have been signed without inquiry; and, in one instance at least, the seal of the court has been within reach of a person most interested in its improper application It is obvious that, under such circumstances, no severity of administration can check the abuse of the law; and information has, from time to time, been communicated to the Pension Office, questioning or denying the right of persons placed upon the pension list, to the bounty of the country. Such cautions are always attended to, and examined. Bu a far more general investigation is called for. And I therefore recommend, in conformity with the suggestions of the Secretary of War, that an actual inspection should be made, in each State, into the circumstances and claims of every person now drawing a pension. The honest veteran has nothing to fear from such a scrutiny, while the fraudulent claimant will be detected. and the public treasury relieved to an amount, I have reason to believe, far greater than has heretofore been suspected. The details of such a plan, could be so regulated as to interpose the necessary checks, without any burthensome operation upon the pensioners. The object should be two fold: 1. To look into the original justice of the claims, so far as this can be done under a proper system of regulations, by an examination of the claimants themselves, and by inquiring, in the vicinity of their residence, into their history, and into the opinion entertained of their revolutionary services.

2. To ascertain, in all cases, whether the original claimant is living, and this by actual personal inspection.

This measure will, if adopted, be productive, I think, of the desired results, and I therefore recommend it to your consideration, with the further suggestion, that all payments should be suspended till the neces Say reports are received.

It will be seen by a tabular statement annexed to the documents transmitted to Congress, that the appropriations for objects connected with the War Department, made at the last session, for the service of the year 1834, excluding the permanent appropriation for the payment of m.litary gratuities, under the act of June 7, 1832, the appropriation of two hundred thousand dollars for arming and equipping the militia, and the appropriation of ten thousand dollars for the civilization of the Indians, which are not annually renewed, amounted to the sum of nine millions three thousand two hundred and sixty-one dollars, and that the estimates of appropriations necessary for the same branches of service for the year 1835, amount to the sum of five millions seven hundred and seventy-eight thousand nine hundred and sixty four dollars, making a difference in the appropriations of the current year over the estimates of appropriations for the next, of three millions two hundred and twentyfour thousand two hundred and ninety-seven dollars.

The principal causes which have operated at this time to produce this great difference, are shown in the reports and documents, and in the detailed estimates. Some of these causes are accidental and temporary, while others are permanent, and, aided by a just course of administration, may continue to operate beneficially upon the public expenditures.

A just economy, expending where the public service requires, and withholding where it does not, is among the indispensable duties of the Government

I refer you to the accompanying report of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, and to the documents with it, for a full view of the operations of that important branch of our service, during the present year. It will be seen that the wisdom and liberality with which Congress have provided for the gradual increase of our navy material, have been seconded by a corresponding zeal and fidelity on the part of those to whom has been confided the execution of the laws on the subject, and that but a short period would be now required to put in commission a force large enough for any exigency into which the country may be thrown

When we reflect upon our position in relation to other nations, it must be apparent, that in the event of conflicts with them, we must look chiefly to our Navy for the protection of our national rights. The wide seas which separate us from other governments, must of necessity be the theatre on which an enemy will aim to assail us, and unless we are prepared to meet him on this element, we cannot be said to possess the power requisite to repel or prevent aggressions. We cannot, therefore, watch with too much attention this arm of our defence, or cherish with too much care the means by which it can possess the necessary efficiency and extension. To this end our policy has been heretofore wisely directed to the constant employment of a force sufficient to guard our commerce, and to the rapid accumulation of the materials, which are necessary to repair our vessels, and construct with ease such new ones as may be required in a state of war.

In accordance with this policy, I recommend to your consideration the erection of the additional Dry Dock described by the Secretary of the Navy, and also the construction of the Steam Batteries to which he has referred, for the purpose of test ng their efficacy as auxiliaries to the system of defence now in use.

The report of the POSTMASTER GENERAL, herewith submitted, exhibits the condition and prospects of that Department. From that document it appears that there was a deficit in the funds of the Department at the commencement of the present year, beyond its available means, of three hundred and fifteen thousand five hundred and ninety-nine dollars and ninety-eight cents, which, on the first of July last, had been reduced to two hundred and sixty-eight thousand ninety two dollars and seventy-four cents. It appears, also, that the revenues for the coming year will exceed the expenditures about two hundred and seventy thousand dollars, which, with the excess of revenue which will result from the operatious of the current half year, may be expected, independently of any increase in the gross amount of postages, to supply the entire deficit before the end of 1835. But as this calculation is based on the gross amount of postages which had accrued within the period embraced by the times of striking the balances, it is obvious that without a progressive increase in the amount of postages, the existing retrenchments must be persevered in through the year 1836, that the Department may accumulate a surplus fund sufficient to place it in a condition of perfect ease.

It will be observed that the revenues of the Post Office Department, though they have increased, and their amount is above that of any former year, have yet fallen short of the estimates inore than a hundred thousand dollars. This is attributed in a great degree to the increase oi free letters, growing out of the extension and abuse of the franking

privilege. There has been a gradual increase in the number of executive offices to which it has been granted; and by an act passed in March, 1833, it was extended to Members of Congress throughout the whole year. It is believed that a revision of the laws relative to the franking privilege, with some enactments to enforce more rigidly the restrictions under which it is granted, would operate beneficially to the country, by enabling the Department at an earlier period to restore the mail facilities that have been withdrawn, and to extend them more widely as the growing settlements of the country may require.

To a measure so important to the Government, and so just to our constituents, who ask no exclusive privileges for themselves, and are not willing to concede them to others, I earnestly recommend the serious attention of Congress.

The importance of the Post Office Department, and the magnitude to which it has grown, both in its revenues and its operations, seem to demand its reorganization by law. The whole of its receipts and disbursements have hitherto been left entirely to Executive control, and individual discretion. The principle is as sound in relation to this as to any other Department of the Government, that as little discretion should be confided to the Executive officer who controls it, as is compatible with its efficiency. It is therefore earnestly recommended that it be organized with an Auditor and Treasurer of its own, appointed by the President and Senate, who shall be branches of the Treasury Department.

Your attention is again respectfully invited to the defect which exists in the JUDICIAL SYSTEM of the United States. Nothing can be more desirable than the uniform operation of the Federal Judiciary throughout the several States, all of which, standing on the same footing as members of the Union, have equal rights to the advantages and benefits resulting from its laws. This object is not attained by the judicial acts now in force, because they leave one-fourth of the States without Circuit Courts.

It is undoubtedly the duty of Congress to place all the States on the same footing in this respect, either by the creation of an additional number of associate judges, or by an enlargement of the circuits assigned to those already appointed, so as to include the new States. Whatever may be the difficulty in a proper organization of the judicial system, so as to secure its efficiency and uniformity in all parts of the Union, and at the same time to avoid such an increase of judges as would encumber the supreme appellate tribunal, it should not be allowed to weigh against the great injustice which the present operation of the system produces.

I trust that I may also be pardoned for renewing the recommendation I have so often submitted to your attention, in regard to the mode of electing President and Vice President of the United States. All the reflection I have been able to bestow upon the subject, increases my con viction that the best interests of the country will be promoted by the adoption of some plan which will secure, in all contingencies, that important right of sovereignty to the direct control of the People. Could this bettained, and the terms of those officers be limited to a single period of either four or six years, I think our liberties would possess an additional safeguard.

At your last session I called the attention of Congress to the destruction of the public building occupied by the Treasury Department. As the public interest requires that another building should be erected, with as little delay as possible, it is hoped that the means will be seasonably provided, and that they will be ample enough to authorize such an enlargement and improvement in the plan of the building as will more ef fectually accommodate the public officers, and secure the public documents deposited in it from the casualties of fire.

I have not been able to satisfy myself that the bill entitled "An act to improve the navigation of the Wabash river," which was sent to me at the close of your last session, ought to pass, and I have therefore withheld from it my approval, and now return it to the Senate, the body in which it originated.

There can be no question connected with the administration of public affairs, more important or more difficult to be satisfactorily dealt with, than that which relates to the rightful authority and proper action of the Federal Government upon the subject of Internal Improvements. To inherent embarrassments have been added others resulting from the course of our legislation concerning it.

I have heretofore communicated freely with Congress upon this subject, and in adverting to it again, I cannot refrain from expressing my increased conviction of its extreme importance, as well in regard to its bearing upon the maintenance of the Constitution and the prudent management of the public revenue, as on account of its disturbing effect upon the harmony of the Union

We are in no danger from violations of the Constitution by which encroachments are made upon the personal rights of the citizen. The sentence of condemnation long since pronounced by the American People upon acts of that character, will. I doubt not, continue to prove as salutary in its effects as it is irreversible in its nature. But against the dangers of unconstitutional acts which instead of menacing the vengeance of offended authority, proffer local advantages, and bring in their train the patronage of the Government. we are, I fear. not so safe. To suppose

that because our Government has been instituted for the benefit of the People, it must therefore have the power to do whatever may seem to conduce to the public good, is an error, into which even honest minds are too apt to fall. In yielding themselves to this fallacy, they overlook the great considerations in which the Federal Constitution was founded.) They forget that in consequence of the conceded diversities in the interest and condition of the different States, it was foreseen, at the period of its adoption, that although a particular measure of the Government might be beueficial and proper in one State, it might be the reverse in another-that it was for this reason the States would not consent to make a grant to the Federal Government of the general aud usual powers of Government, but of such only as were specifically enumerated, and the probable effects of which they could, as they thought, safely anticipate: and they forget also the paramount obligation upon all to abide by the compact, then so solemnly, and, as it was hoped, so firmly established. In additi the Constitution springing from the sources I hav greater than all. I all

ich was perhaps bject has afford

ed for sinister appeals to selfish feelings, and the opinion heretofore so extensively entertained of its adaptation to the purposes of personal ambition. With such stimulants it is not surprising that the acts and pretensions of the Federal Government in this behalf should sometimes have been carried to an alarming extent. The questions which have arisen upon this subject have related

1st. To the power of making internal improvements within the limits of a State, with the rights of territorial jurisdiction, sufficient at least or their preservation and use

2d. To the right of appropriating money in aid of such works when carried on by a State or by a company in virtue of State authority, surrendering the claim of jurisdiction; and

3d. To the propriety of appropriation for improvements of a particular class, viz. for light-houses, beacons, buoys, public piers, and for the removal of sand bars, sawyers, and other temporary and partial impediments in our navigable rivers and harbors

The claims of power for the General Government upon each of these points certainly present matter of the deepest interest The first is, however, of much the greatest importance, inasmuch as, in addition to the dangers of unequal and improvident expenditures of public moneys, common to all, there is superadded to that the conflicting jurisdictions of the respective Governments. Federal jurisdiction, at least to the extent I have stated, has been justly regarded by its advocates as necessarily appurtenant to the power in question, if that exists by the constitution. That the most injurious conflicts would unavoidably arise between the respective jurisdictious of the State and Federal Governments in the absence of a constitutional provision marking out their respective boundaries, cannot be doubted. The local advantages to be obtained would induce the States to overlook in the beginning the dangers and difficulties to which they might ultimately be exposed. The powers exercised by the Federal Government would soon be regard d with jealousy by the State authorities, and originating as they must, from implication or assumption, it would be impossible to affix to them certain and safe limits. Opportunities and temptations to the assumption of power incompatible with State sovereignty, would be increased, and those barriers which resist the tendency of our system towards consolidation greatly weakened. The officers and agents of the General Government might not always have the discretion to abstain from intermeddling with State concerns; and if they did, they would not always escape the suspicion of having done so. Collisions, and consequent irritations would spring up-that harmony which should ever exist between the General Government and each member of the Confederacy, would be frequently interrupted-a spirit of contention would be engenderedand the dangers of division greatly multiplied

Yet we all know, that notwithstanding these grave objections, this daugerous doctrine was at one time apparently proceeding to its final establishment with ferful rapidity. The desire to embark the Federal Government in works of internal improvement, prevailed in the highest degree, during the first session of the first Congress that I had the honor to meet in my present situation. When the bill authorizing a subscription on the part of the United States for stock in the Maysville and Lex