1

None of the above offences are triable at Quarter Sessions. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove expressly that the defendant intended and desired any of the results stated above it is sufficient that his acts or words tended to produce such a result. The defendant will be presumed to have intended those consequences which would flow naturally from his conduct. It is always a question for the jury

whether his acts or words would or would not in fact tend to produce any of these results; if they would, public safety demands their repression.

"Every man (who is of sufficient understanding to be responsible for his actions) is supposed to be cognisant of the law, as it is the rule by which every subject of the kingdom is to be governed, and therefore it is his business to know it. If, therefore, a man publishes that which the law says is treasonable, seditious or rebellious, the alleging in the indictment or information that the party did it with a libellous or seditious intent is a mere matter of legal inference from the fact of publication, and not the object of proof either on one side or the other." But "where the fact of publication is ambiguous (as where it may be a doubt whether the party pulled the paper out of his pocket by accident or on purpose, or whether he gave one paper instead of another, or any such supposable case) there the maxim holds that actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.” 1

If the defendant's acts or words attack the honour and integrity of our judges, or in any way tend to obstruct the administration of justice, they are not only seditious: they are also a contempt of court, and may be punished summarily as such.2 Insolent misconduct in defiance of either House of Parliament or scandalous attacks on a member of either House may also be punished as a contempt of the House.3

One striking instance of a seditious act is that of inciting soldiers or sailors to desert or to mutiny. Any one who maliciously endeavours to seduce from his allegiance to His Majesty or incites to any act of mutiny any person serving in His Majesty's forces by sea or land is guilty of felonly and liable to penal servitude for life or to imprisonment for

1 Per Ashurst, J., in R. v. Shipley (1784), 4 Dougl. at p. 177; and see McLeod . St. Aubyn, [1899] A. C. 549.

2 See post, p. 201.

* See Odgers on Libel and Slander (5th ed.),

P. 52

1

2

not more than three years. The Army Act, 1881, which contains provisions of the same kind, also enacts that the deserter or mutineer himself may be tried by court martial, and, if on or under orders for active service at the time of desertion or mutiny, may be sentenced to death. The Naval Discipline Act, 1866,3 provides for the punishment of sailors who are guilty of mutiny or desertion.

Another seditious act would be the training of others in the art of warfare without lawful authority. It is a misdemeanour punishable with seven years' penal servitude (a) to be present in an assembly unlawfully convened for the purpose of training or drilling others in the use of arms or in any military exercises, or (b) to train or drill others, or to aid or assist in so doing. It is a misdemeanour punishable with two years' imprisonment and fine for any one to be thus trained or drilled, or to attend such an assembly for that purpose. The prosecution must be commenced within six months after the date of the offence.

Præmunire.

4

Certain ancient forms of sedition were punished under the writ of pramunire, which is now practically obsolete. Such offences, though only misdemeanours, were very severely punished; the offender was liable to imprisonment for life; he forfeited to the Crown all his property, real and personal, and was declared incapable of taking any legal proceedings. These heavy punishments are frequently alluded to as "the pains and penalties of a pramunire." They were inflicted on any one who in this country attempted to place the authority of some foreign potentate (usually the Pope) above that of the King of England. Thus Cardinal Wolsey was indicted and convicted in 1529 of procuring Papal bulls from Rome contrary to the ancient statutes of pramunire, which were even then practically obsolete.

The principal offences of præmunire still recognised in our criminal law

are:

(i.) By 25 Hen. VIII. c. 20, the refusal of a dean and chapter to elect to a bishopric the clergyman nominated to them by the King.

(ii.) By the Habeas Corpus Act the unlawful sending of any prisoner outside the realm so that he would be beyond the protection of the writ of habeas corpus; for there is no power in the High Court or in any judge to

1 37 Geo. III. c. 70, s. 1; and see 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 91, s. 52.

2 44 & 45 Vict. c. 58, s. 12. This Act is re-enacted every year.

3 29 & 30 Vict. c. 109, ss. 10, 19, as amended by 47 & 48 Vict. c. 39.

4 60 Geo. III. & 1 Geo. IV. c. 1, s. 1.

5 31 Car. II. c. 2.

order the issue of a writ of habeas corpus directed to a person who at the date of the order is out of the jurisdiction.1

(iii.) Solemnising or assisting or being present at a marriage which is contrary to the Royal Marriages Act, 1772.2

Seditious Words.

Words which are merely spoken cannot, as we have seen,3 amount to treason, or treason-felony; but they often induce sedition. It is a misdemeanour to speak or to write and publish any words which tend to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or his ministers, or the Government and Constitution of the realm, or either House of Parliament, or the Courts of justice, or to excite His Majesty's subjects to attempt the alteration of any matter in Church or State, otherwise than by lawful means. This misdemeanour cannot be tried at Quarter Sessions. The defendant will not be allowed to urge as a defence that the words are true; for Lord Campbell's Act does not apply to seditious words."

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4

Thus it is sedition to speak, as well as to write and publish, of the Sovereign any words which deny his title to the Crown, or call his legitimacy in question, or impute that he is insane, or corrupt, or immoral in his private life, or perjured-any words, in short, which would be libellous and actionable per se, if printed and published of any other public character; for such words must tend to create disaffection and disorder. But to assert that the King is misled by his ministers, or is wrong in his policy, is no crime.

Again, a publication is not a seditious libel unless it affects the government of this country. Hence, if the words complained of, though published in this country, do not tend to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the United Kingdom, but only of some foreign country, they are not a seditious libel, and are not punishable here as such (although they may possibly be indictable here as a personal libel upon the individual Sovereign attacked 9).

8

But where there is no intention to foment disaffection among the people, to obstruct the administration of the law, or to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the realm, the 1 R. v. Pinckney, [1904] 2 K. B. 84.

2 12 Geo. III. c. 11, s. 3.

3 Ante, p. 148.

Ex parte William O'Brien (1883), 12 L. R. Ir. 29.

6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6.

R. v. Harvey and Chapman (1823), 2 B. & C. 257.

7 St. John's Case (1615), Noy, 105.

R. v. Antonelli (1906), 70 J. P. 4.

See R. v. Peltier (1803), 28 St. Tr. 617; R. v. Most (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 244.

utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all public affairs. A fair comment on any matter of public interest is no crime. "The power of free discussion is the right of every subject in this country. In a free country like ours the productions of a political author should not be too hardly dealt with."1 "The people have a right to discuss any grievances they may have to complain of." 2 "A journalist may canvass and censure the acts of the Government and their policy—and, indeed, it is his duty.":

In the present day at all events, an attempt to remove from power the ministers in office, or any agitation for the abolition of any tax or the repeal of any Act of Parliament, cannot be seditious if no unlawful means be employed. Any meeting lawfully convened for the discussion of any matter of public interest, or for the bona fide purpose of reforming our laws by petitioning Parliament, &c., is not seditious. So with our newspapers. Any words which directly tend to create riot and disorder will be punished. But subject to these restrictions, which are necessary for the protection of the public safety, our newspapers are free to publish what they choose on any matter of public interest. The best method of anticipating and thus preventing sedition is to redress all just grievances of the people. Hence those who call attention to such grievances and endeavour by lawful means to remove them are not guilty of sedition; on the contrary, they are assisting the Government in forestalling sedition.1

This country is the birthplace of "the Liberty of the Press." At first no doubt the printing press was regarded with apprehension, and deemed a danger to the State. The King endeavoured to restrict the number of presses and to keep them all in safe hands. Then a censor was appointed, and no one might print (or, later, publish) a book without his Imprimatur. This censorship continued till 1695, in spite of Milton's noble protest, the Areopagitica, which was published on 24th November, 1644. But since 1695 no preliminary licence is necessary: any man may publish what he will; but he must be prepared to take the consequences if a jury decide

1 Per Lord Kenyon, C. J., in R. v. Reeves (1796), Peake, Add. C. at p. 86.

2 Per Littledale, J., in R. v. Collins (1839), 9 C. & P. at p. 461.

8 Per Fitzgerald, J., in R. v. Sullivan and others (1868), 11 Cox, at p. 54.

4 See Odgers on Libel and Slander (5th ed.), pp. 518–522.

that what he has published is a libel. In the latter part of the eighteenth century this question was deemed one for the judge rather than the jury in a criminal case; the jury found the fact of publication, and then the judge decided whether the words were libellous or not. But in 1792 Mr. Fox's Act1 put a stop to this, and restored the earlier criminal law, by which the practice in civil and criminal cases was identical, viz., that the question of libel or no libel was for the jury.2 Since that date the English Press has been the freest in the world.

1 32 Geo. III. c. 60.

2 See post, p. 179.