within six hours after demand by a prisoner or on his behalf a copy of the warrant or commitment under which he is detained, is in certain cases liable to a penalty of £100 and loss of office, and for a second offence to a penalty of £200; in other cases he is liable, on motion made to the Court, to be sent to prison for contempt. Any person who takes or sends a prisoner outside the realm in order that he may be beyond the protection of this writ is liable to the pains and penalties of a pramunire.3 4 Lastly, whenever an individual is injured by the refusal of a judicial or public officer to perform any duty imposed on him by his office, he may apply for a writ of mandamus to compel him to do his duty. The applicant for such a writ must show that he has a clear legal right to the performance of a certain act by the person against whom he asks the Court to issue the writ, and also that it is the imperative duty of such person to do that act. If such person has vested in him a discretion to do or not to do that act as he may think fit, no writ of mandamus will issue against him. And if the applicant has any other remedy which is equally convenient, beneficial and effectual, the Court will not grant him a writ of mandamus.5 Thus a mandamus to hear and determine a case will be granted against the judge of an inferior Court, who has declined to exercise his jurisdiction by refusing to hear a case; but it will not be granted against a judge of any superior Court. In some cases, however, where a judge of an inferior Court refuses to give judgment in a case, party who suffers from such delay may apply to the High Court for a writ of procedendo ad judicium commanding the judge to proceed to judgment. 6 III. Bribery and Corruption. the Any person holding judicial or other public office, who accepts any gift or payment offered to him in order to 1 31 Car. II. c. 2. 2 56 Geo. III. c. 100. 8 See ante, p. 156. 4 R. v. Kensington (1848), 12 Q. B. 654; R. v. Vestry of St. Luke's, Chelsea (1862), 31 L. J. Q. B. 50. 5 R. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 461. 6 See further as to the writ of mandamus, post, p. 1175. influence his conduct in respect of any business connected with such office, is guilty of bribery; so is the person who offers such gift or payment. It does not matter whether the gift or payment is made as a reward for past services or as an inducement for future favours, nor whether the thing which the officer is thus bribed to do is in itself a proper or improper act. It is a bribe whenever it is offered in relation to business which has been, is being or will be transacted, so long as it is business which comes before such person in the way of his office. The offence, which is not triable at Quarter Sessions, is a common law misdemeanour, punishable by fine or imprisonment.1 Various statutes have dealt with special instances of the application of this general rule. Thus by the East India Company Act, 1793,2 it is a misdemeanour for any British subject holding office in the East Indies to demand or receive any sum of money or other valuable thing as a gift or present. Again, by the Customs Laws Consolidation Act, 1876,3 any officer of customs who takes a bribe is liable to a penalty of £500. By the Inland Revenue Regulation Act, 1890, any collector, officer or person employed in relation to inland revenue, who asks for or receives any money or other recompense, or enters into or acquiesces in any collusive agreement with any person to do or abstain from doing or to conceal or counive at any act or thing whereby His Majesty is or may be defrauded, is liable to a penalty of £500, and is on conviction incapable of ever holding any office under the Crown. The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889,5 contains important provisions for the prevention and punishment of bribery and corruption by members, officers or servants of corporations, councils, boards and other public bodies. It provides that every person commits a misdemeanour who corruptly solicits, receives or agrees to receive for himself or for any other person any gift, loan, fee, reward or advantage whatever as an inducement or reward for or otherwise on account of any member, officer or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter in which the public body is concerned." The offender may 1 R. v. Whitaker, [1914] 1 K. B. 1283. 2 33 Geo. III. c. 52, s. 62. 939 & 40 Vict. c. 36, s. 217. 453 & 54 Vict. c. 21, s. 10. 52 & 53 Vict. c. 69. And see 6 Edw. VII. c. 34, and 6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 64. be sentenced to two years' imprisonment, with or without hard labour, or fined £500, and in either case can be deprived for long periods from exercising any political rights, or from holding public office of any kind. A prosecution for an offence under this Act can only be instituted with the consent of the Attorney or Solicitor-General. IV. Offences in connection with Elections. Bribery at Parliamentary elections was at common law a misdemeanour punishable on indictment or information. It does not, however, appear that any prosecution ever took place until the offence was made a statutory one, although the House of Commons in exercise of its exclusive privilege in matters relating to the constitution of its own body took cognizance of bribery as a ground for unseating its members. Acts of Parliament have from time to time been passed to secure purity of election, and to put a stop to that bribery and corruption which formerly was only too rife. By the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Acts, 1883 and 1895,2 any candidate who has been guilty of any corrupt practice within the meaning of the Acts can never sit in the House of Commons for the constituency where such offence was committed. Even a voter who is guilty of any corrupt practice in reference to an election is not allowed to sit in the House of Commons for seven years. Treating, undue influence and bribery by an agent with the candidate's knowledge are also misdemeanours. Offences in reference to municipal and county council elections are dealt with in a similar manner.3 Personation is a felony, and is punishable with two years' imprisonment. Any one, who at an election applies for a ballot paper in some one else's name, whether that name be that of a person living or dead, or of a fictitious person, or who, having voted once at any such election in his own name, applies at the same election for another ballot paper, is liable to be convicted of this offence.1 1 R. v. Pitt (1762), 3 Burr. 1338. 2 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51; 58 & 59 Vict. c. 40. 4 Ballot Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 33), s. 24. CHAPTER VI. OFFENCES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Ir is of national importance that the administration of justice in our law Courts should be pure and unsullied, free from all suspicion of bias or prejudice, firm and impartial in the strict administration of law to persons of all classes alike. Legal proceedings must not be made the instrument of extortion or oppression, nor must the Courts be misled by perjury or fraud. Their decrees, when once pronounced, must be effective and rigidly enforced by the strong arm of the law. We will examine first the precautions which are taken with the object of securing that all evidence given in our law Courts shall be true. False Evidence. If any person who has been lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding wilfully makes a statement material in that proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he is guilty of perjury. This offence seems not to have been treated as a crime till the year 1613. It is now a statutory misdemeanour, punishable with seven years' penal servitude. This crime is dealt with in detail on pp. 195 et seq. Subornation of perjury was made penal before perjury itself—namely in 1540. It consists in hiring or procuring another person to make a false statement on oath under such circumstances as would constitute perjury in the suborner. To amount to subornation the oath must be in fact taken and the false statement actually made: otherwise the would-be suborner is guilty only of inciting. Every person, who aids, abets, counsels, procures or suborns another person to commit an offence against this Act, B.C.L. 1 Perjury Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V. c. 6), s. 1 (1). 13 shall be liable to be proceeded against, indicted, tried and punished as if he were a principal offender. Every person, who incites or attempts to procure or suborn another person to commit an offence against this Act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and, on conviction thereof on indictment, shall be liable to imprisonment, or to a fine, or to both such imprisonment and fine."1 Any conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice, e.g., by dissuading witnesses from giving evidence or by obstructing any legal process, civil or criminal, is a misdemeanour. So is any conspiracy to accuse another falsely of a crime.3 2 Again any one, who fabricates a false document, which if genuine would be admissible in evidence in any judicial proceeding, or tenders such a document in evidence knowing it to have been so fabricated, is liable to the same punishment as a witness who is convicted of perjury. It is a felony punishable with penal servitude for life or for various terms of years for any one to forge official or public documents, foreign or colonial acts of State and judgments, orders of an English Court, registers, by-laws, registers of British vessels, certificates of convictions or acquittals, examined or certified copies of any of these documents, or to tender the same in evidence knowing them to have been forged. So the fraudulent fabrication of real evidence-as, for example, by tampering with sealed samples--is a misdemeanour at common law.5 A man who wilfully makes a false statement on oath, but not in a judicial proceeding, is not guilty of perjury. But he was at common law guilty of the misdemeanour of "making a false oath," and was punishable with two years' imprisonment without hard labour. A more severe punishment is now assigned by the Perjury Act, 1911, which enacts that "if any person (i.) being required or authorised by law to make any statement on oath for any purpose, and being lawfully sworn (otherwise than in a judicial proceeding), wilfully makes a statement which is material 1 S. 7. 2 R. v. Mawbey (1796), 6 T. R. 619; 3 R. R. 282. 8 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 29. 4 Forgery Act, 1913 (3 & 4 Geo. V. c. 27), s. 3. 5 R. v. Vreones, [1891] 1 Q. B. 360. 6 Ss. 2, 3 (1). |