McClellan CHAP. IV. and hopes. McClellan immediately began sending him reënforcements, and in his first written instruction made the East Tennessee movement a prime object. This injunction he repeated and emphasized from time to time: "I am still convinced that political and strategical considerations render a prompt movement in force on Eastern Tennessee imperative. The object to be gained is to cut the communication between the Mississippi Valley and Eastern Virginia; to protect our Union friends in Tennessee, and reëstablish the Government of the Union in the eastern portion of that State." "I think we owe it to our Union friends in Eastern Tennessee to protect them at all hazards. 1861. W. R. First secure that; then, if you possess the means, carry Nashville." "If you gain and retain possession of Eastern Tennessee you will have won brighter laurels than any I hope to gain." "I tell the East Tennessee men here to rest quiet; that you will take care of them, and will never desert them." to Buell, Nov. 25, 1861. W. R. Vol. VII., p. 447. Ibid., Nov. 29, Vol. VII., p. 457. Ibid., Dec. 3, 1861. W. R. Vol. Ibíd.. VII. 468. W. R. pp. 473, 583. As soon as Congress met, President Lincoln made another effort to forward the expedition which he had so much at heart. His study of the subject with military men showed him that the problem of transportation was the main difficulty the East Tennessee campaign would have to encounter. To obviate this he proposed to Congress the construction of a military railroad to Cumberland Gap or Knoxville. "I deem it of importance," said his annual message, "that the loyal regions of East Tennessee and Western North Carolina should be connected with Kentucky and other faithful parts of the Union by railroad. I therefore recommend, as a military measure, that Congress provide for request $ 66 's L the construction of such road as speedily as pos- CHAP. IV. It would seem that the general direction of central authority could scarcely be made stronger without descending to such details as must, in war, always be left to the determination of local conditions, and to that judgment which an officer founds upon his personal observation. Apparently General Buell accepted the instruction which had been given him; but McClellan quickly discovered Appendix, p. 1. to Buell, Nov. 27, 1861. W. R. Vol. CHAP. IV. that the reënforcements sent were not being placed with reference to East Tennessee. "What is the McClellan reason," he inquired by telegraph, "for concentration of troops at Louisville? I urge movement at VIL., p. 450. once on Eastern Tennessee unless it is impossible." Here Buell ought to have sent a straightforward reply, either that it was impossible, or that he would obey; instead of this he answered evasively, suggesting several alternative plans, but giving no indications of a willingness to act; his chief solicitude was reënforcement, drill, organization. These were certainly useful, perhaps necessary. But when they interfered with the prosecution of an enterprise specifically directed by his superior, he should not have left his intentions unexplained. Ten days more ran on, and Andrew Johnson and Horace Maynard, who were in Washington attendMaynard ing Congress, sent Buell an anxious dispatch: Johnson to "Our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts Dec. 7, 1861. of the forest; the Government must come to their relief.” His reply kept the word of promise to the ear: "I assure you I recognize no more imperative duty, and crave no higher honor, than that of rescuing our loyal friends in Tennessee, whose sufferings and heroism I think I can appreciate." But his letter to McClellan of the same day, if they could have seen it, would have sadly chilled their hope: "I do not mean to be diverted more than is absolutely necessary from what I regard as of the first importance-the organization of my forces, now little better than a mob." In his letter of two days later, by way of making amends, he said he had organized a division at Lebanon with special reference to East Tennessee, but hinted that he and Buell, W. R. Vol. VII., p. 480. Buell to Maynard and Johnson, Dec. 8, 1861. W. R. Vol. VII., p. 483. Buell to McClellan, Dec. 8, 1861. W. R. Vol. VII., p. 483. would convince McClellan it could be used to better CHAP. IV. advantage elsewhere. Buell to Thomas to Buell to Thomas, Dec. 21, Vol. VII., p. 509. Ibid., Dec. 23, 1861, W. R. Vol. VII., pp. 511, 512. To leave him no excuse the War Department telegraphed him, December 20: "Do you need VII., p. 487. more regiments than are now under your orders; if so, how many?" His reply indicated that he realized he was trying the patience of the Govern- VII., p. 509. ment: "I am not willing to say that I need more regiments. I can use more with decided advan- 1861 WR. tage, if they can be sent." His more formal answer acknowledged that he had an aggregate “of some 70,000 men, about 57,000 for duty," and his letter at length discloses the idea upon which he had been acting: "The plan which I propose for the troops here is one of defense on the east and of invasion on the south." Finally, the approach of the New Year, together with other circumstances, again brought the question, so long evaded and neglected, sharply to his attention. "Johnson, Maynard, etc., are again becoming frantic," McClellan telegraphed him on December 29th, "and have President Lincoln's sympathy excited. Political considerations would make it advisable to get the arms and troops into Eastern Tennessee at a very early day; you are, however, the best judge. Can you tell me about when and in what force you will be in Eastern Tennessee?" Whether he intended it or not, he once more sent an evasive and misleading response: "It startles me to think," he wrote on December 29, "how much time has elapsed since my arrival, and to find myself still in Louisville... I have this moment received your dispatch. I intend a column of 12,000 men, with three batteries, for East Tennessee; but, as I have McClellan 1861, W. R. Dec. 29, Vol. VII., p. 926. In any CHAP. IV. telegraphed you, it is impossible to fix a time for it to be there, so much depends on the circumstances which may arise in the mean time. . . event I must tell you, what I have been unwilling McClellan, to do all along, that you will require more troops 1861 W. R. in Kentucky. Don't acknowledge this, however, pp. 520, 521. but act on it." Buell to Dec. 29, Vol. VII., Lincoln to Jan. 4, 1862. W. R. Vol. VII., p. 530. This last qualified promise did not long serve to postpone the decisive avowal that Buell had been hitherto allowing the Administration to entertain delusive hopes. Prompted by causes which are related elsewhere, President Lincoln, on the 4th of January, telegraphed him the definite question: "Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction. Answer." In his reply, Buell for the first time, after nearly two months of evasion, fully let out the secret that his plans lay in another quarter. "While my preparations have had this movement constantly in view, I will confess to your Excellency that I have been bound to it more by my sympathy for the people of East Tennessee and the anxiety with which you and the General-in-Chief have desired it than by my opinion of its wisdom as an unconditional measure. As earnestly as I wish to accomplish it, my judgment has from the first been decidedly against it, if it should render at all doubtful the success of a movement against the great power of the rebellion in the West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily be concentrated at any point of that line pp. 530, 531. which is attacked singly." President Lincoln's comment on this extraordinary avowal is in that Buell to Jan. 5, 1862. |