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Chap. XXII. Court will, upon a proper case being made out, restrain a

Injunction against the negotiation of securities, &c.

tenant for life from selling under the Settled Land Act-e.g., in the case of a sale at so gross an undervalue as to be evidence of fraud (h), or, where there are no trustees for the purposes of the Act (i).

Where a vessel has become unable to proceed on her voyage without repairs, the owners of goods shipped on board the vessel may obtain the assistance of the Court to restrain the captain from selling the cargo. But before the Court will grant such assistance, the plaintiffs must show their title to the goods, and must settle with the captain for what is due to him, and must exonerate the captain from his contract to deliver the goods at the place of destination, and from all liability on the bills of lading (k).

Where the sale of a mortgaged estate has been effected under the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction in a colony, and no case of fraud is made out, equity has no jurisdiction to interfere by injunction (1).

If there is danger that a negotiable instrument fraudulently or improperly obtained, or which ought not to be negotiated, will get into the hands of a bona fide holder without notice, to the prejudice of the maker or acceptor, or persons interested in the same, the Court will interfere to restrain the negotiation, assignment, or endorsement of the instrument, and will order it to be delivered up (m).

In Bank of England v. Anderson (n), an injunction was granted at the suit of the Bank to restrain a banking company, carrying on business within the distance of sixty-five miles from London, from accepting a bill of exchange

(h) Wheelwright v. Walker, 23 C. D. 752, 762; and see Humpden v. Earl of Buckinghamshire, (1893) 2 Ch. 531 (C. A.); and see also s. 53 of the Settled Land Act, 1882.

(i) Wheelwright v. Walker, 23 C. D. 752.

(k) Rayne v. Benedict, 10 L. J. Ch. 297.

(1) White v. Hall, 12 Ves. 321. Comp. Lord Cranstown v. Johnstone, 3 Ves. 182, 5 Ves. 277.

(m) Hood v. Aston, 1 Russ. 412; Green v. Pledger, 3 Ha. 165; Lord Lewes v. Barnett, 1 Set. 727, 728; Thiedemann v. Goldsmidt, 1 D. F. & G. 4; Day v. Longhurst, W. N. (1893) 3.

(n) 2 Keen, 328.

payable at less than six months from the time of giving Chap. XXII. such acceptance (o).

An injunction may, upon a proper case being made out, be obtained restraining the defendant from parting with documents in his possession belonging to the plaintiff, and from preventing the plaintiff and his solicitor from having access to the documents at reasonable times after reasonable notice (p).

In Glasse v. Marshall (g), the East India Company were restrained from paying over the principal and interest secured upon East India Bonds to a person who had wrongfully obtained possession of them, or to any other person than the lawful owner.

The Court will not grant an injunction to restrain a man Injunctions who is alleged to be a debtor from parting with (r) or dealing with property. against parting with (s) his property as he pleases. Where no order has been made by the Court for the payment of money, the Court has no power to make an order to restrain a man from removing his property out of the jurisdiction (t). But if an order has been made for the payment of money, the Court will restrain a man from removing his property so as to put it out of the control of the Court (u). Moreover, under s. 32 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, and the rules made under the provisions of the Divorce Acts, the Court has power before a decree nisi for divorce has been made absolute, to confirm the report of the Registrar approving of maintenance for the wife, to order the husband to secure the maintenance to the wife upon the decree becoming absolute, and in the meantime to restrain him from dealing with his property so as not to leave sufficient security (x).

In Gooch v. London Banking Association (y), an injunction

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Chap. XXII.

Injunctions

to restrain

was granted on motion to restrain a company in voluntary liquidation from distributing assets among its shareholders without setting aside sufficient assets to provide for future rent and other liabilities under a lease.

There being a dispute as to the appointment of an administrator, the Court restrained one of the parties who was in possession of the personal estate of the deceased from disposing or removing any of the estate of the intestate (z).

Although the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the sovereign acts of a foreign government, or to make a decree against a foreign ambassador who does not submit to the jurisdiction (a), an injunction may be had restraining a third party from handing over to a foreign ambassador a fund, the right to which is in dispute (b), or restraining the agent of a foreign government from parting with securities which ought to be deposited in this country as security to bondholders (c). A foreign sovereign may submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts here, but such submission cannot take place until the jurisdiction is invoked. The fact, therefore, that a foreign sovereign has been residing in this country and has entered into a contract here, under an assumed name as being a private individual, does not amount to a submission to the jurisdiction, or render him liable to be sued for breach of such contract (d).

The Court will not, as a rule, restrain a party from proarbitrators from ceeding with an arbitration in a matter beyond the agreement making awards. to refer, although such arbitration proceeding may be futile and vexatious (e). But the Court may restrain a party from proceeding with an arbitration if an action is pending impeaching the instrument which contains the agreement

Co., 11 A. C. 332. But see Craig's
Claim, (1895) 1 Ch. 267, 276
(C. A.).

(z) Brand v. Mitson, 24 W. R.
524.

(a) Ante, p. 7.

(b) Gladstone v. Musurus Bey, 1 H. & M. 495.

(c) Foreign Bondholders v. Pastor,

23 W. R. 109.

(d) Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, (1893) 149 (C. A.).

(e) North London Railway Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co., 11 Q. B. D. 30 (C. A.); and see Wood v. Lillies, 61 L. J. Ch. 158; Farrar v. Cooper, 44 C. D. 323.

to refer (f). Moreover, the conduct of the parties may found _Chap. XXII. a sufficient ground for the interference of the Court (g). An injunction accordingly may be had to restrain an arbitrator from proceeding with a reference on the ground of corruption (h). So also if it is discovered in the course of the arbitration by one of the parties, to whom it was at first unknown, that the arbitrator has an interest in the subjectmatter of the award, or if the arbitrator has so misconducted himself as to be obviously unfit for the exercise of such functions, the Court will restrain him from acting (i).

The rule, however, which applies to a person holding judicial office, that he ought not to hear cases in which he might be suspected of a bias, does not apply to an arbitrator named in a contract to whom both parties have agreed to refer disputes. In order to justify the Court in saying that such an arbitrator is disqualified from acting, circumstances must be shown to exist which establish at least a probability that he will in fact be unfairly biased in favour of one of the parties in giving his decision (k). Accordingly, where a contract contained a provision referring disputes to the engineer of the employers, and disputes having arisen the contractors brought an action for the purpose of having the same determined, the Court ordered a stay under s. 4 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, notwithstanding the fact that the engineer would, in substance, be acting as a judge in his own cause; no sufficient reason having been given for suspecting that the engineer would act unfairly (1).

Where an umpire has been irregularly appointed, the Court will restrain him from acting (m).

(f) Kitts v. Moore, (1895) 1 Q. B. 253 (C. A.).

(g) Pickering v. Cape Town Railway Co., 1 Eq. 84.

(h) Malmsbury Railway Co. v. Budd, 2 C. D. 113.

(i) Beddow v. Beddow, 9 C. D. 92; Jackson v. Barry Railway Co., (1893) 1 Ch. 238, 249 (C. A.).

(k) Eckersley v. Mersey Docks,

(1894) 2 Q. B. 667 (C. A.); Jack-
son v. Barry Railway Co., supra;
In re Haigh and L.N.W. and G.W.
Railway Companies, (1896) 1 Q. B.
649; Bright v. River Plate Con-
struction Co., (1900) 2 Ch. 835.

(1) Ives and Barker v. Willans,
(1894) 2 Ch. 478 (C. A.).

(m) Pescod v. Pescod, W. N. (1888) 2, 58 L. T. N. S. 76.

Chap. XXII.

Injunctions

between husband and wife.

The Court will restrain a husband from disposing of or intermeddling with the wife's separate estate (n); from molesting or interfering with her in a business which has been assigned to her separate use (o); from assigning or dealing with property to which the wife has become entitled, pending a suit by her to enforce her equity to a settlement in respect of the same (p); or from dealing with property to which the wife was entitled at the date when she went through the ceremony of marriage with the defendant, pending a suit instituted by her in the Divorce Court for declaration of nullity of such marriage (q). So also the Court will enforce by injunction legal and proper covenants in a separation deed (r).

In an action by a creditor to enforce against the separate estate of a married woman a general engagement entered into with her on the credit of that estate, the Court will not, before the creditor has established his right by obtaining a judgment, restrain the defendant from dealing with her separate estate (s). In a recent case in which an action brought by a married woman "suing in respect of her separate estate was at the trial dismissed with costs, which were directed to be taxed and to be paid out of her separate estate, but not otherwise, it turned out that the only separate property of the married woman consisted of a share coming to her under a will. Before the taxation of the costs had been completed the trustees of

(n) Green v. Green, 5 Ha. 400 n.; Wood v. Wood, 19 W. R. 1049; Symonds v. Hallett, 24 C. D. 346. See Gaynor v. Gaynor, (1901) 1 Ir. R. 217, where the Court restrained a husband who had ill-treated his wife from interfering with the business carried on by her (a licensed public-house) which was her separate property, but refused to make an order restraining him from entering the house. Weldon v. De Bathe, 14 Q. B. D. 339, 343 (C. A.).

Cf.

(0) Donnelly v. Donnelly, 31 Sol. J.

45; Gaynor v. Gaynor, (1901) 1 Ir. R. 217.

(p) Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Cox, 422; Ellis v. Ellis, 2 Coo. C. C. 234. See Osborne v. Morgan, 9 Ha. 432.

(1) Sealey v. Gaston, 13 W. R.

577.

(r) Hamilton v. Hector, 6 Ch. 701, S. C. 13 Eq. 511; Besant v. Wood, 12 C. D. 605; Marshall v. Marshall, 5 P. D. 19; Aldridge v. Aldridge, 13 P. D. 210.

(8) Robinson V. Pickering, 16 C. D. 660 (C. A.).

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