in the one case the individual is not sufficiently influenced by the opinions of others, and in the other case the individual is likely to be too subservient to the dictates of society. The abnormal character of extreme self-sufficiency, it should be noted, lies in the incorrect relative estimate of individual worth. There is nothing abnormal or undesirable in placing a high absolute valuation on the individual so long as it applies to others as well as to oneself. In fact the higher the estimate we place on the individual, the more mankind will develop, and the higher will be the whole plane of social intercourse. Many social problems arise from failure to appreciate the possibilities inherent in an individual. Social progress might be interpreted in terms of our growing appreciation of the worth of all individuals beginning with ourselves. Unequal and incorrect estimates of individual values lead to social injustice and oppression; but the inability to appreciate individual worth leads to individual degradation and vicious social relations.

Social Results of the Desire for Approbation. The desire for approbation stimulates progress both in a positive and a negative manner. The negative action appears in those cases in which individuals conform to social customs and usages merely to avoid the pain of social disapproval. The positive aspects of the desire cause individuals to seek the pleasure of the definite approval of society instead of being satisfied with merely escaping notice or adverse comment. The individual may gain positive approval either by punctilious or meritorious conformity to group standards or by introducing innovations which do not depart too widely from group customs. On the whole the chief effect of this desire is to produce conformity; and it may be made a powerful, even a brutal, method of self-control.

This social desire, in giving us a better knowledge of other individuals and in increasing the realization that they are like ourselves, stimulates the growth of sympathy and aids in the attainment of brotherhood. Brotherhood is the term used by Mackenzie to express the social ideal; and, as the social desire is a prominent factor in attaining this ideal, its normal action is consequently of the utmost importance. The kind of social relation which will be favorable to brotherhood is that based on free and unreserved association, by which is meant the absence of mental as well as physical impediments. Not only must the environmental conditions be such as to permit free association, but the association must be carried on with perfect willingness to know and to estimate candidly the personalities of others. Prejudices, or preconceived notions of superiority, are inconsistent with perfect freedom of association. Psychological relations which permit association without restriction, together with social relations which tend towards actual equality are the conditions essential for the final attainment of complete brotherhood and democracy.

Notwithstanding the numerous perversions of the desire for approbation, the growth of a strong social sense is of the utmost importance for the proper development of the individual. A large part of society still lives within the bounds of the physical desires. Such members are merely superior animals, or perhaps even less than that. They are contented with the satisfaction of physical needs and fail to respond to the stimuli arising out of the social desire for self-expression. Self-consciousness being still undeveloped, they are insufficiently sensitive to the judgments of society as a whole. Their estimate of individual worth is uniformly low. Many reformers with a sincere desire to improve the condition of the less developed classes in society assume that the chief need calls for the higher spiritual influences to be found in art, morality, or religion; when what is actually lacking is that phase of the normal development of the ego resulting from a high grade of social intercourse, and the formation of high ideals of personality. Three phases of individual growth are recognizable. The first is that of superior animals, and the next that of social beings, and from these preliminary types is developed a more intellectual or spiritual personality. Every individual who reaches the highest plane passes through the early stages of development, but development may be arrested on any one of these levels if the individual is sufficiently fascinated by the pleasures it affords, or if he remains insensible to the possibilities of the higher levels. Therefore whole groups in society are to be found permanently established on one or another of the levels and governed in the main by the motives prevailing on that level.

While a strong social desire does not represent the highest phase of development, its place in individual and social progress should not be overlooked. It serves primarily to develop the individual; but in so doing it regulates and perfects the activities of the lower physical plane, and prepares the individual for the highest spiritual achievements. The economic result is to raise the standard of living, and the genetic effect is to regulate the growth of population. In the interests of society as a whole therefore its influence should be brought to bear on the lowest class as well as on other classes so that all may be influenced by the same general motives, and greater social unity may thereby be promoted. Only under these circumstances will the survival of the best be assured.

REFERENCES FOR COLLATERAL READING
BALDWIN, J. M., Social and Ethical Interpretations.
COOLEY, C., Human Nature and the Social Order, Ch. 5.
EDMAN, I., Human Traits and their Social Significance, Chs. 5 and 8.
PARK and BURGESS, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, Ch. 2.

CHAPTER XXVI

SUGGESTION AND IMITATION

From the preceding discussion it appears that the desire for approbation is one of the chief motor forces in social life; and this force operates by means of two great processes, imitation and opposition. This desire is principally an unifying force and the most important social process by which unity is attained is imitation.

Imitation and Suggestion Defined. In this discussion the term imitation will be used broadly to mean the transmission of acts or ideas from person to person, either consciously or unconsciously, through the mechanism of the mind. It is the agent of social heredity which supplements physical heredity, - the latter dealing with the transmission of qualities through the germ cells, as the former treats of their transmission through the mind. Tarde defines imitation as “ the action at a distance of one mind upon another and of action which consists of a quasi-photographic reproduction of a cerebral image upon the sensitive plate of another brain” i

Imitation is not necessarily present simply because two persons or groups do the same thing. They may merely have chanced upon similar kinds of behaviour; or similar conditions may have suggested similar lines of conduct. On the other hand, imitation may be the true explanation of an act even though the process is not immediate, nor the influence even conscious. Therefore imitation is a more frequent cause of individual or social similarities than the casual observer would suppose.

Imitations involve at least two persons, the imitator and the imitated; or, as they are sometimes called, the originator and the subject. In the process of the transmission of ideas, the part played by the originator is usually called suggestion, and that

1 Laws of Imitation, p. xiv.

played by the subject is called imitation. Ross says that suggestion and imitation are two aspects of the same thing, the one being cause and the other effect. While this point of view is a useful one for the discussion of social phenomena, it involves a broader use of the term suggestion than that usually given it by pychologists. McDougall defines suggestion as “a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance.” 1 In other words suggestion is here confined to those impressions which enter the mind without supervision from the critical faculties; ideas acquired as a result of fixed attention and logical conviction would belong to a different class, and come under the head of persuasion. According to this distinction then imitation would result either from suggestion or from persuasion; that is, there may be logical as well as non-logical grounds for imitation. But good authority exists for using the term suggestion itself in a sense broad enough to include both forms of communication. Bechterew defines suggestion as “ in general one of many means of influence of man on man that is exercised with or without intention on persons who respond either consciously or unconsciously.”? Inasmuch as the sociologist must recognize both forms of communication, and inasmuch as conviction in the acceptance of an idea is after all a matter of degree, it will be most convenient to use suggestion here in the broad sense; and when it is necessary to indicate specifically the persuasive rather than the spontaneous character of its acceptance, suggestion may be sub-divided into logical and non-logical forms, corresponding to different forms of imitation.

Different Methods of Receiving Suggestions. Inasmuch as the spread of ideas in society depends upon the character and the suggestibility of the subject, as well as the source of the idea, some of the principles of the repetition of ideas may be considered, first from the point of view of the suggestibility or receptivity of the individual. Suggestions are reproduced with varying degrees of strength and accuracy under different conditions. In

1 An Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 100. ? Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p. 408.