to any person in his position such a description as that of de facto sovereign. In most of the South American republics the Practical Sovereign is the army, or a general (or combination of generals) whom the army, whether or no this general be in fact President, will follow. In Egypt, though the Legal Sovereign is the Khedive for little regard need be had to the theoretical suzerainty of the Turk, which is put in force only when the European Powers choose to use it for their own purposes the Practical Sovereign has for some years past been the British Government. In Rome, after the revolution which overthrew the republic, the Practical Sovereign was Octavianus Augustus, though the Legal Sovereignty remained vested in the People, subject to the claim of the Senate to exercise certain powers. In Syracuse under Dionysius the Elder, in Florence under Lorenzo dei Medici, each of those tyrants was Practical Sovereign, though neither enjoyed legal supremacy. In England people are accustomed to call the House of Commons the sovereign power,' though the law makes the consent of the other House and that of the Crown just as necessary to the validity of a statute as is that of the representatives of the people. In Denmark within our own time the Practical Sovereign was for some years the King, because the Constitution, which gives legal sovereignty to the Legislature and King together, was for a while virtually in abeyance, there having been a struggle and deadlock during which the Crown retained its ministers and raised taxes without the concurrence of the popular house. One might refer, by way of illustration, to cases in which some private organization exerts a power which interferes with that of the de iure government. Such was the Vehmgericht in Westphalia in the fifteenth century, such, on a much smaller scale and in a less effective way, were the Molly Maguires of Pennsylvania and the Mafia of Sicily. But these cases lie quite outside our definition: as do those of monarchies in which a strong minister or a father confessor or even

a court favourite has held the position of Practical Sovereign, that is to say, has been the person who would and could have his way, wielding the powers of the State at his sole pleasure through his influence upon the will of the titular sovereign 1.

The Musulman world furnishes two instances which deserve a passing word. The Mogul Emperors after Aurungzebe continued to be sovereigns de iure for a long time in Northern and Central India, though it was hard to say, till the East India Company extended its conquests far inland, who was sovereign de facto. Since the time of Sultan Selim the First (A.D. 1516) the Turkish Sultans have been (in large measure) Khalifs de facto. They claim to be Khalifs de iure, but the better opinion among Muslim sages is that the Khalif must be, as were the Ommiyads and the Abbasides, of the tribe of the Khoreish, to which Muhamad belonged, and in matters of such high sanctity long possession de facto makes no difference. Possibly therefore the Shereef of Mecca may be better entitled to call himself the Khalif de iure, entitled to the obedience of all the Faithful.

Where the Legal is not also the Practical Sovereign, it is obviously a far more difficult task to discover the latter than the former. As respects legal power there are the fixed rules of law, which in communities that have reached a certain stage of development indicate clearly the person (or body) to whom the ultimate right of legislation, or of issuing executive orders, belongs. But the political philosopher or historian who wishes to ascertain the actually strongest force in a State lacks the guidance of such rules as the lawyer possesses. He has to do with facts which are uncertain, with forces which are imponderable. In no two countries, moreover, are the phenomena of Practical Sovereignty quite the same. Nevertheless it is true that there is in every State a Strongest Force, a power to which other powers

1 During part of Lewis the Fifteenth's reign Madame Du Barry might almost have been, and probably was, described as sovereign de facto of France.

bow, and of which it may be, more or less positively, predicted that in case of conflict it will overcome all resistance. Here, however, we come upon one of the many difficulties that beset an inquiry into practical supremacy. Are we to take a condition of peace, and ask whose will actually prevails while peace lasts, or are we to suppose a condition of war, and ask who would prevail if the strife between contending authorities were to be fought out by physical force? In the before-mentioned case of Denmark, for instance, though the Crown practically carried on the government, it was by no means clear that, if an insurrection broke out, the Crown would prove to be stronger than the popular chamber or those who supported it. In such inquiries the precision with which Legal Sovereignty can be determined. is unattainable, for the political student finds that the terms suited to the phenomena of one country are unsuited to those of another, and that his general propositions regarding the actually Sovereign Powers must be subject to so many qualifications that they virtually cease to be general.

We have, however, found in every political community two kinds of Sovereign, belonging to two different spheres of thought, the Sovereign de iure and the Sovereign de facto. Let us see what are the relations of the two conceptions, or the two concrete persons, each to the other.

IV. THE RELATIONS OF LEGAL TO PRACTICAL

SOVEREIGNTY.

The Sovereign de iure may also be the sovereign de facto. He ought to be so; that is to say, the plan of a well-regulated State requires that Legal Right and Actual Power should be united in the same person or body. Right ought to have on its side, available for its enforcement, physical force and the habit of obedience. Where Sovereignty de facto is disjoined from Sove

reignty de iure, there will not necessarily be a collision, because the former power may act through the latter. But there is always a danger that the laws will be overridden by the Practical Sovereign and disobeyed by the citizens.

Sovereignty de iure and sovereignty de facto have a double tendency to coalesce; and it is this tendency which has made them so often confounded.

Sovereignty de facto, when it has lasted for a certain time and shown itself stable, ripens into Sovereignty de iure. Sometimes it violently and illegally changes the pre-existing constitution, and creates a new legal system which, being supported by force, ultimately supersedes the old system. Sometimes the old constitution becomes quietly obsolete, and the customs formed under the new de facto ruler become ultimately valid laws, and make him a de iure ruler. In any case, just as Possession in all or nearly all modern legal systems turns itself sooner or later through Prescription into Ownership --and conversely possession as a fact is aided by title or reputed title-so de facto power, if it can maintain itself long enough, will end by being de iure. Mankind, partly from the instinct of submission, partly because their moral sense is disquieted by the notion of power resting simply on force, are prone to find some reason for treating a de facto ruler as legitimate. They take any pretext for giving him a de iure title if they can, for it makes their subjection more agreeable and may impose some restraint upon him.

Sovereignty de iure in its turn tends to attract to itself sovereignty de facto, or, in other words, the possession of legal right tends to make the legal sovereign actually powerful. Hence a ruler de facto is always anxious to get some sort of de iure title, and Louis Napoleon, who had seized power by violence in 1851, thought himself, and doubtless was, more secure after he had got two (so-called) plebiscites in his favour in 1852, recognizing him first as President for ten years and then Emperor.

This is not merely because the Legal Sovereign has presumably a moral claim to obedience-I say presumably, because he may have forfeited this claim by tyrannybut also because most men are governed and all are influenced by Habit, and therefore tend to go on obeying the person they have theretofore obeyed. It is moreover easier, in case of conflict, to know who is de iure sovereign than to foretell who will prove to be sovereign de facto; and whereas the de iure sovereign is certain, if victorious, to punish as rebels those who have opposed him, the de facto sovereign, having been himself a rebel, may possibly be more indulgent. Under King Henry the Seventh in England express provision was made by statute for the protection of persons obeying a de facto king1. Accordingly, when strife arises between two persons or bodies of nearly equal physical resources, each claiming authority, the person who has the better legal claim will usually have the better prospect of success, and the ordinary citizen will be safer in siding with him. This is one of the reasons why conspiracies and insurrections, even against the worst de iure sovereigns, so often fail.

Similarly it happens that where sovereignty de iure is in dispute and uncertain, strife is likely to trouble the practical sphere in the hands of the claimant who for the moment holds the government de facto; and this not merely because some of the people are zealous to support rights which they think infringed upon, but also because the sense of stability which supports a government has been impaired, and the usual check on a resort to physical force thereby removed.

When a sovereign has been long and quietly established de iure, the distinction between law and fact is forgotten, and people assume that whoever has the legal right will also as a matter of course have the physical force to support it. This tends to make the distinction forgotten. Conversely, when de facto sovereignty is 1 II Henry VII, cap. 1.