconveniences are more than counterbalanced, by the greater security of their interests, which is effected by the mutual checks which are thus interposed. But it is not believed that there are any inconveniences to foreign powers, of which they can, with propriety, complain. To give validity to any treaty, the consent of the contracting parties is necessary. As to the mode by which that consent shall be expressed, it must necessarily depend with each upon its own peculiar constitutional arrangement. that can rightly be demanded in treating, is to know the contingencies, on the happening of which that consent is to be regarded as sufficiently testified. This information, the government of the United States has always communicated to the foreign powers with which it treats, and to none more fully than to the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Nor can it be admitted that any just cause of complaint can arise out of the rejection by one party, of a treaty, which the other has previously ratified. When such a case occurs, it only proves that All the consent of both, according to the constitutional precautions which have been provided for manifesting that consent, is wanting to make the treaty valid. One must necessarily precede the other in the act of ratification; and, if after a treaty is ratified by one party, a ratification of it be withheld by the other, it merely shows that one is, and the other is not, willing to come under the obligations of the proposed treaty. I am instructed by the president to accompany these frank and friendly explanations by the expression of his sincere regret that, from the views which are entertained by the senate of the United States, it would seem to be unnecessary and inexpedient any longer to continue the negotiation respecting the slave convention, with any hope that it can be made to assume a form satisfactory to both parties. The government of his Britannic majesty insists, as an indispensable condition, that the regulated right of search, proposed in the convention, should be extended to the American coasts, as well as to those of Africa and the West Indies. The senate, even with the omission of America, thinks it unadvisable to ratify the Colombian convention. And it is, therefore, clearly to be inferred, that a convention with his Britannic majesty, with a similar omission, would not receive the approbation of the senate. The decision of the senate shews that it has made up its deliberate judgment, without any regard to the relative state of the military or commercial marine, for all the considerations belonging to a view of that subject would have urged the senate to an acceptance of the Colombian convention. It is hoped, therefore, that his Bri tannic majesty cannot fail to perceive that the senate has been guided by no unfriendly feeling towards Great Britain. Before closing this note, I must express my regret that I am unable to concur with you in the view which you have been pleased to present, of the act of the British parliament, by which it has denounced, as piratical, the slave trade, when exercised by British subjects. It is acknowledged that the government of the United States considered such a denunciation as expedient, preliminary to the conclusion of the projected convention. But the British parliament, doubtless, upon its own sense of the enormity of the offence, deemed it proper to affix to it the character and the penalties of piracy. However much it may be supposed to have been actuated by an accommodating spirit towards the United States, it can hardly be imagined that it would have given that denomination to the fact of trading in slaves, from motives of concession merely, contrary to its own estimate of the moral character of that act. The executive of the United States believed that it might conduce to the success of the negotiation, if the British parliament would previously declare, as the United States had done, the slave trade to be piratical. But it did not follow, from the passage of that act, that any treaty, in which the negotiation might terminate, was to be taken out of the ordinary rule by which all treaties are finally submitted to the scrutiny and sanction of the respective governments. No peculiar advantage has accrued to the United States from the enactment of that British law. Its continued existence, moreover, now depends upon the pleasure of the British parliament. But there is no disposition to dwell longer on this subject. The true character of the whole nego tiation cannot be misconceived. Great Britain and the United States have had in view a common end of great humanity, entitled to their highest and best exertions. With respect to the desire of attaining that end, there is no difference of opinion between the government of his Britannic majesty and that of the United States, in any of its branches. But the senate has thought that the proposed convention was an instrument not adapted to the accomplishment of that end, or that it was otherwise objectionable. And, without the concurrence of the senate, the convention cannot receive the constitutional sanctions of the United States. Without indulging, therefore, unavailing regrets, it is the anxious hope of the president, that the government of his Britannic majesty should see, in all that has occurred, nothing towards it unfriendly on the part of that of the United States, and nothing that ought to slacken their separate or united exertions, in the employment of all other practical modes to effectuate the great object, so dear to both, an entire extirpation of a traffic which is condemned by reason, religion, and humanity. I pray you, Sir, to accept the assurance of my distinguished consideration, H. CLAY. Henry C. Addington, esq. Chargé d'Affaires from Great Britain. Mr. Addington to Mr. Clay. knowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th inst. in which you announce to me the definitive decision of the president with regard to the convention for the more effectual suppression of the slave trade, which I had the honour to submit for the acceptance of this government, on the 6th of November last. In expressing my regret at the failure of the benevolent efforts which have been employed in a cause so dear to humanity, I may venture to assure you that, however deeply his majesty's government may deplore the present disappointment of their hopes, they will consider the unfortunate issue of this business as in no wise affecting the friendly feelings which exist between the two governments, and will accept, with pleasure, the expression of the president's desire, that every exertion should still be used for effecting the entire extirpation of that odious traffic, which the convention was designed to suppress. I cannot dismiss this subject without a brief observation on that part of your letter in which you animadvert upon the argument employed in mine of the 6th of November last, relative to the act passed by the British parliament, for denouncing the slave trade as piracy. The expressions used by you would lead to a belief, that I had represented the passage of the act, on the part of Great Britain, as rendering it imperative on the American government to recede to the convention, even at the expense of a sacrifice of their constitutional prerogatives. A reference to the expressions of my letter, will, I apprehend, at once demonstrate the erroneousness of this impression, by shewing that I put the case as a point of conscience, not one of right, and that I urged the argument, above alluded to, in the form of an appeal, not of a demand. The denunciation of the slave trade as piracy, by British statute, was made by this government, a sine qua non to the signature of the convention. As far as Great Britain was concerned, that proceeding, although perfectly conformable to the views of parliament, quoad morality, was one of pure supererogation, and conferred no power towards the suppression of the slave trade, not possessed before. Had the government of the United States not expressly desired the enactment of that statute, it would never have been passed: but, being passed, its revocation, although certainly within the competence of parliament, is now, by the interposition of subsequent events, rendered tantamount to morally impossible. These circumstances will, I apprehend, amply justify both the form of the argument which I built upon them, and the warmth with which I urged it. I offer the preceding remarks, not by any means with a view to invite to further discussion, but simply in order to obviate all misconstruction of the meaning of words already employed by me. I have the honour, Sir, to re- The hon. Henry Clay, CONVENTION with RUSSIA. &c.; and his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, the sieur Charles Robert Count de Nesselrode, his Imperial Majesty's privy councillor, a member of the Council of the Empire, secretary of state for the department of Foreign Affairs, &c., and the sieur Pierre de Poletica, his Imperial Majesty's councillor of state, &c; who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles : His majesty the king of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his majesty the emperor of all the Russias, being desirous of drawing still closer the ties of good understanding and friendship which unite them, by means of an agreement which may settle, upon the basis of reciprocal convenience, different points connected with the commerce, navigation, and fisheries of their subjects on the Pacific Ocean, as well as the limits of their respective possessions on the north-west coast of America, have named plenipo- Art. I.-It is agreed that the tentiaries to conclude a convention respective subjects of the high confor this purpose, that is to say-tracting parties shall not be trouhis majesty the king of the united bled or molested, in any part of kingdom of Great Britain and the ocean commonly called the Ireland, the right hon. Stratford Pacific Ocean, either in navigating Canning, a member of his said the same, in fishing therein, or in majesty's most hon. Privy Council, landing at such parts of the coast as shall not have been already occupied, in order to trade with the natives, under the restrictions and conditions specified in the following articles. II.-In order to prevent the right of navigating and fishing, exercised upon the ocean by the subjects of the high contracting parties, from becoming the pretext for an illicit commerce, it is agreed that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall not land at any place where there may be a Russian establishment, without the permission of the governor or commandant; and, on the other hand, that Russian subjects shall not land, without permission, at any British establishment on the north west coast. - III.-The line of demarcation between the possessions of the high contracting parties, upon the coast of the continent, and the islands of America to the north west, shall be drawn in the manner following:Commencing from the southermost point of the island called Prince of Wales's Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes, north latitude, and between the 131st and the 133rd degree of west longitude (meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel, as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast, as far as the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude (of the same meridian); and, finally, from the said point of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st degree in its prolongation as far as VOL. LXVII. the Frozen Ocean, shall form the limit between the Russian and British possessions on the continent of America to the north-west. IV. With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding article, it is understood 1st. That the island called Prince of Wales's Island shall belong wholly to Russia. 2nd. That wherever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast, from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude, shall prove to be at the distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above-mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom. V. It is moreover agreed, that no establishment shall be formed by either of the two parties within the limits assigned by the two preceding articles to the possessions of the other: consequently, British subjects shall not form any establishment either upon the coast, or upon the border of the continent comprised within the limits of the Russian possessions, as designated in the two preceding articles; and, in like manner, no establishment shall be formed by Russian subjects beyond the said limits. VI. It is understood that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, from whatever quarter they may arrive, whether from the ocean or from the interior of the continent, shall for ever enjoy the right of navigating freely, and without any E* |