arrived in England as the representative of the United States government, addressed a note to Lord Palmerston, not asking any question as to the British protectorate of Mosquito, but requesting to know whether her Majesty's government would join with the United States in guarantying the neutrality of a ship-canal, railway, or other communication between the two oceans, to be open to the world, and common to all nations, and whether the British government intended to occupy or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast so called, or any part of Central America. To this note Lord Palmerston replied by stating, that her Majesty's government had no intention to occupy or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, nor any part of Central America, and that her Majesty's government would feel great pleasure in combining and co-operating with the government of the United States for the purpose of assisting the operations of a company which might be formed with a view to establish a general communication, by canal or railroad, across the isthmus separating the northern and southern portions of the American continent, both by offering security for the works while in progress, and when completed and in use, and by placing such communication, through the means of political arrangements, beyond the reach of molestation, disturbance, or obstacle, by reason of international disputes, which may at any time unfortunately arise, upon the conditions, moreover, that such communication should at all times be open and accessible for the commerce of all nations, and on equal terms for all. These notes-copies of which are hereunto annexed-are of great importance, inasmuch as they laid the foundation for the subsequent convention of Washington, whilst they explain the nature of the feelings entertained at that time by the United States government and by the government of her Majesty. It was clear that the United States government, which had regarded the affairs of Central America not long before with comparative indifference, had had its attention lately called to this part of the world by its acquisition of California and the discovery of the ore which that region was found to contain-circumstances which rendered of vast importance some safe and rapid means of communication between the possessions of the United States on the Pacific and the possessions of the United States on the Atlantic. A project of a canal communication, moreover, through the state and lake of Nicaragua, and the river San Juan, was then in contemplation, and Nicaragua had granted to a company of American citizens whatever rights it possessed over this proposed line of traffic.

Great Britain, however, by having placed a people under her protection in possession of the port and town of San Juan de Nicaragua, might exert her influence either to prevent this canal being formed, or, if she allowed it to be formed, might aim, through her protectorate, at acquiring over such canal peculiar rights or absolute control.

The government of the United States was, therefore, justly anxious to know whether the British government would favour or impede the construction of a canal by the river San Juan, and whether it would attempt to establish a predominant and permanent power over this canal by colonizing, fortifying, occupying, or taking absolute possession of the country through which it passed.

The mere protectorate of Great Britain, stripped of those attributes which affected the construction and the freedom of the proposed canal, was of small consequence to the United States; but, connected with those attributes, it was a matter of great importance.

On the other hand, her Majesty's government, which had just expelled the Nicaraguans from Greytown (or San Juan de Nicaragua) and the country adjacent, and had formally discussed, and finally rejected, the claims of the Nicaraguan government to these contested possessions, could not with honour or credit retire, at the mere interposition of the United States, from the position it had assumed, or abandon the long-established British protectorate over the Mosquitos, and allow the authorities of Nicaragua to reoccupy the ground from which they had so recently been driven. But Great Britain could clearly engage herself to the United States to do all that was required respecting the construction and protection of any canal communication to be enjoyed on equal terms by all nations, and she could also limit the powers of her protectorate over Mosquito, so as to remove all suspicion or possibility of her using it in any manner that would place such canal conmunication under her exclusive authority and dominion.

Thus, when the drawing up of a treaty afterwards took place, the object of the British negotiator, and, it must be presumed, that of both negotiators, necessarily was to draw up such a convention as, without conceding any specific point on which one party could not in honour yield, would make such concessions on all other points as the other party desired; and if the convention in question be referred to, it will be seen that it is drawn up carefully, in such a manner as to make it a matter of indifference, so far as the canal is concerned, as to whether the port and town of San Juan are under the modified protectorate of Great Britain, or under the government of Nicaragua. Moreover, in drawing up this treaty, both Mr. Clayton and Sir H. L. Bulwer referred to the notes which had passed between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Lawrence, and even made use of the precise terms which had been there employed; from which it must of necessity be inferred that they meant to transfer to their convention, with the words which they borrowed, the meaning which had previously been attached to those words in the documents from which they extracted them; and a referense to such documents will at once show that Mr. Lawrence, while he asked her Majesty's government whether it meant to occupy, fortify, colonize, or assume or exercise dominion

over Mosquito, did not allude to the protectorate of Great Britain over that country, and that Lord Palmerston, in declaring that her Majesty's government did not intend to do any of these things, expressly left the question concerning the political relations between Great Britain and the Mosquitos untouched.

So much for the spirit which presided over the convention of 1850.

With regard to the literal meaning, this treaty declares in words that the two parties "will not occupy, nor fortify, nor colonize, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, nor any part of Central America," and that neither party will "make use of any protection which either affords or may afford, or any alliance which either has or may have" with any state or people, for the purpose of occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the

same.

Mr. Buchanan says, with regard to that portion of the foregoing sentence which restricts the use which Great Britain or the United States might make of any protection which either might afford to any state or people, it has been said that this article of the convention acknowledges by implication the protectorate of Great Britain over Mosquito. Now, her Majesty's government does not pretend that in this article the United States acknowledges the aforesaid protectorate of Great Britain in Mosquito; it was never the intention of her Majesty's government, or that of the British negotiator, to obtain indirectly that which was not asked for openly; but it is evident that this article clearly acknowledges the possibility of Great Britain or the United States affording protection to Mosquito or any Central American state, and that the intention of the parties was not to prohibit or abolish, but to limit and restrict, such protectorate. But supposing all mention of protection in the treaty had been omitted, and that the question at issue merely rested on the words "colonize, fortify, occupy, and assume or exercise dominion over," is there any one of these terms which excludes the right of protection, although each of them limits its capability? Defending or protecting is a temporary act of friendship; occupying, colonizing, fortifying, or acquiring sovereignty, are acts which have a permanent result.

It has never been held that neutral territories or kingdoms over which other kingdoms are prohibited by treaty from acquiring dominion, which other kingdoms cannot colonize, occupy, nor fortify, may not be defended by such kingdoms at the desire and request of the neutral state, although it would doubtless be necessary for any nation undertaking such defence to declare formally and promise clearly that it would not turn this transitory and allowable act into one of a continuous nature which engagements had prohibited.

No one will maintain that the bar to colonization or fortifying is a bar to all protection; no one will assert that to afford protection to a state and establish dominion over it are necessarily the same thing; no one will contend that to send a naval or military force for the purpose of expelling an enemy from the territory of an ally, or of punishing his antagonist, is to hold or occupy the territory of that ally or of his enemy.

Were this the sense of the word as inserted in the treaty of 1850, as that word is equally applied to all Central America as well as to Mosquito, it would have a far wider signification than her Majesty's government contemplated, or than the United States government would in all probability admit; for in such a case neither Great Britain nor the United States could in any circumstance employ force, naval or military, against any Central American State, however great or just the provocation they might receive.

The citizens of the United States, for instance, might on their way from California to Washington be arrested and confined on any suspicion or pretext, and the demands of the United States for their release refused. But is it to be argued that under such circumstances the United States could not send an armed force into Nicaragua to compel the release of the citizens from California, and chastise those who had unjustly incarcerated them? The United States government, however, would be bound to state the object it had in view in sending a force into Nicaragua. It would be bound to declare that it did not mean to colonize, fortify, occupy, or establish its sovereignty over Nicaragua, and, by adhering to this pledge, its treaty obligations would be fulfilled. But surely this dispute as to the nature and meaning of protection is one that should not have arisen with respect to the treaty of 1850. The very object and nature of that treaty ought to manifest that protection is not equivalent to occupation or sovereignty, and that it does not of necessity imply the acquisition of any exclusive advantages to the parties protecting, or give those parties exclusive control over that which is protected.

Great Britain and the United States by the said treaty bind themselves to protect certain canals or railways, which may be formed through various independent states: Great Britain and the United States do not by this protection acquire any right of sovereignty or occupation over such canals or railways, whilst they carefully exclude themselves from having any exclusive control over them, and from deriving from them any exclusive privileges.

It is surely unnecessary further to discuss the construction of the treaty with reference to the protection of Mosquito. That her Majesty's government merely expresses now that view of the treaty which it entertained, and which it had understood that the government of the United States entertained, when the treaty was concluded, is evident from the fact that within little more than a month after the treaty of 1850 had been ratified her Majesty's minister at Washington entered into further negotiations with the

government of the United States relative to the position of Mosquito, interpreting the treaty as her Majesty's government now interprets it. That there was nothing extraordinary, unnatural, or unfair in the interpretation thus given to the treaty by her Majesty's government, is equally evident from the fact that such interpretation was at once accepted by the Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, than whom no statesman at that time living, whether in Europe or America, was more fitted to comprehend the spirit or analyze the wording of any international obligation; and that her Majesty's government was not at that time, and is not now, animated by any such object as that of obtaining any peculiar influence or control over the river San Juan, or the canal that may be formed from its waters, is likewise demonstrated by the circumstance, worth noting, that the object which Great Britain had in view in pursuing these further negotiations with the United States was that of withdrawing her protection from the very town called Greytown, or San Juan de Nicaragua, and the adjoining territory, and of placing the same in the hands of some Central American State, on conditions in no wise beneficial to herself, or only beneficial in so far as such conditions tended to mantain a state of peace and tranquillity in that part of the world to which they related, and to preserve the Mosquitos in a territory bordering that which was to be ceded, in an inoffensive state of neutrality and security.

Indeed, when her Majesty's minister, in a conversation which took place about the end of July, 1851, on this subject, agreed, on the part of the British government to assign Greytown to Nicaragua, upon her coming to a fair settlement with Costa Rica as to some of the points of contention between them, and upon her agreeing to leave the Mosquito people unmolested within certain portions of the territory which they now occupy, and over which the Spanish dominion never, otherwise than nominally, extended, Mr. Webster, whilst observing that the United States had no direct interest in any question concerning Nicaragua and Mosquito, except as respected the construction of a canal and its free navigation, and that consequently, he did not wish to take an active part in any negotiation extending beyond these limits, added, addressing himself to the Nicaraguan minister, who was present, that he considered the offer made by the British minister was one which the Nicaraguan government might consider as a fair basis for an arrangement, and her Majesty's government then entertained the hope and belief that, by the friendly understanding subsisting between Great Britain and the United States, and the joint efforts of both, such a settlement would be speedily concluded between all the parties interested as would enable her Majesty's government to release itself from the duty of protecting or defending Greytown, in which, for the time being, a self-elected body, in a great measure composed of United States citizens, was carrying on the government in the name of the King of Mosquito.