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is not for the parents, but the parents for the child. And the parental instinct exists not for its own sake but to ensure the care of the offspring. Similarly the sex instinct exists not for the individual, but for the pair; and its restraint, though seemingly an individual sacrifice, is actually a condition for its normal and perfect expression in ideal mating. Individual repression is normal and necessary whenever it contributes either to higher individual development or to the perfection of the group. Repressions which neither expand the individual nor promote group welfare are needless, probably pernicious, and should be removed. This principle may be taken as a guide not merely in the solution of problems connected with matrimonial restrictions, but also of those relating to individual freedom in any sphere of life.

Conclusion. In conclusion it may be said that the important factors affecting the family relations in modern societies, as well as in ancient, are degree of individual development and economic conditions. One significant feature in the present situation is that not all individuals by any means are monogamically inclined, though monogamic marriage is the only form recognized by law. The result is that other forms of sexual relations secretly flourish. A second factor in the modern situation is that not all persons are economically independent; and among those who are, marked differences exist in amount of wealth and character of occupation. The result of this condition is that much of the monogamy existing is forced rather than voluntary. Progress then requires, first, the extension of the monogamic ideal through education and the influence of public sentiment, rather than through legal repression; and, secondly, it requires a change in the character of the marriage relation through an extension of economic independence, though not of economic affluence, for the extremes of wealth and of poverty have both resulted in excessive license or excessive repression. The situation is complicated by the fact that individual development does not vary with degree of wealth,

Notable changes taking place in modern conditions arise out of the increasing independence of women, which has two kinds of results. It has caused increased dissolution of the marriage

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tie in cases of the proprietary form of monogamy, a result not entirely unwholesome for those in the monogamic stage of development, and it has caused a demand for greater sexual

, independence along with other forms of freedom. This reform again, when advocated by monogamic individuals, is unobjectionable; but when sought by the polygamously inclined is cause for concern, though the retrogression resulting would be more apparent than real, for law may aid but does not perfect evolution of the family. Polygamous instincts forcibly restrained do not give monogamy in spirit; but polygamous instincts rampant do not give monogamy even in form.

Future changes in the relations of the sexes must be consistent with the ideal of the permanent monogamic family. But the standards of efficiency of the family may be improved by greater individual freedom and a wider range of activities on the part of the women, in so far as they tend to contribute to individual development without interfering with the fundamental purposes of the family. Parentage outside the monogamic union would be detrimental to the offspring; and extra-marital relations would interfere with the highest type of mating. All measures tending to promote monogamic unions within the recognized limits of sexual selection are desirable and should be encouraged; but this object is thwarted, not assisted, by laxity on the part of either sex. The greater the limitation of illicit sexual relations, the more freely will monogamic unions be formed.

REFERENCES FOR COLLATERAL READING CALHOUN, A. W., A Social History of the American Family. DEALEY, J. Q., The Family in its Sociological Aspects. ELLWOOD, C. A., Sociology and Modern Social Problems. GOODSELL, W., The Family as a Social and Educational Institution. HOWARD, G. E., A History of Matrimonial Institutions. PARSONS, E. C., The Family. SPENCER, H., Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, Pt. III. STARCKE, C. N., The Primitive Family. WESTERMARCK, E., History of Human Marriage.

CHAPTER XIX

THE LAWS OF POPULATION: THE BIRTH RATE

The population of a given country may increase in two ways, either by natural means, that is, by the excess of births over deaths, or by immigration. In the latter case, although the immediate result is to effect a redistribution of populations, such a redistribution may ultimately influence the birth and death rates of both countries involved in such a way as to cause an increase or decrease of their aggregate populations over long periods of time. A formulation of the laws of the natural increase of populations, involves a discussion of both the birth and death rates; and the birth rate, which is the more important, will be considered first.

Birth Rates. Before proceeding to a discussion of the principles of population, the more significant facts concerning present tendencies of the birth rate should be considered. Table IV gives the crude birth rates of several European countries since the decade in which the rate reached the maximum.

A number of suggestive facts may be gleaned from this table. The birth rate varies greatly from country to country, but it averages lowest in northern European countries and highest in southern countries. The figures show also that the birth rate has declined in all countries, but that the decline started in northern Europe where the rate was already lowest. Among the northern countries the decline has been most rapid and the rate is now the lowest in the more advanced industrial countries. Germany presents a slight exception to the rule, perhaps more of an exception than the figures in the table would indicate. The birth rate in Germany was particularly high in the '60s and '70s, and from 1880 to 1900 no appreciable change took place. It was only after 1900 that a decline comparable to that in other industrial countries appeared. To bring out only the

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TABLE IV

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34.8

BIRTH RATES OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. 1

Decade of
highest rate Highest rate

1891-1900 1912 France

1801-1810

32.2

22.1 19.0 (1913) Denmark

1851-1860

32.5

30.2 25.6 (1914) Sweden

32.8

27.1 24.8 Norway

33.0

30.4

25.2 (1914) Finland

35.9

32.1

27.1 (1913) Spain

1861-1870
37.8

32.6 Germany

1871-1880

39.1

36.1 27.5 (1913) Scotland

35.0

30.3 25.9 England and Wales

35.5

30.0 23.3 Ireland

26.4

23.0 23.0 Belgium

32.7

28.9 22.6 Netherlands

36.4

32.5 28.2 (1914) Austria

39.0

37.1 31.3 Italy

1881-1890

37.8

35.3 31.7 (1913) Hungary

44.0

40.4 36.3 Servia

45.4

41.9 38.0

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more obvious differences in birth rates of European countries would require at least a two-fold subdivision; first, between northern and southern countries, and, second, between agricultural and industrial countries. The division between northern and southern countries is not primarily a matter of climatic difference, because France, situated in middle Europe, has the lowest rate, and Russia, one of the coldest countries, has the highest rate, - reported as 45, though probably the figures are not very reliable. The significant difference between northwestern Europe and southeastern Europe, so far as the birth rate is concerned, lies in the superior average of intelligence, and in the higher standards of living of the north.

Although crude birth rates are sufficiently accurate for many purposes of comparison, they do not indicate whether a decline is due to less fertile marriages or to other causes, for they take no account of the age distribution of the population or of the numbers of the married and single. To give a more accurate idea of the nature of the decline in the birth rate, the refined rates for various countries are given in Table V, with the percentage of decline between 1880 and 1900.

1 Part of this table is taken from the report of the National Birth Rate Commission, p. 27.

173

283

TABLE V1
LEGITIMATE BIRTHS PER 1,000 WIVES, 15-45 YEARS OF AGE.

Percentage Decrease 1880-2 1890–2 1900-2 1880-1900 France 196

157

19.9 Spain

258
264
259

4
Italy
276

269

2.5 Austria

281
292
284

1.0 increase Ireland

283
288
289

2.1 increase England

286
264
235

17.8 Denmark

287
278
259

9.7 Sweden

293
280
269

8.0 Germany

310
301
284

8.4 Scotland

311
296
272

12.5 Belgium

313
285
251

19.8 Norway

314
307
303

3.5 Holland

347
339
315

9.2

The chief facts in this table agree with the preceding. The countries with the lowest crude birth rate, France, England, and Belgium, have also the lowest refined rates, and the percentage of decline has been most marked with them; that is, in these countries the lower birth rate means smaller-sized families. The more moderate declines in the crude birth rates for Denmark, Sweden, and Germany appear also from Table V to mean moderate declines in the average size of families. On the other hand, Italy and Austria, which showed moderate declines in the crude birth rate, seem to have had an actual increase in the refined rates between 1880 and 1890, though this was followed by a slight decrease in 1900. This variation may have been caused by the character of the emigration from these countries. Norway and Holland have a much higher refined birth rate than might be expected from the figures for the crude rates, and the decline in the refined rates in Norway was small up to 1900. On the whole the table for the refined birth rates indicates that the decline in most cases means smaller families rather than fewer marriages. In fact the marriage rate has not generally decreased in European countries with the exception of England and Scotland. In a few cases the lower crude birth rates may be caused by changes in the age distributions of the

1 Encyclopedia Britannica, Art. Population, by Sir J. A. Baines.

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