whether interlocutory or perpetual (m), and can enforce obedience by committal (n). But the County Court has no power to restrain the infringement of a patent if its validity is disputed (0), and it has been doubted whether the County Court can grant an injunction to restrain a threatened injury where no damage has been sustained (p). Where the only question before the Court is whether an injunction shall be granted or not, an appeal lies without leave, notwithstanding sect. 120 of the County Courts Act, 1888 (q). It has been held that sect. 116, sub-sect. 2 of the County Courts Act, 1888, which deprives a plaintiff of costs who brings an action founded on tort in the High Court and recovers less than 101. damages, does not apply where the main relief sought is an injunction (»). Chap. II. against repeti contract. In any cause or matter in which an injunction has been or Injunction might have been granted, the plaintiff may before or after tion of wrongful judgment apply for an injunction to restrain the defendant or act or breach of respondent from the repetition or continuance of the wrongful act or breach of contract complained of, or from the commission of any injury or breach of contract of a like kind relating to the same property or right, or arising out of the same contract, and the Court or a judge may grant the injunction either upon or without terms as may be just (s). (m) Richards v. Cullerne, 7 Q. B. D. 623. (n) Martin v. Bannister, 4 Q. B. D. 491. (0) Reg. v. Halifax C. C., (1891) 2 Q. B. 263. (p) Martin v. Bannister, supra. (r) Keates v. Woodward, (1902) 1 (8) Ord. L. r. 12. CHAPTER III. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST THE VIOLATION OF COMMON LAW RIGHTS. Chap. III. Sect. 1. Protection of legal rights pending litigation. SECTION 1.-THE PROTECTION OF LEGAL RIGHTS TO PROPERTY THE jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice by injunction is not confined to the protection of equitable rights, but extends to the protection of legal rights to property from damage pending litigation. The protection of legal rights to property from irreparable or at least from serious damage pending the trial of the legal right was part of the original and proper office of the Court of Chancery (a). In exercising the jurisdiction the Court does not pretend to determine legal rights to property, but merely keeps the property in its actual condition until the legal title can be established (b). The Court interferes on the assumption that the party who seeks its interference has the legal right which he asserts, but needs the aid of the Court for the protection of the property in question until the legal right can be ascertained (c). The office of the Court to interfere being founded on the existence of the legal right, a man who seeks the aid of the Court must be able to show a fair primâ facie case in support of the title which he asserts (d). He is not required to make out a clear legal title, but he must satisfy the Court that he has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the legal right which he sets (a) Hilton v. Lord Granville, Cr. & Ph. 283, 292. (b) Harman v. Jones, Cr. & Ph. 299, 301. (c) Ib. (d) Saunders v. Smith, 3 M. & C. 714, 728; 45 R. R. 367; Hilton v. Lord Granville, Cr. & Ph. 283, 292. up (e), and that there are substantial grounds for doubting the existence of the alleged legal right, the exercise of which he seeks to prevent (f). The Court must, before disturbing any man's legal right, or stripping him of any of the rights with which the law has clothed him, be satisfied that the probability is in favour of his case ultimately failing in the final issue of the suit (g). The mere existence of a doubt as to the plaintiff's right to the property, interference with which he seeks to restrain, does not of itself constitute a sufficient ground for refusing an injunction, though it is always a circumstance which calls for the attention of the Court (h). Where the question of right had been decided in the plaintiff's favour in a Court of law, the fact that an appeal was pending was held to be no ground for a Court of equity refusing an injunction, unless the Court doubted the correctness of the decision at law (i). But the pendency of the appeal might be a ground for the Court postponing the operation of the injunction (k). Chap. III. Sect. 1. or threatened right should be If the legal right is not disputed, a man who seeks the aid A case of actual of the Court must be able to show that the act complained of violation of the is in fact a violation of the right, or is at least an act which, made out. if carried into effect, will necessarily result in a violation of the right (1). The mere prospect or apprehension of injury or the mere belief that the act complained of may or will be done, is not sufficient (m); but if an intention to do the act complained of can be shown to exist, or if a man insists on his right to do, or begins to do, or threatens to do, or gives (e) Shrewsbury and Chester Railway Co. v. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Co., 1 Sim. N. S. 410, 426. (f) Sparrow v. Oxford, Worcester, and Wolverhampton Railway Co., 9 Ha. 436, 441. (g) Att.-Gen. v. Mayor of Wigan, 5 D. M. & G. 52. (h) Ollendorf v. Black, 4 De G. & S. 211. (1) Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 M. & K. 169, 176; 41 R. R. 40; Haines v. Taylor, 10 Beav. 471; 2 Ph. 209; Pattison v. Gilford, 18 Eq. 259; Goodhart v. Hyett, 25 Ch. D. 190; Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 C. D. 688. (m) Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 M. & K. 174; 41 R. R. 40; Haines v. Taylor, 10 Beav. 75; 2 Ph. 209; Att.-Gen. v. Corporation of Manchester, (1893) 2 Ch. 87, 91, where (i) Att.-Gen. v. Proprietors of the principles on which the Court Bradford Canal, 2 Eq. 71. (4) 2 Eq. pp. 79, 84. proceeds in granting or refusing Chap. III. Right to relief not excluded by imposition of penalties. Irreparable damage. notice of his intention to do an act which must, in the opinion of the Court, if completed, give a ground of action, there is a foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction (n). The mere denial by a man of his intention to do an act or to infringe a right will not prevent the Court from interfering (0); but if a man who claims a right to do a certain act asserts positively that before proceeding to do the act, he will give notice of his intention to do it, and there is no reason to doubt the truth of his assurance, the Court will not interfere (p). It has been held that where a statute provides a particular remedy for the infringement of a right of property thereby created, the jurisdiction of the High Court to protect the right by injunction is not excluded, unless the statute expressly so provides (q). A man who seeks the aid of the Court by way of interlocutory injunction, must, as a rule (r), be able to satisfy the Court that its interference is necessary to protect him from that species of injury which the Court calls irreparable, before the legal right can be established upon trial (s). By the term "irreparable injury" it is not meant that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury; all that is meant is, that the injury would be a material one, and not adequately reparable by damages (t); and by the term "the inadequacy of the remedy by damages" is meant that the remedy by damages is not such a compensation as will in effect, though (n) Att.-Gen. v. Forbes, 2 M. & C. p. 132; 45 R. R. 15; Tipping v. Eckersley, 2 K. & J. 264, 270; Hext v. Gill, 7 Ch. 699, 711; Cooper v. Whittingham, 15 Ch. D. 501; Phillips v. Thomas, 62 L. T. 793. (0) Jackson v. Cator, 5 Ves. 688; 5 R. R. 144; Potts v. Levy, 2 Drew, 272, 279; Adair v. Young, 12 Ch. D. 19. (p) Lord Cowley v. Byas, 5 Ch. D. 950. (7) Stevens v. Chown, (1901) 1 Ch. 894. Compare with this case Devonport Corporation v. Tozer, (1902) 2 Ch. 182. (r) As to cases where an injunction is claimed against the breach of an express covenant, see post, Chap. X. s. 1. (8) Att.-Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Co., 3 D. M. & G. 304; Johnson v. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway Co., ib. p. 931; Dyke v. Taylor, 3 D. F. & J. 467. (t) Pinchin v. London and Blackwall Railway Co., 5 D. M. & G. p. 860; East Lancashire Railway Co. v. Hattersley, 8 Ha. p. 90; Att.-Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Co., 3 D. M. & G. 304, 320; Bloxam v. Metropolitan Railway, 3 Ch. p. 354. not in specie, place the parties in the position in which they formerly stood (u). If the act complained of threatens to destroy the subject-matter in question, the case may come within the principle, even though the damages may be capable of being accurately measured (r). The fact that the amount of damage cannot be accurately ascertained may constitute irreparable damage (y); but although the amount of damage may be difficult to ascertain, a man who has on a previous occasion compromised his rights against other parties by accepting a sum of money, may preclude himself from saying that the damage is irreparable, and cannot be compensated by money (2). It is, however, no objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction by injunction that a man may have a legal remedy. The question in all cases is, whether the remedy by damages is, under the circumstances of the case, full and complete (a). "A person by committing a wrongful act (whether it be a public company for public purposes or a private individual) is not entitled to ask the Court to sanction his doing so by purchasing his neighbour's rights, by assessing damages in that behalf" (b). Chap. III. party who seeks fair and honest. The jurisdiction of the Court to interfere by way of inter- Conduct of the locutory injunction in support of a legal title being purely the aid of the equitable, it is governed upon strict equitable principles. The Court must be Court, where its summary interference is invoked, always looks to the conduct of the party who makes the application, and will refuse to interfere, even in cases where it acknowledges a right, unless his conduct in the matter has been fair and honest, and free from any taint of fraud or illegality (c). (u) Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. N. S. p. 165. (x) Hilton v. Lord Granville, Cr. & Ph. 283, 292. (y) Cory v. Yarmouth and Norwich Railway Co., 3 Ha. 603. (2) Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. N. S. 168, 169; Dowling v. Betjeman, 2 J. & H. p. 544; Ormerod v. Todmorden, &c., Mill Co., 11 Q. B. D. 162. But see Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14 W. R. 630, 632. (a) See Lumley v. Wagner, 1 D. M. & G. 604, 616; and Ryan V. Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association, (1893) 1 Ch. p. 128; Jordeson v. Sutton, &c., Gas Co., (1899) 2 Ch. 237, 238. (b) Per Smith, L.J., in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., (1895) 1 Ch. p. 322. (c) Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Railway Co., 1 M. & K. p. 168; 36 R. R. 289; Great Western Railway |