land, — bright and shining lights that they were, of that denomination. Roger Williams wrote,1

"There goes many a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal and woe is common, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or a human combination, or society. It hath fallen out sometimes, that both Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks, may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm that all the liberty of conscience that ever I pleaded for turns upon these two hinges : that none of the Papists, Protestants, Jews, or Turks be forced to come to the ship's prayers, nor compelled from their own particular prayer or worship."

Let it not be forgotten, nor misapprehended that Mormon plural marriages are, by the parties to them, revered and held as sacred a part of their worship, as circumcision is by the Jews, or immersion or sprinkling is by Baptists and Congregationalists, or as celibacy is by the Shakers and by the Roman Catholic priesthood. If a ship (in Roger Williams's day a ship was of only some few hundred tons burden) could carry hundreds of Papists, Protestants, Jews, and Turks on a long voyage (the voyage of life to most of us is but a short one) without internal religious strifes, simply by these different sects and nationalities mutually abstaining from persecution of one another, then certainly it is not impossible in the vast territory of the United States (where each State is at liberty, without let, hinderance, or other restraint than moral ones, to establish monogamy, polygamy, or any other marriage institution that the people of each State may respectively desire) for Americans of all creeds, modes of faith, and republican social institutions, to dwell together in peace, harmony, and prosperity, if they will abstain from persecution or violation of one another's natural rights.

"In my Father's house are many mansions." For aught I know to the contrary, Jesus may have prepared, among those many mansions, a place for the Mormons.

Dr. Wayland, in the section on "Persecution on account of Religious Opinions," in his "Limitations of Human Re

1 Knowles's Memoir of Roger Williams, p. 279.

sponsibility," states principles for the right regulation of human conduct, which, applied to the Mormon problem, will, with peace and justice to all parties, sects, and denominations, surely and honorably solve it. Those principles are that we are not responsible for the religious opinions or practices of our fellow-men, and, whatever be our physical power, we cannot rightfully use it to the detriment of our neighbor, to accomplish any good whatever, if he does not infringe upon our rights. "My brother," he says, "may be in error; but he has the same right to propagate his error that I have to propagate my truth. To use any other weapons against him than arguments is persecution, and shows a selfish disposition to invade the rights of our neighbors. The weapons of Christian warfare are not carnal, but simply truth and righteousness.

These principles, unswervingly adhered to, will solve, to the satisfaction of every person who acts upon them, the Mormon problem, all temperance, prohibition, and divorce questions, and other enigmas that sometimes perplex legislators, judges, ministers, and other intelligent and conscientious people.

Proximus ardet Ucalegon. If the Mormon house of worship be destroyed, whose house will next burn?

PART II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT.

PLEASE permit me, Gentlemen of Massachusetts, now to ask your attention to the case of Reynolds vs. United States (98 United States Reports, Supreme Court), argued and adjudged in the Supreme Court, October term, 1878, in which case Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

You know (for some, if not all of you are lawyers) that certain cases in law books are called leading cases; perhaps (I hope it is) because, amid the conflicts of human selfish interests and prejudices, they allure to brighter worlds, and lead the way to the eternal principles of truth and justice. Such was the Sommersett negro case, in which, amid the prejudices, and social and monetary influences which clouded it, Lord Mansfield discerned human rights, and secured freedom to a slave. Coming time may reveal whether the Reynolds case will be classed among leading cases, or overruled cases, whether, in the galaxy of luminous, just decisions, that of Chief Justice Waite's will be, as Lord Mansfield's was, a guiding star. No other considerations than love of liberty, truth, and justice, and regard for the good name and permanent best interests of our country, have led me to examine the Reynolds case, and address this letter to you. I find that in it are involved not only Mormon interests, but the American, the human right of all men to the free exercise of religion. As violations of this right have

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not unfrequently kindled animosities and wars, it seems to me that this case has not, either in the court or elsewhere, attracted the attention nor received the discussion which its importance merits. In what I may say, I wish it understood that I desire to be merely an amicus curiæ; certainly I am not a partisan.

In this case the charge was that the plaintiff in error, having a wife living, married another, and thereby violated Sect. 5,352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which statute. makes every married person who marries another in a Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, guilty of bigamy, and punishable by fine and imprisonment. To this charge it was answered that that statute is unconstitutional, because it is contrary to, and violates Article I. of Amendments to the Constitution, which amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Supreme Court of the United States have decided that the statute is constitutional and valid; and it is popularly supposed that that decision settles the matter But let us consider the reason of the case, for nothing is law that is not reason."

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The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Waite. It is one of the excellences of a people's government, that the acts of its legislators and the decisions of its judges, are open to the examination and criticism of every citizen. Of this privilege, or rather blessing of liberty, resulting from the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press, I wish to avail myself, and shall therefore here examine and comment on certain parts of that opinion.

Most gratifying to every lover of civil and religious liberty is its declaration that "Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the Territories, which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. The first amendment to the Constitution expressly forbids such legislation. Religious freedom is guaranteed every where throughout the United States, so far as Congressional interference is concerned. The question

to be determined," says the court, "is whether the law now under consideration [i.e., Sect. 5,352] "comes within this prohibition."

"The word 'religion,'" the court continues, "is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning; and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been guaranteed?" (p. 162.)

The court, after briefly alluding to ancient Virginia controversies arising from taxation for support of particular sects, etc., refers to a "Memorial and Remonstrance," prepared by Mr. Madison, in which he demonstrated “that religion, or the duty we owe the 'Creator,' was not within the cognizance of civil government;" also to an act "for establishing religious freedom," drawn by Mr. Jefferson: "In the preamble of this act" [12 Hening, Stat. 84],1 the court says "religious freedom is defined;" and, after a recital that "to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the professions or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty," it is declared "that it is time enough, for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere, when principles break out into overt actions against peace and good order." "In these two sentences," says the Supreme Court, "is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the church and what to the state."

Is "religion" or or "religious freedom" to be cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd, bound in any verbal definition? Are only such citizens to be protected from Congressional interference with their religious freedom, as believe religion to be "the duty we owe the Creator"? Has Congress the constitutional power to prohibit the free exercise of their religion to citizens who believe, with Thomas Paine, that "the world

1 See act in the Appendix.