The Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847,1 enables a dock company to make by-laws under its common seal for a great variety of purposes connected with the use and management of its docks and property. Penalties may be imposed for infringements of these by-laws. But no by-laws (except such as relate solely to the company or its officers or servants) have effect, unless confirmed by a judge of one of the superior Courts, or by the justices at Quarter Sessions, or by such other confirming authority as may be prescribed in the special Act. Moreover, notices have to be given before they are confirmed, and, when confirmed, they have to be published as directed by the Act.5 When duly made, confirmed and published, the by-laws become binding on all parties, and they can only be altered by other by-laws similarly made and confirmed. A board of conservators has power to make by-laws under ss. 39 and 45 of the Salmon Fishery Act, 1873;7 so has a canal company.8

When power to make by-laws is conferred by statute, a condition, as we have seen, is generally imposed that before such by-laws come into operation they must be submitted to some confirming authority, which has power to disallow them, wholly or in part. And even though a by-law has been duly approved and confirmed by the appointed authority, it may yet be held invalid by the High Court, if it be either unreasonable in itself or contrary to the general law of the land. It is impossible to lay down any general rule which will determine when a by-law is unreasonable. As Lord Russell, C. J., says in Burnett v. Berry, "Authorities cited on the construction of other by-laws are of very little use in assisting the Court to decide whether the particular by-law before them is or is not good. Each must be judged by its own language." 10

A by-law imposing a penalty ou a passenger for travelling in a superior class to that for which his ticket was issued, or for using a ticket on any day for which it is not available, or which has been already used, without requiring that the act should be done with intent to defraud, is unreasonable, an intention to defraud being "the gist of any such offence." 11

110 Vict. c. 27, s. 83.

2 S. 84.

3 S. 85.

4 Ss. 86, 87.

5 S. 88.

6 S. 89.

7 36 & 37 Vict. c. 7.

88 & 9 Vict. c. 42, s. 2.

9 [1896] 1 Q. B. at p. 643.

10 And see Gentel v. Rapps, [1902] 1 K. B. 160; Wilson v. Fearnley (1905), 92 L. T. 647; Batchelor v. Sturley (1905), 93 L. T. 539; Srott v. Pilliner, [1904] 2 K. B. 855. 11 Dyson v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 32; Huffam v. North Staffordshire Ry. Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 821.

A town council or other local authority has power to make by-laws for the regulation of bathing on the seashore within its district. But any by-law which fixes a maximum charge for towels or bathing costumes, or requires that such articles shall be provided by the proprietors of bathing machines without extra charge, is ultra vires and cannot be enforced. Channell, J., however, was of opinion that a by-law requiring the proprietor of bathing machines to supply some kind of bathing costume without extra charge would not be ultra vires, if it left him free to make an extra charge for articles of superior quality.2

In this Introduction we have endeavoured to state in outline the general principles of the law of England in clear and simple language, and without any reference to technical details. But this to a practising lawyer is by no means an easy task. He is so used to the language of the Courts that it is difficult for him to translate it into the language of the market and the home. Moreover, while stating these general principles broadly-and general principles must be stated broadly he is conscious that there are to most of them many minute exceptions, chiefly created by statutes, which it is impossible for him to state in his proposition without rendering it cumbrous and pedantic, and probably also unintelligible. The reader will not expect in a piece of scene-painting the minute correctness of a miniature; he will understand that there are important exceptions to many, if not to all, of the general propositions hitherto laid down. Some of these exceptions will be found stated in the following pages.

1 Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 89), s. 69.

2 Parker v. Clegg (1904), 2 L. G. R. 608.

i

SUBSTANTIVE LAW.

BOOK II.

CRIMINAL LAW.

SUBSTANTIVE Law, as we have seen, deals with rights and wrongs, Adjective Law with the procedure by which rights are enforced and wrongs redressed; in other words, Substantive Law defines our duties, Adjective Law our remedies. We shall say very little in this Book as to remedies.1 The Substantive Law of any modern civilised State may be roughly divided into four parts:

(i.) Rights of Property. It is beyond the scope of this treatise to deal with the law relating to real and personal property in any greater detail than has been done already in the Introduction.

(ii.) Crimes—those wrongful acts which the State punishes in the interests of the community at large.

(iii.) Torts those wrongful acts which give the person injured by them the right to claim compensation.

(iv.) Contracts-those civil obligations which a man voluntarily incurs by some agreement, express or implied.

1 See post, Book V., Adjective Law.

Of the last three heads, it is right that we should deal first with crimes; for this is the branch of law which most affects the nation as a whole. This, too, is the branch of law which it most behoves each citizen to know, lest he unwittingly commit a crime. This, moreover, is the branch of our law in which the State speaks in most imperative tone; its edicts here are undoubtedly commands, enforced by the clearest

sanction.

We proceed, therefore, to discuss the essentials of a crime.

PART I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE OF A CRIME.

EVERYONE, who violates the right of another or neglects his own duty to the prejudice of another or of the State, does wrong. Wrongful acts are either crimes, torts or breaches of contract.

A crime is a wrongful act of such a kind that the State deems it necessary, in the interests of the public, to repress it; for its repetition would be harmful to the community as a whole.

A tort is a wrongful act, independent of contract, which gives the person injured a right to be compensated by the wrong-doer for the injury done to him.

A breach of contract is the wrongful neglect or omission by one party to a contract to perform his promise to the other party, who is therefore entitled to be paid a debt or to receive damages.

Torts and breaches of contract, it will be observed, do not directly affect the community at large, but only the persons individually concerned; they create merely civil obligations.

In other words, the object of criminal proceedings is to punish the offender and to prevent any repetition of the offence; the object of civil proceedings is to compensate the person wronged by compelling the wrong-doer to make him satisfaction.

An act, which injures an individual and entitles him to compensation, may at the same time be such that its repetition would be harmful to society and therefore such as the State