Chap. II. Judicature Acts have not altered the principles on which injunctions are granted. slander that the Court will interfere by injunction, and especially by interlocutory injunction (s). The Judicature Acts, however, have not altered the principles on which the Court acts in granting injunctions where principles have been established as just and convenient (t). "The very first principle of injunction law is that primâ facie you do not obtain injunctions to restrain actionable wrongs for which damages are the proper remedy" (u). Nor will an injunction be granted where the case is one, not of legal injury, but of mere inconvenience (x). Moreover, an injunction will not be granted in a trivial case (y), nor where the plaintiff has the remedy in his own hands (z). It was not the function or practice of the Court of Chancery to restrain men from prosecuting frivolous, litigious or desperate suits merely because they are so (a). Nor has the Court under the Judicature Acts jurisdiction to interfere by injunction upon a false assumption of authority. The Court has no general jurisdiction to restrain persons from acting without authority and an injunction cannot be granted to restrain a person from taking proceedings out of Court in the name of a person who had given no authority to use it (b). In like manner, the Court has no jurisdiction to restrain a party from proceeding with an arbitration in a manner not authorised by the agreement to refer, although such arbitration may be futile and vexatious (c). But the Court will, in a proper case, restrain a party from proceeding with an arbitration if an action is pending impeaching the instrument which contains the agreement to refer (d). (8) Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269 (C. A.); and see Monson v. Tussaud's Ltd., (1894) 1 Q. B. 671 (C. A.). (t) Gaskin v. Balls, 13 Ch. D. 329, per Thesiger, L.J. (") Per Lindley, L.J., in London and Blackwall Railway Co. v. Cross, 31 C. D. p. 369. (x) Day v. Brownrigg, 10 C. D. 294. (y) Llandudno Urban Council v. Woods, (1899) 2 Ch. 705. (z) Elliman v. Carrington, (1901) 2 Ch. 275, 279. (a) Pennell v. Roy, 3 D. M. & G. 133, per Knight-Bruce, L.J. (b) London and Blackwall Railway Co. v. Cross, 31 Ch. D. 354. (c) North London Railway Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co., 11 Q. B. D. 30 (C. A.); and see Wood v. Lillies, 61 L. J. Ch. 158. (d) Kitts v. Moore, (1895) 1 Q. B. 253 (C. A.). The Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the public Chap. II. to interfere with Government, &c. duties of any of the departments of Government (e), or with the No jurisdiction sovereign acts of a foreign government (ƒ), or to enforce the public duties of contracts of a foreign government against the property of such a department of government in England (g), or to prevent a foreign sovereign from removing his property in this country (h), or to make a decree against a foreign ambassador who does not submit to the jurisdiction (i). in matters The Court will not interfere by injunction in matters No jurisdiction merely criminal or immoral, which do not affect any right merely criminal to property (k). But if an act which is criminal touches also or immoral; the enjoyment of property, the Court has jurisdiction, but its interference is founded solely on the ground of injury to property (1). The Court will not, it seems, interfere by injunction to prevent criminal proceedings being taken against a person who is defendant to a pending action, notwithstanding that the criminal proceedings and the action are both based on the same wrongful act (m). And the Court will not (unless in very special circumstances) interfere by declaration of right or injunction in cases where the Legislature has pointed out a mode of procedure before a magistrate (n). Accordingly, it seems that a local authority, whose bye-laws may be enforced before a magistrate, cannot enforce the same by an injunction (o). (e) See Ellis v. Grey, 6 Sim. 214, 223; 38 R. R. 93. N. S. p. 127; Att.-Gen. v. Sheffield (f) Gladstone v. Ottoman Bank, of Austria v. Day, 3 D, F. & J. 253 ; 1 H. & M. 505. (g) Smith v. Weguelin, 8 Eq. 198; Twycross v. Dreyfuss, 5 Ch. D. 605. (h) Vavasour v. Krupp, 9 Ch. D. 351. (1) Gladstone v. Musurus Bey, 1 H. & M. 495. (k) Att.-Gen. v. Sheffield Gas Co., 5 D. M. & G. p. 320; Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 D. F. & G. p. 253. Mogul Steam Ship Co. v. Macgregor, (m) Saull v. Browne, 10 Ch. 64; (n) The Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hampton, (1898) 2 Ch. 331; Devonport Corporation v. Tozer, (1902) 2 Ch. 182. Cf. Stevens v. Chou, (1901) 1 Ch. 894. (0) Devonport Corporation v. Tozer, ante. Chap. II. or in political matters. Interference in favour of the country. In the winding up of a company, however, the Court has jurisdiction under sect. 85 of the Companies Act, 1862, to restrain by injunction quasi criminal proceedings which are being taken against the company to recover penalties (p). So also where a petition has been presented for winding up a company, the Court has jurisdiction under sect. 85 to restrain proceedings on a summons for enforcing poor rates owing by the company (q). Matters of a political nature do not come within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court will not interfere with the view of preventing revolution in a foreign country, or in favour either of the prerogative of a foreign sovereign or the political rights of his subjects or in aid of the revenue laws of a foreign country. But if a case of injury to the property of a foreign sovereign or his government or his subjects be made out, the Court has jurisdiction to interfere at the suit of a foreign sovereign (1). Nor will the Court interfere in favour of any laws of a foreign laws of another country which are in conflict with our own laws on subjects of religion and morality (s). Where the Courts of one country are called upon to enforce a contract entered into in another, it is not enough that the contract should be valid according to the laws of that country (t), for if any part of the contract is inconsistent either with the law or policy of the former, the contract will not be enforced even as to another part of it which would not be open to objection, and may be the only part remaining to be performed (u). In granting injunctions the Court operates in personam. The person to whom its orders are addressed must be within the reach of the Court or amenable to its jurisdiction. But the Court will not suffer anyone within its reach to do what is contrary to its notions of equity, merely because (p) Re Briton, &c., Life Association, 32 Ch. D. 503. (1) Re Flint, &c., Co., 56 L. J. Ch. 232. (r) Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 D. F. & J. 217; United States v. Prioleau, 2 H. & M. 559 ; 2 Eq. 659. (8) Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 D. F. & J. p. 242. (t) Rousillon v. R., 14 C. D. 351, 369. (u) Hope v. H., 8 D. M. & G. 731; but see Quarrier v. Colston, 1 Ph. 147. the act to be done may be, in point of locality, beyond its jurisdiction (x). As a consequence of the rule, that in granting an injunction the Court operates in personam, the Court may exercise jurisdiction independently of the locality of the act to be done, provided the person against whom relief is sought is within the reach and amenable to the process of the Court. This jurisdiction is not grounded upon any pretension to the exercise of judicial or administrative rights abroad, but on the circumstance of the person to whom the order is addressed being within the reach of the Court (y). But an English Court will not pronounce a decree, even in personam, which can have no specific operation without the intervention of a foreign Court, and which in the country where the lands to be charged by it lie, would probably be treated as a brutum fulmen (z). Nor, it seems, will the Court entertain an action which directly raises the question of the title to land situate abroad (a). Moreover, where a matter in dispute is being litigated in a foreign Court which has the means of deciding upon and enforcing the rights of the parties, the Court here will not, in general, interfere (b). Upon the principle that the Court acts in personam in granting an injunction, it appears that it has power, upon a proper case being made out, to restrain a man from applying to Parliament (c). But the jurisdiction will only be exercised under very exceptional circumstances (d). The Court cannot, however, restrain a man from applying for a grant to a foreign sovereign, nor, after the grant is made, can the Court prevent (r) The Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. C. 416, 436. y) Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 M. & K. p. 108; 41 R. R. 23; Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. C. 436. (z) Norris v. Chambres, 3 D. F. & J. p. 584. (a) Companhia de Mocambique v. British South Africa Co., (1892) 2 Q. B. 358; (1893) A. C. 602. (b) Norris v. Chambres, 3 D. F. & J. 583; and cf. Fletcher v. Rodgers, (c) Ware v. Grand Junction Rail- (d) Ib.; Steele v. North Metropolitan Railway Co., 2 Ch. 237. Chap. II. Injunction operates in personam. Chap. II. Injunction does not run with the land. Injunctions to restrain actions a man from using the grant made by the same sovereign authority. The fact that the grant so made may be inconsistent with a grant previously made by the same sovereign authority does not give a man any equity to apply to the Court (e). An injunction being an order directed to a person, it does not run with the land (ƒ). Under the former procedure, the Court of Chancery had at law abolished. jurisdiction to restrain by injunction an action at law in all cases where the defendant to the action could show that he had a good equitable defence. But this jurisdiction has been abolished by the Judicature Act, 1873 (g). It is there declared that no cause or proceeding, at any time pending in the High Court of Justice or before the Court of Appeal, shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction, but that every matter of equity on which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might have been obtained, if this Act had not passed, either unconditionally or on any terms or conditions, may be relied on by way of defence thereto (h). Prerogative of Crown not affected by the Although the Court has no longer jurisdiction to restrain a pending action, an injunction may be granted to restrain the institution of proceedings in the High Court of Justice (i). The prerogative of the Crown to intervene in actions affecting the right and revenue of the Sovereign has not been affected Judicature Acts. by the Judicature Acts (k); and the proper tribunal for the determination of such matters is the Revenue side of the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice (1). Jurisdiction of County Court by injunction. A County Court has under the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 89, in actions within its jurisdiction, power to grant an injunction, (e) Gladstone v. Ottoman Bank, 1 H. & M. 505. (ƒ) Att.-Gen. v. Birmingham, &c., (g) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 24, (i) Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 630; and see Cercle Restaurant, &c., Co. v. Lavery, 18 Ch. D. 555; and In re A Company, (1894) 2 Ch. 349. (k) Att.-Gen. v. Constable, 4 Exch. D. 172. (1) Lord Stanley of Alderley v. Wild and Son, (1900) 1 Q. B. 256 (C. A.). |