Chap. XX. or vicar by persons in whom the power of appointment is vested, the Court will restrain a bishop from instituting the person so appointed (q). So also, the Court will, in a proper case, restrain a bishop and churchwardens from interfering with a vicar in the enjoyment of his benefice (r). (q) Att.-Gen. v. Bishop of Lichfield, 5 Ves. 825; Att.-Gen. v. Earl of Powis, Kay, 186. (r) Sweet v. Bishop of Ely, (1902) 2 Ch. 508, 516. CHAPTER XXI. ORDERS RESTRAINING PROCEEDINGS. 1873, s. 24, UNDER the former procedure the Court of Chancery had Chap. XXI. jurisdiction to restrain by injunction an action at law in all Judicature Act, cases where the defendant to the action could show that he sub-s. 5. had a good equitable defence. But this jurisdiction has been abolished by the Judicature Act, 1873, by which it is enacted that no cause or proceeding pending in the High Court of Justice, or in the Court of Appeal, shall be restrained by injunction or prohibition, but that every matter of equity on which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might have been obtained under the former procedure may be relied on by way of defence thereto (a). This enactment only applies where a proceeding is "pending"; and accordingly there is jurisdiction to restrain by injunction the institution of proceedings in the High Court (b). The above enactment contains a proviso to the effect that Stay of nothing in the Act is to disable either the High Court or the Court of Appeal from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it, if it shall think fit, upon application made to it in a summary way. proceedings vexatious Order 25, r. 4, provides that any pleading may be struck out Frivolous and on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action actions. or answer; and in such case, or in case of the action or defence being shown by the pleadings to be frivolous or vexatious, the action may be stayed or dismissed, or judgment entered, as may be just. Independently of this rule, every Court of (a) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 24, sub-s. 5; Garbutt v. Faucus, 1 C. D. 155. (b) Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D. 630; and see Cercle Restaurant, &c., Co. Chap. XXI. justice has an inherent jurisdiction to protect itself from abuse of its own procedure, and to stay proceedings which are manifestly frivolous and vexatious (c). When an application is made under Order 25, r. 4, the Court does not look outside the pleadings (d), but when the application is under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, affidavit evidence is admissible (e). By the Vexatious Actions Act, 1896, it is provided that the Attorney-General may apply for an order under the Act, and if he satisfies the High Court that any person has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior Court, and whether against the same person or against different persons, the Court may, after hearing such person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, after assigning counsel in case such person is unable on account of poverty to retain counsel, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by that person in the High Court or any other Court, unless he obtains leave of the High Court or some Judge thereof, and satisfies the Court or Judge that there is primâ facie ground for such proceeding (ƒ). The Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to restrain by injunction proceedings in the County Courts (g), the Lord inferior Courts. Mayor's Court (h), and in tribunals constituted for a special purpose (i). This jurisdiction has not been affected by the Judicature Acts, and may, accordingly, on a proper case being made out, be exercised by the High Court. Injunction to restrain proceedings in The principles on which the Court of Chancery interfered with proceedings in these Courts were the same as those upon which it interfered with proceedings before Courts of law. If the question was one which might be more satisfactorily and more completely settled in equity than by the Court in which pro- Chap. XXI. ceedings were taken or instituted, the Court of Chancery would interfere by injunction, and draw the matter within its own jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the power of the Court in which proceedings were taken or instituted was sufficient and adequate for the purposes of justice, the proceedings were allowed to take their course. The Court would not interfere with proceedings in these Courts, unless to do so would be a sound exercise of its discretion. It was not necessary, to induce the Court to interfere with the proceedings in these Courts, that it should find a case which would entitle the plaintiff to relief at all events. It was sufficient if the Court found upon the pleadings and upon the evidence a case which made the transaction a proper subject of investigation in a Court of equity (k). Parties, accordingly, were, under the circumstances of the case, restrained after a commission in bankruptcy from taking proceedings in foreign attachment in the Lord Mayor's Court (1). So also, proceedings in foreign attachment in the same Court were restrained on the ground that the matter could be more satisfactorily and expeditiously settled in the Court of Chancery (m). So also, a creditor of an intestate was restrained from taking proceedings in the Lord Mayor's Court after a decree for administration (n). But where, previously to an administration order in a creditor's action, another creditor had obtained judgment in the County Court against the executor, the Court would not restrain the judgment creditor from pursuing his remedy in the County Court against the executor personally (0). Where the Legislature has constituted a tribunal for a special purpose, the Court of Chancery would not prevent (k) Glascott v. Lang, 3 M. & C. 451, 455; Fletcher v. Rodgers, 27 W. R. 97; Re Original Hartlepool Colliery Co., 51 L. J. Ch. 508. (1) Barker v. Goodair, 11 Ves. 78. See Pennell v. Roy, 3 D. M. & G. (m) Cotesworth v. Stephens, 4 Ha. 185, 194. See Anderson v. Kemshead, 16 Beav. 329. (n) Redhead v. Welton, 30 L. J. Ch. 577. (0) Re Womersley, 29 C. D. 557. Chap. XXI. Concurrent administration Court. persons who were entitled to do so from applying to that tribunal (p). No equity could be founded on an allegation that a Court, legally constituted, was not properly competent to decide questions within its jurisdiction (q). But if a case of fraud could be shown, the Court might entertain jurisdiction (). In Dyke v. Stephens (s), the Court restrained a man who had submitted to the jurisdiction from instituting proceedings in respect of the same subject-matter in the Chancery Court of Lancaster. Where concurrent actions for administration of the same actions in High estate are pending before different Judges of the Chancery Division, as a general rule, the action in which judgment has been first obtained will be allowed to proceed, and the other actions will be stayed (t). Injunctions to restrain proceedings in foreign Courts. The High Court of Justice has clear and undoubted jurisdiction on a proper case being made out to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting suits in the Courts of foreign countries (u). In the exercise of the jurisdiction the Court does not proceed upon any claim of right to interfere with or control the course of proceedings in the tribunals of a foreign country, or to prevent them from adjudicating on the right of parties when drawn in controversy, and duly presented for their determination. The jurisdiction is founded on the authority vested in Courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction, and amenable to process to restrain them from doing acts which work wrong and injury to others, and are therefore contrary to equity and good conscience. As the order of the Court in such cases is pointed solely at the individual, and does not extend to the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pending, it is immaterial that (p) Harris v. Jose, 14 W. R. 303. (1) Barnsley Canal Co. v. Twibell, 7 Beav. 19. See Bateman v. Boynton, 1 Ch. 359. (r) See Earl Beauchamp v. Darby, W. N. (1866) 308. (8) W. N. (1885) 177, 29 Sol. J. 682. (t) Harris v. Gandy, 1 De G. F. & J. 13; In re Swire, 21 C. D. 647 (C. A.). (u) See McHenry v. Lewis, 22 C. D. 397 (C. A.); Armstrong v. Armstrong, (1892) P. 98. |