bearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or business; or If any person knowingly gives to any agent, or if any agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested, and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which to his knowledge is intended to mislead the principal; 1 1 he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding two years, or to a fine not exceeding five hundred pounds, or to both such imprisonment and such fine, or on summary conviction to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding four months, or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or to both such imprisonment and such fine."2 A prosecution for an offence under this Act cannot be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General. No indictment under this Act can be tried at Quarter Sessions; nevertheless a Court of Quarter Sessions may hear and determine an appeal from a summary conviction under this Act.3 "The expression 'consideration' includes valuable consideration of any kind; the expression agent' includes any person employed by or acting for another; and the expression 'principal' includes an employer. A person serving under the Crown or under any corporation or any municipal, borough, county or district council, or any board of guardians, is an agent within the meaning of this Act."2 1 See Sage v. Eichholz (1919), 35 Times L. R. 382. 26 Edw. VII. c. 34, s. 1. 3 Ib. s. 2. CHAPTER III. FALSE PRETENCES AND OTHER FRAUD. ANY person, who with intent to defraud makes a representation as to some matter of fact which he knows to be untrue and thereby induces another to part with any chattel, money or valuable security,' is guilty of the misdemeanour of obtaining such property by false pretences, and liable on conviction to penal servitude to the extent of five years. This offence can be tried on an indictment either at Assizes or Quarter Sessions; and since 1899 it can in certain cases be also dealt with summarily by justices of the peace.* Section 32 of the Larceny Act, 1916, runs as follows:- (1) with intent to defraud, obtains from any other person any chattel money or valuable security, or causes or procures any money to be paid, or any chattel or valuable security to be delivered to himself or to any other person for the use or benefit or on account of himself or any other person; or (2) with intent to defraud or injure any other person, fraudulently causes or induces any other person (a) to execute, make, accept, endorse or destroy the whole or any part of any valuable security; or (b) to write, impress or affix his name or the name of any other person, or the seal of any body corporate or society, upon any paper or parchment in order that the same may be afterwards made or converted into, or used or dealt with as, a valuable security; shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and on conviction thereof liable to penal servitude for any term not exceeding five years." In dealing with this offence we must consider several points. In the first place the representation made by the prisoner need not always be expressed in words. It is 1 The phrase "valuable security" has a very wide meaning; it is defined by s. 1 of the Larceny Act, 1861, which is not repealed by the Act of 1916. 2 See Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 22). sufficient if it can be reasonably and naturally inferred from his acts or conduct. Whether it can be so inferred is a question of fact for the jury to decide. It is not necessary that the words or that the acts should be capable only of the meaning charged in the indictment; it is sufficient if they did in fact convey that meaning to the prosecutor. "A representation must depend upon what a man says or does, and what his words and acts would convey to the mind of another. It cannot depend upon the state of his own mind." 2 If A. tacitly consents to a representation made by B., which A. knows to be false and by means of which something is obtained from C., A. may be held guilty of false pretences by conduct. If a person obtains goods from another by giving him in payment a cheque upon a bank at which he has no account, he can be indicted for false pretences; for his act in giving the cheque is a representation by conduct that the cheque is a good and valid order for the payment of its amount. If, however, the accused at the time he gives the cheque has good ground for believing that the cheque will be paid on presentation, he cannot be convicted of false pretences; for in that case there is no intent to defraud.5 Again, it was held that a person, who, though not a member of the University, entered a shop at Oxford in cap and gown and obtained goods on credit, was guilty of false pretences; for his conduct in assuming such a costume amounted to a representation that he was a member of the University. 6 So a person, who fraudulently obtained goods by sending to the vendor the half of a bank note, having previously parted with the corresponding half to a third person, was convicted of false pretences; for by sending the half-note he represented that he still held the corresponding half and was ready and able to forward it to the vendor.? But in R. v. Jones the prisoner's conduct was held not to amount to a representation sufficient to justify the jury in finding that he had obtained goods by false pretences. The prisoner in that case entered a restaurant and ordered a meal. He made no verbal representation at the time as to his ability to pay, nor was any question asked him with regard to it. After the meal he said that he was unable to pay, and that he had (as was the fact) only one halfpenny in his possession. At the trial he was con Per Lush, J., in R. v. Cooper (1877), 2 Q. B. D. at p. 514; and see R. v. Foster, ib. 301. Per Brett, J., in R. v. Hazelton (1874), L. R. 2 C. C. R. at p. 139. R. v. Grosvenor (1914), 111 L. T. 1116. R. v. Hazelton, suprà. R. v. Walne (1870), 11 Cox, 617. R. v. Barnard (1837), 7 C. & P. 781. R. v. Murphy (1876), 13 Cox, 298. 8 [1898] 1 Q. B. 119. victed of obtaining goods by false pretences, and also of obtaining credit by fraud under section 13 of the Debtors Act, 1869.1 The Court for Crown Cases Reserved quashed the former conviction, but affirmed the latter. A mere expression of opinion, however, is not a false pretence. A man, who by merely puffing his wares induces another to purchase them, cannot be convicted of false pretences, provided that such puffing does not amount to the assertion of a fact. For example, if he merely says that the spoons which he is offering for sale "are equal to Elkington's A.," that is a mere puff a statement as to a matter of opinion. It would be otherwise if he had stated that they "are Elkington's A.; " for this would be a misrepresentation of fact. Again, the representation must be to the effect that a certain fact exists or has existed. "To be an indictable false pretence it must be in respect of a supposed present or past fact." 3 A man cannot be convicted for representing that he will do something, although he does not intend to do it. To break such a promise may be a breach of contract; but a breach of contract is not a crime." "A promise as to future conduct not intended to be kept is not in itself a false pretence." Where, however, a man's promise or threat that he will do a thing implies a false representation that he now has the power to do that thing, an indictment will lie. Thus, if the prisoner obtains goods from A. by promising to return on the next day and pay for them in cash, this is not a false pretence. But where a married man obtained money from a woman by threatening to bring an action for breach of promise of marriage against her, it was held that an indictment for false pretences would lie; for his threat to bring the action involved the false pretence that he was in a position to do so, that is, that he was unmarried. So where a woman was deserted by her husband, and the prisoner obtained money from her by promising to bring her husband back to her "over hedges and ditches," it was held that the prisoner was rightly convicted; for by such promise she represented that she had the power to bring him back.8 1 See post, p. 374. 2 R. v. Bryan (1857), 7 Cox, 313. Per Erle, C. J., in R. v. Giles (1865), 34 L. J. M. C. at p. 54. 4 R. v. Lee (1863), 9 Cox, 304; R. v. Speed (1882), 46 L. T. 174. 5 But see ante, pp. 106, 107. 6 Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 22), s. 3. 7 R. v. Copeland (1842), Car. & M. 516. 8 R. v. Giles (1865), 31 L. J. M. C. at p. 54. Next, the prosecution must prove that the representation was untrue, that the facts alleged never existed, and further that the prisoner knew that they never existed, and made the representation with the deliberate intent to defraud. The prosecution must satisfy the jury that such was the state of the prisoner's mind at the time when he made the false pretence. To establish this, the prosecution is now allowed to give evidence of any similar false pretences made either previously or subsequently in order to obtain money or goods from other persons. 2 But such evidence is not admissible where the other false pretences are different in their character from that charged in the indictment. Thus where a man was convicted of obtaining a pony and cart by falsely alleging that he wanted them for his wife, who was an invalid, and that he had an account at Parr's Bank, Widnes, and evidence was admitted to show that about the same time he had obtained provender by falsely stating that he had stables and horses at Blackburn, the conviction was quashed.3 So where the prisoner was indicted for obtaining money from A. by falsely representing that he had paid on A.'s account larger sums than he had in fact paid, evidence that on other occasions he had obtained money from A. by falsely representing that certain china figures were genuine old Dresden china was held inadmissible. 4 The prosecutor must be deceived by the misrepresentations made by the prisoner. If he knows them to be false and yet lets the prisoner have the goods, the latter cannot be convicted of the full offence," but only of the crime of attempting to obtain goods by false pretences, which is a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment to the extent of two years with hard labour. In order to secure a conviction for obtaining goods by false pretences, the prosecution must show that it was the prisoner's statement which acted on the mind of the prosecutor, and induced him to part with his property. If the false pretence charged in the indictment be made after 1 R. v. Dunleavy (1908), 73 J. P. 56. R. v. Rhodes, [1899] Q. B. 77; R. v. Ollis, [1900] 2 Q. B. 758; R. v. Wyatt, [1904] 1 K. B. 188; and see Powell on Evidence, Book I., Chap. VI. 3 R. v. Fisher, [1910] 1 K. B. 149; cf. R. v. Baird (1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 1785. R. v. Ellix, [1910] 2 K. B. 746. R. v. Mills (1857), 26 L. J. M. C. 79. Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, s. 16 (1); R. v. Gould (1918), 13 Cr App. Rep. 144. B.C.L. 24 |