other parts of the agreement which the Court could not enter into (). So also where on the sale and purchase of land the purchaser covenanted with the vendor, a brewer, that he should have the exclusive right of supplying all ale, beer and porter which should be consumed in any building which should be erected on this particular piece of land, the Court restrained the defendant who took under the purchaser from acting in contravention of the covenant, in spite of the fact that in the conveyance to the original purchaser the vendor did not covenant to supply any ale, beer or porter (s). Chap. X. Sect. 1. The contract of charter-party is, from the peculiar nature of Negative quality the subject of the contract, an exception to the rule that a charter-party. imported into a negative quality will not be imported into an affirmative agreement, unless the agreement is of such a nature that a decree for specific performance can be made (t). "I think," said Lord Chelmsford, in De Mattos v. Gibson (u), "that a vessel under a charter-party ought to be regarded as a chattel of peculiar value to the charterer, and that although a Court of equity cannot compel a specific performance of the contract which it contains, yet that it will restrain the employment of the vessel in a different manner, whether such employment is expressly or impliedly forbidden according to the principle expressed in Lumley v. Wagner." If a charter-party is bonâ fide entered into between the owner of a vessel and the charterer, either party is entitled to an injunction to restrain the other from doing anything inconsistent with the agreement (x). not imported ment, unless If the agreement consists of two or more stipulations, and Negative quality is one which cannot from its very nature be specifically en- into an agree forced as a whole, the Court will not import a negative quality the party who into the agreement so as to be a foundation for an injunction, seeks the aid of unless the person who makes the application has actually performed his (r) Ib. (8) Catt v. Tourle, 4 Ch. 654; and see Metropolitan Electric Supply Co. v. Ginder, (1901) 2 Ch. 799, 807. (t) De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 D. & J. 276. See this case discussed in Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, (1891) 2 Ch. 416, 431 (C. A.). K.I. (u) 4 D. & J. 276, 298. (x) Sevin v. Deslandes, 30 1. J. the Court has own part of it. Chap. X. Agreement containing both performed his own part of the agreement (y). Where an affirmative covenant has a negative element in it, or where a covenant is partly affirmative and partly negative, (y) Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 B. (z) Peto v. Brighton, Uckfield, and (a) Peto v. Brighton Railway Co., 1 H. & M. 468. See Ogden v. Fossick, 4 D. F. & J. 426. (b) 33 Beav. 22; but see Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, (1891) 2 Ch. 416 (C. A.). (c) 3 K. & J. 675. (d) See Hamilton v. Dunsford, 6 Ir. Ch. 412. Chap. X. the Court will in a proper case enforce the negative portion of the covenant (e); and the Court may also enforce by injunction the negative part of an agreement containing both affirmative and negative stipulations, although the affirmative part of the agreement is of such a nature that it could not be specifically enforced (f). In Lumley v. Wagner (g) the defendant had Lumley v. Wagner. entered into an engagement with the plaintiff to sing at his theatre and not to sing at any other theatre. Lord St. Leonards restrained her from singing at any other theatre than the plaintiff's, though it was beyond all doubt that he had not the power to decree specific performance of the affirmative part of the agreement. "The case," he said (h), "is a mixed one, consisting not of two correlatives to be done, one by the plaintiff and the other by the defendant, but of an act to be done by the defendant alone, to which is superadded a negative stipulation on her part to abstain from the commission of any act which will break in upon her affirmative covenant, the one being auxiliary to, concurrent and operating with the other. The agreement to sing for the plaintiff during three months at his theatre, and during that term not to sing for anybody else, is not a correlative contract; it is in fact one contract. The engagement to perform at one theatre must necessarily exclude the right to perform at the same time at another theatre" (i). So also where a contract for the sale of chattels contained an express negative stipulation not to sell to any other person, an injunction was granted to restrain the doing of the act stipulated not to be done, although the contract was one of which specific performance would not have been granted (k). "With regard to the case of Lumley v. Wagner," said Lord Lumley v. Wagner. (e) Clegg v. Hands, 44 C. D. 503 (C. A.). (f) Lumley v. Wagner, 1 D. M. & G. 604. Cases of this kind, however, are not to be extended, post, P. 404. (g) 1 D. M. & G. 604. (4) Ib. 618. (i) Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. N. S. 433; Daggett v. Ryman, 16 W. R. (k) Donnell v. Bennett, 22 C. D. Chap. X. Selborne (1), "it is not a case which tends in any way to limit In Whitwood Chemical Company v. Hardman (n) Lindley, L. J., said: "I agree with what Fry, L. J., has said more than once, that cases of this kind are not to be extended. I confess I look upon Lumley v. Wagner rather as an anomaly to be followed in cases like it, but an anomaly which it would be very dangerous to extend." The true principle seems to be this that the Court will consider whether the contract or covenant is or is not of a kind fit for being specifically enforced. If it is, the Court will restrain acts inconsistent with it, whether there are negative words or not; if it is not, no injunction will be granted even though negative words be present (o). () 16 Eq. 440. (m) See Donnell v. Bennett, 22 C. D. 839, per Fry, L. J.; Davis v. Forman, (1894) 3 Ch. 654. (n) (1891) 2 Ch. 428. (0) See Donnell v. Bennett, 22 C. Chap. X. Enforcement notice. The principle of the Court with respect to notice in its application to the case of persons taking property with notice of a previous contract affecting the same, has been thus of covenants generalised by Knight Bruce, L. J., in De Mattos v. Gibson (p) against persons by injunction "It may be stated at least as a general rule that where a man taking with by gift or purchase acquires property from another, with knowledge of a previous contract lawfully, and for valuable consideration, made by him, with a third person to use and employ the property for a particular purpose in a specified manner, the acquirer shall not, to the material damage of the third person in opposition to the contract, and inconsistently with it, use and employ the property in a manner not allowable to the giver or seller" (q). Accordingly, the mortgagee of a charter-party, or the purchaser of a ship, with notice of a charter-party previously entered into was restrained from doing any act which would have the effect of interfering with the due performance of the charter-party ('). The jurisdiction of the Court over contracts and covenants is Enforcement by not confined to cases where an action at law can be maintained, covenant relating injunction of but extends to cases where an action at law is not maintainable. to the use and occupation of Except in cases between landlord and tenant, the obligation of land against persons taking a covenant restricting the enjoyment of land (and not amount- with notice. ing to an easement, or to the grant of a rent-charge) does not run with the land at law so as to bind an assignee, although assigns be expressly named in the covenant (s). But such covenants, though not running with the land at law so as to give a legal remedy, and though not even purporting to bind assigns, will be enforced in equity, provided the person into whose hands the land passes has taken it with notice of the covenants (t). "The question," said Lord Cottenham, in Tulk D. 835, and cf. Davis v. Forman, (9) See Barfield v. Nicholson, 2 (r) De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 D. & (8) Austerberry v. Corporation of |