habits is therefore always dangerous. Association, as well as heredity, is probably accountable in some degree for similarity in physiological traits among members of the same family, for children are particularly liable to involuntary imitation. Involuntary imitation from its very nature does not operate primarily because of the desire for approbation. But it is possible that greater resistance is offered even to reflex imitations of acts which are not approved.

The Province of Non-Rational Imitation. From the point of view of the analysis of social processes voluntary imitation, especially in its non-rational form, is of most interest. Rational imitation is the greater cause of progress, but non-rational imitation is the surer cause of uniformity. Rational imitation is exemplified by persons of independence of thought who are continually subjecting social acts to standards of judgment. Nonrational imitation is manifested by the more completely socialized, by that great mass of society which follows social standards as a matter of course. Their attitude serves to assure social unity, and unity and stability are the normal foundations upon which social life is based. The introduction of new standards, or the revision of old standards, can be tolerated only at infrequent intervals, and then only if the new is manifestly superior to the old. A continuance of old methods ensures the advantages of routine and habit, that ease of action demanding only the smallest expenditure of energy and permitting the attention to be concentrated upon other things. Social customs, therefore, like individual habits are necessary to facilitate social life. Three classes of activities, both for individuals and for societies, may be distinguished: those which are unconscious and automatic in their action, those which are conscious but habitual, and those requiring conscious attention and frequent decision. In social life a few operations, such as sewerage and lighting systems, have been reduced to the automatic stage. A great many others are habitual, such as the routine of business and of parliamentary procedure. A legislative system once decided upon is followed year after year as a matter of course with a consequent saving of time and energy. Yet the process is not automatic, but requires conscious attention and a knowledge of rules. Finally in all departments of social life occasions arise more or less frequently which require the exercise of reason and new decisions, such as the passing of new laws, or the frequent reorganizations and adaptations in business life necessitated by new conditions. Progress is achieved by reducing some of the conscious rational processes to the routine stage and some of the routine processes to the automatic stage, through superior organization which releases energy and permits concentration upon new issues. Not all processes can be reduced to the field of custom, but the number is gradually being extended. For example, the sliding scale of wages is an attempt to reduce a very troublesome problem to routine procedure.

The above analysis of social activities serves to clarify the nature and province of imitation, which is so closely connected with the formation of custom. In all social institutions customary action forms a shell or frame work to protect and aid the

a changing mental products within. While custom has its place in practically all departments of social life, it has a field of wider usefulness in the more material than in the more intellectual departments. In religious organizations, although ritual and routine practices may assist worship, belief itself should be consciously rational. In political life detailed organization is doubtless essential to the smooth working of a complicated system; but views and beliefs should be matters of independent judgment both to ensure individual development and to stimulate social progress. Economic life offers perhaps the widest opportunity for imitation, because in it not only can methods of production be reduced to routine, but consumption also, the choice of the product, can to a great extent be made a matter of custom or of fashion. For example, widespread uniformity in such matters as dress and food is both practicable and desirable, permitting large scale production and consequent cheapening of products. Constant changes in fashions would interfere with both continuous and large scale production, necessitating incessant designing of new styles and patterns and continuous readjustment of productive machinery.

In social life also imitation and custom have had a wide application. Any extension of social contacts is accomplished with difficulty, a certain amount of doubt and hesitation being always present when persons first meet whose characteristics are unknown to each other. Prescribed ceremonies, observed by all, serve to smooth the path of social intercourse. Common formalities make approach easier than it would be if the reactions of new acquaintances were uncertain and varied; only friends of long standing can afford to discard formalities, as hindrances to intimate relationships. On the other hand, it is also true that formalities set up desirable barriers to sudden intimacies. The ceremonials of society ensure a kind of probation period during which the unknown individual may be tested. If judgment is adverse, closer intimacy may be avoided merely by retaining the barriers of convention, for continued formality gently repels while an informal approach invites intimacy. The conventions of social life then form a sort of anti-chamber for preliminary observation which may be used either to facilitate or to retard social relations; and fewer mistakes are made in the cultivation of new acquaintances if everyone follows the formalities of social life.

The discussion so far has indicated the desirable rather than the actual limits to imitative action. In practice the less critical members of society are ruled by imitation in all aspects of life which interest them and in which they are unable to form independent judgments. They imitate therefore not merely in concrete matters, such as methods of production or forms of recreation, but in political views, scientific and religious beliefs, and the whole field of thought. Of course the individual, while borrowing his beliefs, may still exercise choice as to the party or group to which he shall conform, yet even this is ordinarily determined for him by social heredity or by external circumstances. But, having once identified himself with a particular group, the individual accepts the group judgment on all new questions which may arise. The true imitator shows complete loyalty. He does not accept some group judgments and reject others.

Progress in democratic countries calls for a reduction in the amount of non-rational imitation in opinions and beliefs, and the substitution for it of rational imitation and increasing independence of thought. The frame work of customary action surrounding our vital mental products has been represented here in its most desirable aspects; but to ensure its continued utility custom should not become so rigid that in the course of changing needs and conditions it obstructs rather than aids social achievement. Customs that are rigid, or even too complicated, not only hinder freedom of action but come to be revered as ends in themselves rather than as means, and so resist revision. The reorganization of these outworn adjuncts to social life produces what we call revolution.

The Laws of Imitative Choice. Ideas vary in power of suggestion. Having now discussed imitation from the side of the suggestibility of the subject, we may turn next to the character of the source and ask, why an individual imitates one idea more readily than another? And why is he more responsive to one source of suggestion than to another? The suggestibility of the individual explains his tendency to imitate, but not his tendency to discriminate. His responsiveness to particular acts or ideas is, according to some writers, due partly at least to the inherent character of the idea or act. Certain types of suggestion, it is said, spread more easily than other types. For example, according to Tarde, among the physical desires thirst is more contagious than hunger; and therefore the use of drinks spreads more easily than the use of viands. The sex appetite is more susceptible to suggestion than other physical desires. Bodily movements, like gestures or rhythmic motions of the legs, yawning, or even tone of voice, are all easily imitated. And, he

the functions of the higher senses are more transmissible through imitation than those of the lower. ... We are much more likely to copy someone who is looking at or listening to something than someone who is smelling a flower or tasting a dish.” Again he says, “ All passions, needs for luxury, are more contagious than simple appetites and primitive needs." While these statements are doubtless correct it seems doubtful if the explanation is to be found in the principle that sight and hearing belong to the higher senses. Is it not rather that a wider range of possibilities is connected with them, and that it is easier to satisfy our curiosity concerning them? When we see others

adds,

gazing intently at something our curiosity is aroused because the object might be of any nature, wonderful, dangerous, or ridiculous; and as the satisfaction of our curiosity puts us to no inconvenience we look also. But if we see anyone tasting a dish our curiosity is not aroused by the same breadth of possibility. Even if we have not already experienced the taste, as it would put us to considerable inconvenience to get a sample of the food and taste it, we do not satisfy the slight curiosity aroused. Tarde's proposition that the use of drinks spreads more easily than the use of viands is also open to question. The rapid spread of a new confection, or of a well advertised breakfast food, leads one to question any universal application of the distinction. The unequal spread of such articles of consumption may be more reasonably explained on some other basis than the mere distinction between food and drink.

In mental states also a similar difference in power of suggestibility is thought to exist. Tarde goes on to say that admiration, confidence, love, and resignation are superior to contempt, distrust, hatred, and envy; hope is more contagious than terror, and indolence than ambition and avarice; while curiosity is the most imitative of all. And imitation of the emotions spreads more rapidly than imitation of ideas. Inasmuch as these subjects have been only superficially investigated, these observations are given merely as interesting preliminary opinions, but further study is necessary before trustworthy conclusions can be reached. It seems doubtful if the above distinctions would always hold. Some ideas seem to spread as rapidly as sentiments. And it is hard to believe that terror is always less contagious than hope. It is questionable if the right basis has been hit upon for the comparative contagiousness of different mental states. However Ross seems to be in substantial agreement with Tarde's statements, and consequently they are given here as supported by excellent authority.

While it is quite possible that the great diversity in power of contagion of different ideas or acts is influenced by their inherent natures, physiological or otherwise, their contagiousness depends to a much greater extent on the social conditions under which they present themselves and the relation of their source to the imitator.