Sect. 5. The title to an injunction at the trial may be lost if there Chap. XXIII. has been acquiescence; but it seems that mere lapse of time will not bar the claim to an injunction in aid of a legal or delay. right, unless all remedy for the enforcement of such right is barred by the Statutes of Limitations (1). Where the right to a perpetual injunction has been established, the Court has no jurisdiction to compel the plaintiff to accept damages in lieu of an injunction (m). Acquiescence SECTION V.-INQUIRY AS TO DAMAGES WHERE INJUNCTION DISSOLVED. Though an interlocutory injunction has been granted on the undertaking of the plaintiff as to damages, the Court is not bound to grant an inquiry as to damages in every case in which the injunction is dissolved, or the action is dismissed at the trial. The Court has a discretion, and before it will grant an inquiry as to damages it must be satisfied that the injunction was improperly obtained and that under all the circumstances of the case damages ought to be given. It may happen that an interlocutory injunction is dissolved for delay, or for some cause which disentitles the plaintiff to an interlocutory injunction, though not to relief by way of injunction at the trial. The Court in such a case has a discretion whether under all the circumstances the defendant ought to have damages in respect of the interlocutory injunction having been granted. Moreover, the Court will have regard to the amount of damage; if it be trifling or remote, the Court will not direct an inquiry as to damages (n). in which case the Court, although making a declaration of right, refused an injunction upon the ground that the mischief complained of was trivial. (1) Fullwood v. Fullwood, 9 C. D. 176; and see ante, p. 19. (m) Woodhouse v. Newry Navigation, (1898) 1 Ir. R. 161. (n) Smith v. Day, 21 C. D. 421 (C. A.). Chap. XXIII. Application for inquiry when inquiry-when to be made. The application for an inquiry as to damages should as a general rule be made either at the time the injunction is dissolved or at the hearing of the cause. But it may be made by motion subsequently to the trial. There is, in fact, no absolute rule as to the time within which the application should be made; but, as a general rule, the Court ought to be asked to enforce the undertaking within a reasonable time after it is ascertained that the injunction has been improperly granted (6). In Newby v. Harrison (p), an inquiry was directed after four months, and special circumstances might induce the Court to allow even a greater delay; but a very special case must be made out (q). The damages must be confined to the loss which is the natural consequence of the injunction under the circumstances of which the party obtaining the injunction has notice at the time when he makes his application (r). The defendant is entitled to the benefit of the undertaking as to damages even though it should be decided that the injunction was wrongly granted owing to the mistake of the Court itself (s). Where an injunction has been wrongly granted, an undertaking given by the plaintiff is equally enforceable whether the mistake was in point of law or in point of fact. In such a case the Court will not as a rule refuse an inquiry as to damages, unless the damages alleged would be too remote, if the defendant was suing in respect of them upon a breach of contract (t). The Court will not grant an inquiry as to damages where it can satisfy itself without such inquiry as to what is the amount of such damages (u). (0) Smith v. Day, 21 C. D. 421 (C. A.); Ex parte Hall, 23 C. D. 644 (C. A.). (p) 3 D. F. & J. 287. (q) Smith v. Day, 21 C. D. 421 (C. A.). (r) Smith v. Day, 21 C. D. 421 (C. A.). (8) Griffith v. Blake, 27 C. D. 474 (C.A.); Huntv. Hunt, 54 L. J. Ch. 289. As to the measure of damages where an inquiry is directed, see Mansell v. British Linen Company Bank, (1892) 3 Ch. 159; Schlesinger V. Bedford, W. N. (1893) 57. (t) Hunt v. Hunt, 54 L. J. Ch. 289, W. N. (1884) 243. (u) Graham v. Campbell, 7 C. D. 490, 494 (C. A.). SECTION VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREACH OF AN INJUNCTION Chap. XXIII. Sect. 6. OR RESTRAINING ORDER. An order for an injunction must be implicitly observed, and Breach of injunction. every diligence must be exercised to obey it to the letter (x). However erroneously or irregularly obtained, the order must be implicitly observed so long as it exists. A party affected by it cannot disregard it or treat it as a nullity, but must have it discharged on a proper application (y). A man who does not obey it to the letter so long as it exists is guilty of contempt, unless there be something to mislead upon the plain reading of the order (z). An undertaking entered into with the Court is equivalent to, Breach of undertaking. and will have the effect of an injunction so far that any infringement thereof may be made the subject of an application to the Court (a). But where a party had by mistake consented to a more extensive undertaking than he intended, the Court refused to enforce the part of the undertaking which had been given by mistake (b). A judgment requiring any person to do any act other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing anything, may be enforced by writ of attachment, or by committal (c), and it is usual in the notice of motion to ask for attachment or committal in the alternative (d). Committal, however, appears to be the more appropriate remedy for breach of an injunction (e). The proper method of enforcing an undertaking given to the Court, whether the undertaking be affirmative or negative, is committal, not attachment (ee). The notice of (x) Harding v. Pingey, 12 W. R. 684; Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health, 1 Eq. 42. (y) Woodward v. Earl of Lincoln, 3 Sw. 626; Russell v. East Anglian Railway Co., 3 Mac. & G. 117. Comp. Daw v. Eley, 3 Eq. 509. (z) Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health, 1 Eq. 42. (a) London and Birmingham Railway Co. v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 1 Ra. Ca. 241, per Lord Cottenham. K.I. (b) Mullins v. Howell, 11 C. D. 763; and see Scott v. Moxon, 81 L. T. 774. (c) Ord. XLII. r. 7. (d) Oswald on Contempt, 2nd (e) See Mander v. Falcke, (1891) (ee) D. v. A. & Co., (1900) 1 Ch. p. 489. 38 Sect. 6. Chap. XXIII. motion for committal must be personally served, but service of the order in which the undertaking is embodied need not be effected (ƒ). No breach till notice of injunction. order not in all The Court will not punish for breach of an injunction or interim restraining order, unless it be clear that the party alleged to be in contempt knew that the injunction had issued, or that the order had been made (g). He ought, strictly speaking, to be served with the order itself in the manner Actual service of already pointed out (h). But if the matter is very pressing, cases essential. the service of the order itself will be dispensed with, and service of a copy of the minutes of the order, or of a notice of its having been obtained, will be sufficient. An injunction operates from the date of the order, and not from the time of sealing. If, after service of the notice or the copy of the minutes, the party enjoined acts in opposition to the order, he is guilty of a contempt, and may be committed (i). It is sufficient if clear notice of the order is proved. A committal may, indeed, be ordered where neither the order nor the minutes of the order have been served, nor any personal notice given, but the party enjoined was in Court at the time the order was made (k), or received notice of the order by telegram (). If, indeed, a man remains in Court until the order is about to be made, he cannot, by leaving before the order is actually pronounced, avoid its consequences (m). It is sufficient that a man has clear notice, however given, of the order (n), and knew that the plaintiff intended to enforce it: and this rule is not limited to (ƒ) D. v. A. & Co., (1900) 1 Ch. (h) Ante, p. 572. As to its not (i) M'Neil v. Garratt, Cr. & Ph. 98; Gooch v. Marshall, 8 W. R. 410. (k) Anon., 3 Atk. 567; Skip v. Harwood, ib. 564; Hall v. Trigg & Co., (1897) 2 Ch. 219, 222; and see D. v. A. & Co., (1900) 1 Ch. p. 487. (1) Re Bryant, 4 C. D. 98; Er parte Langley, 13 C. D. 116; D. v. 4. & Co., (1900) 1 Ch. p. 487. (m) Hearn v. Tennant, 14 Ves. 136. (n) Heywood v. Wait, 18 W. R. 205; Avory v. Andrews, 30 W. R. 564; United Telephone Co. v. Dale, 25 C. D. 778; D. v. A. & Co., (1900) 1 Ch. p. 487. Sect. 6. cases in which a breach is committed before there has Chap. XXIII. been time for the plaintiff to get the order drawn up and entered. The Court will not, however, commit a man for breach of an injunction, if it be doubtful whether, owing to the conduct of the plaintiff, he may not have been drawn into the idea that it was not the intention of the plaintiff to enforce the injunction (o). Where, for example, in consequence of the order not being drawn up and served, the defendant might very fairly consider that the plaintiff did not intend to proceed at all, it was held necessary before the plaintiff could obtain a committal that he should serve the defendant with the original order (p). So also, a man who has acted in breach of an injunction will not be committed for contempt, where he swears that though he had received notice of it by telegram, he bonâ fide believed that no injunction had been granted and the circumstances show that such belief was not unreasonable (q). If it is sought to commit for contempt a man who after receiving such notice disregards it, the Court must decide upon the facts of the particular case whether he in fact had notice of the injunction, and it is the duty of those who ask for committal to prove this beyond reasonable doubt (r). commit. The order for committal is obtained upon motion, notice of Application to which must be served personally upon the party committing the contempt (s). The terms of the notice should be that the party "may stand committed to Holloway prison for breach of the injunction"(t). If the breach has been committed by a person not named in the order, the notice of motion must be that he may be committed for his contempt in knowingly assisting in the breach (u). The Court has undoubted jurisdiction to commit for contempt a person not included in (o) United Telephone Co. v. Dale, 25 C. D. 778. (p) Wood v. Downes, 18 Ves. 522; Van Sandau v. Rose, 2 J. & W. 264. (4) Ex parte Langley, 13 C. D. 110. (8) Angerstein v. Hunt, 6 Ves. 488; Hope v. Carnegie, 7 Eq. 260; (u) Lord Wellesley v. Earl of |