Amending the Constitution Relative to the Taking of Private Property ...: Hearings ... on S.J.Res. 3, H.R. 640 and H.J.Res. 21 ... Feb. 24 and April 14, 1954
1954 - 31 strani
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act of Congress action adopted appear argued asked assert Association authority believe branch calendar Chairman Chief Executive circumstances claim clear committee Congressman connection consider consideration constitutional amendment construed contention counsel CURTIS danger Davis decision Defense Department due process effect emergency enacted executive power exercise existed express fact February field fifth amendment follow future Government grant hearing House of Representatives inherent power invitation John JONES Judiciary Committee June Justice kind language legislation letter limited manner matter McCulloch ment military necessary never objection officer operations opinion particular passed PERLMAN person possession present President President's private property procedures prohibit proposed amendment question reason record REED rules seize private property Senate Joint Resolution Senator McCARRAN situation specific statement statute Steel Seizure subcommittee Supreme Court taken taking of private Thank theory thought treaties United Washington White House World
Stran 20 - Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1.
Stran 21 - When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.
Stran 22 - President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Stran 21 - The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the taking of private property for public use. It can make laws regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain fields of our economy. The Constitution does not subject this law-making power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.
Stran 20 - theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Stran 5 - Constitution already prohibits the taking of private property without due process of law and the Court construed that provision in the Steel Seizure case.
Stran 21 - ... these policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a government official to promulgate additional rules and regulations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to carry that policy into execution.
Stran 22 - Barreme, but also by a score of other pronouncements of distinguished members of this bench — the Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency. In fact, to my thinking, such a grant may well be necessary to the very existence of the Constitution itself. As Lincoln aptly said, "[is] it possible to lose the Nation and yet preserve the Constitution?" In describing this authority I care not whether one calls it "residual," "inherent,"...
Stran 21 - ... a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter? enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.3 3.
Stran 22 - I conclude that where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis; but that In the absence of such actions by Congress, the President's independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation con-fronting the nation.