1

Various subsidiary statutes have from time to time been passed dealing with special classes of persons, who are often asked to receive stolen property. Thus dealers in old metal are forbidden to purchase anything before 9 a.m. or after 6 p.m. They are also prohibited from dealing with persons "apparently under the age of sixteen years." Any justice of the peace has power, upon a sworn complaint that there is reason to believe that old metal unlawfully obtained is stored at a certain marine store, to authorise a search of the premises and the seizure of any such metal found therein.2 Marine store dealers are forbidden to cut up any cable or other similar article exceeding five fathoms in length.

Every pawnbroker is required yearly to take out a licence, and if a pawnbroker is convicted on indictment of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, the Court may direct that his licence shall cease to have effect.* He is now prohibited from dealing with "any person apparently under the age of fourteen of fourteen years.'

The Old Metal Dealers Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 110), s. 8 (2); and see 8 Edw. VII. c. 67, s. 116 (1).

2 lb. s. 4.

3 Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 541. The Pawnbrokers Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 93), ss. 37, 38. 5 The Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII. c. 67), s. 117.

B.C.L.

25

CHAPTER V.

FORGERY.

AT common law it was, and still is, a misdemeanour punishable with fine or imprisonment for two years without hard labour, or both, for any one to fraudulently make or alter any writing with the object of prejudicing another man's right, or to fraudulently utter any writing knowing that it is so made or altered. This is so whether any one be in fact prejudiced or not.1

Thus, it is a crime at common law to forge a railway pass, a county court summons, or a testimonial as to the character of an applicant for an appointment. But it was held not to be forgery at common law to put the signature of a well-known artist on a picture not painted by him, for a picture is not a writing. But if the picture be subsequently sold as genuine, the offender may be punished as a common law cheat, or may be indicted for obtaining money by false pretences, or, in certain circumstances, may be convicted summarily of an offence under the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862.

8

Numerous statutes have been passed with regard to forgery, which prior to 1830 was a capital offence. The law on the subject was consolidated in the year 1861 by the Forgery Act, and again in 1913 by the Act of that year. This latter Act unfortunately leaves the common law and some portions of the earlier statutes still in force,10 which prevents it from being regarded as a perfectly satisfactory code. It com

: Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 6th ed., art. 403; and see R v. Nash (1852), 21 L. J M. C. 147.

2 R. v. Boult (1848), 2 C. & K. 604.

3 R. v. Collier (1831), 5 C. & P. 160.

4 R. v. Sharman (1854), 23 L. J. M. C. 51; and see R. v. Toshack (1849), ± Cox, 38.

5 R. v. Closs (1857), 7 Cox, 494.

6 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, ss. 7, 8; and see ante, p. 375.

7 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98

8 3 & 4 Geo V. c 27. Throughout this chapter, where reference is made to a section without an Act being mentioned, it is a reference to the Forgery Act, 1913.

9 S. 14 (1) (b).

10 E.g., Forgery Act, 1861, ss. 3, 5, 6, 34, 42—44, 47, to end, and parts of ss 28, 36, and 37; Forgery Act, 1870, ss. 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8

mences with a definition of the crime of forgery which runs as follows: "For the purposes of this Act forgery is the making of a false document in order that it may be used as genuine, and in the case of the seals and dies mentioned in this Act the counterfeiting of a seal or die."1

66

It next defines the phrase a "false document."

A document is false within the meaning of this Act if the whole or any material part thereof purports to be made by or on behalf or on account of a person who did not make it nor authorise its making, or if, though made by or on behalf or on account of the person by whom or by whose authority it purports to have been made, the time or place of making, where either is material, or, in the case of a document identified by number or mark, the number or any distinguishing mark identifying the document, is falsely stated therein; and in particular a document is false:

(a) if any material alteration, whether by addition, insertion, oblitera tion, erasure, removal or otherwise, has been made therein;

(b) if the whole or some material part of it purports to be made by or on behalf of a fictitious or deceased person;

(c) if, though made in the name of an existing person, it is made by him or by his authority with the intention that it should pass as having been made by some person, real or fictitious, other than the person who made or authorised it.

For the purposes of this Act

(a) It is immaterial in what language a document is expressed or in what place within or without the King's dominions it is expressed to take effect;

(b) Forgery of a document may be complete even if the document when forged is incomplete, or is not or does not purport to be such a document as would be binding or sufficient in law;

(c) The crossing on any cheque, draft on a banker, post-office money order, postal order, coupon or other document, the crossing of which is authorised or recognised by law, shall be a material part of such cheque, draft, order, coupon or document." 2

"Forgery of the following documents, if committed with intent to defraud, shall be felony and punishable with penal servitude for life :

(a) Any will, codicil or other testamentary document, either of a dead or of a living person, or any probate or letters of administration, whether with or without the will annexed;

(b) Any deed or bond, or any assignment at law or in

1 S. 1 (1).

2 S. 1 (2) and (3).

equity of any deed or bond, or any attestation of the execution of any deed or bond;

(c) Any bank note, or any indorsement on or assignment of any bank note."1

Section 2 (2) enumerates a large number of documents, chiefly relating to property, such as valuable securities, powers of attorney and charterparties, the forgery of which with intent to defraud is felony punishable with penal servitude for fourteen years.

Section 3 deals with official documents, the forgery of which with intent to defraud or deceive is felony punishable with

(a) penal servitude for life in the case of any document. under His Majesty's seal;

(b) penal servitude for fourteen years in the case of registers or copies of registers of births, deaths and marriages, &c.; (c) penal servitude for seven years in the case of other official documents, such as licences, certificates, &c.

"Forgery of any document which is not made felony under this or any other statute for the time being in force, if committed with intent to defraud, shall be a misdemeanour and punishable with imprisonment with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding two years." So is "forgery of any public document which is not made felony under this or any other statute for the time being in force, if committed with intent to defraud or deceive." 3

To counterfeit the various seals and dies mentioned in section 5, or the impression of any such seals, with intent to defraud or deceive, is felony punishable with terms of penal servitude varying from life to seven years.

It will be observed that the Act makes an important distinction between "an intent to defraud" and "an intent to deceive." Under sections 3, 4 (2) and 5 it is sufficient if the prisoner did the act with either intention. But in the case of documents referred to in sections 2 and 4 (1) it is necessary prove that the prisoner intended to defraud; a mere intention to deceive would not be sufficient. An intention to deceive may in some cases be innocent: not so an intention to defraud.

1 S 2 (1).

to

2 See ante, p. 194.

3 S 4.

4 See the definition of "seal" in s. 18 (1).

Under the present law, then, it is a crime to forge any "document." But the Act of 1913 does not contain any express definition of the word "document," though most documents which are at all likely to be forged are enumerated in it. The phrase "public document" is also used and not defined. 2

It is no longer necessary that it should on the face of it purport to convey some legal consequence, or that it is good and valid for the purpose for which it was created. It is sufficient "even if the document when forged is incomplete, or is not or does not purport to be such a document as would be binding or sufficient in law."8

4

In 1896 the case of R. v. Riley evoked considerable discussion as to whether a telegram was a document which could be forged. In that case the prisoner, who was a clerk in the head post office at Manchester, heard that a horse named "Lord of Dale" had won the Newcastle Handicap. He thereupon wrote and sent to a bookmaker a telegram which purported to have been handed in at a branch post office in Manchester before the race had been run. This telegram offered a bet on the horse, which the bookmaker accepted and ultimately paid. In reality the telegram was not handed in at the branch office, but was despatched by the prisoner from the head office after the race had been run. It was held that this telegram form was an instrument within the meaning of section 38 of the Forgery Act, 1861, and that the prisoner was rightly convicted.

Merely writing down a lie is not forgery; for instance, fraudulently making a false entry in a book of account is not forgery, nor is the fraudulent imitation of a trade mark.5 It is not enough that the document tells a lic, "it must tell a lie about itself." It need not exactly resemble the instrument it pretends to be; it is sufficient if it is capable of deceiving persons using ordinary observation according to their means of knowledge. But it is forgery either to make a false document or fraudulently to alter a genuine document in some material part.

A man can be guilty of forgery by writing even his own name.

For

1 But it is still doubtful whether a picture is or is not a document within the

meaning of the Act.

* See the definition given by Lord Blackburn, in Sturla v. Freccia (1880), 5 App.

Cas. at p. 643.

S. 1(3) (b). The case of R. v. Harper (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 78, is therefore no

longer law.

4 [1896] 1 Q. B. 309.

But see the provisions of the Merchandise Marks Act, referred to ante, p. 374