of imitation decline. Rational imitations continue and may even increase out of the necessities of the conflict.

Society may be looked upon therefore as made up of innumerable social circles. Each circle is composed of persons who in some particular feel themselves to be alike, and because of this similarity organize groups, such as social, professional, or religious groups. Within the group exists imitation and unity, but between groups, organized for the same general purpose, there is some degree of opposition or rivalry. Opposition between groups may not be formidable, nor even always conscious; but either openly or in some veiled form, it exists wherever there is a break in social solidarity. Absolute indifference is comparatively rare. Opposition, either between groups or between individuals, however, may include only one phase of an individual's activity or one part of his personality. An individual belongs to many groups, and he may admire and imitate another individual in one set of activities, connected perhaps with professional work, and oppose him in another, such as political activities.

This representation of imitations as occurring within groups and oppositions between groups is only a general conception of the dominant tendencies where imitations and oppositions are most obvious. The two processes are not in fact wholly distinct. Within a group there may exist a considerable amount of individual rivalry, though if opposition became too strong a group would split apart. Similarly between groups there may be a considerable amount of admiration and imitation, but opposition must still be present or else the groups would merge. This principle applies of course to groups organized for similar purposes, and there may be a few exceptions. Occasionally organizations do not combine, even when oppositions cease, owing to the complexities of organization. And occasionally large size is detrimental, and small non-competitive organizations may be more efficient. But even in such cases some definite form of coöperation is likely to be arranged unless considerable opposition still persists.

In all the psychological processes the starting point is not the group but the individual; and the individual in each of his human contacts feels both admirations and aversions, which lead

directly to imitations and to oppositions, and eventually to social unity or to social conflict. In one case the affiliation may seem to be wholly one of admiration, so that opposition hardly rises to consciousness; in another the opposition may seem to be so general as to include the entire personality. But these would be extremes of possible relationships. In the majority of social contacts both attractions and repulsions are consciously present, though in varying degrees. We might assume therefore that. if physical conditions permitted, the individual would so far as possible arrange his social life to make association most intimate with those he admired the most, and to associate as little as possible with those who repelled him. That is, the relationships between the individual and those nearest him, with whom associations were most intense, would show the maximum of attraction and the minimum of repulsion. Farther away from the individual, if we may use distance in the social instead of in the physical sense, attractions would decrease and oppositions increase until the total feeling of opposition would be stronger than the total feeling of attraction. At that point associations would normally cease. Beyond that point there might still exist considerable ground for admiration but such a feeling would be overbalanced to a greater and greater extent by repulsions, until finally the repulsions would reach a maximum and the attractions would almost disappear. Such is the real relationship between attractions and oppositions, whether the individual or the group be taken as the starting point.

The Social Value of Opposition. Opposition is defensive. In the preceding discussion oppositions have been represented as setting a limit to imitations, the two varying inversely. The evident conclusion to be drawn from this interdependence would be that oppositions check and weaken socialization, but from another point of view it will appear that they also serve to facilitate socialization. When one first meets a stranger, or when one comes in contact with a new idea, it is probable that the immediate reaction includes some degree of opposition. This opposition may be based on fear, or a closely allied emotion, and the utility of the reaction is self-preservation. Just as we fight or flee from those things which may injure us physically, so we reject new ideas which may be disturbing to our mental life, and we repel strangers who may not be barmonious or who may have a tendency to disrupt our social group. Opposition from the psychological point of view then means the preservation of that mental and social equipment which has been so painfully acquired. Our ideas and principles may not be wholly correct, our personal qualities may be susceptible of improvement, and our social relations may be far from ideal; but they have been acquired with difficulty and, whether good or bad, they have become a part of us and instinctively we protect them from contamination or destruction.

The first function of opposition then is defensive. Opposition serves to protect social and mental products and therefore it conserves that degree of socialization which has been already attained. While opposition does not absolutely preclude the entrance of the new, it serves to check it until its nature is understood. If the new proves to be useful or even harmless, the barriers are thrown down; but if it is destructive to the old the conflict continues until one or the other is destroyed, or until some basis of adjustment is reached.

Opposition helps to adjust incompatible elements. The struggle of opposing forces in the social group may be so strong as to impede or even prevent social relations unless some basis of adjustment is reached. An adjustment between antagonistic elements, sufficient to make social life tolerable, is sometimes obtained by the permanent use of oppositions in some form less intense than that of conflict. In some of these cases, however, two ideas apparently opposed, upon further examination may be found to be consistent, whereupon conflict automatically ceases. Of such a type is adjustment between scientific and religious beliefs. Yet in other cases, ideas which are destructive to old beliefs, and subversive perhaps to the social order, do force their way in. In fact this is constantly the situation, for no society is ever made up of absolutely harmonious elements. But here also opposition still exerts a protective function. It attempts to keep the old ideas from being injured or destroyed and permits social life to continue even where the hostile elements must exist side by side. A state which cannot keep anarchistic views wholly outside its boundaries can avoid disruption by continual suppression. An established religion may not be able to eliminate all heresies, but it may retain its position and its purity by continual opposition to alien doctrines. What is true of ideas or principles is also true of heterogeneous individuals or groups in a society. Ordinarily different races may exist in the same society only by preserving a continual attitude of antagonism. Opposition serves to preserve racial identity and at the same time permits social relationships. To be sure, a society composed of heterogeneous elements is never so strong or so unified as it would be if opposition did not exist; but if opposition were relaxed one or both races would lose their identity. Opposition is continued as a means of race preservation. Two races which are in the position of conquerors and conquered, or of superiors and inferiors, find a possible adjustment of necessary social relations by assuming an attitude of mutual aversion. The position of each race or caste is clearly defined. The mutual understanding permits contacts where necessary and maintains isolation where that is possible. Furthermore the partial isolation resulting from the sentiment of aversion offers a safety valve to the feelings. If there were no reservations to social intimacies open conflict would be a constant menace and social life would be impossible. In the southern part of the United States social life between negroes and whites is comparatively peaceful, because racial antagonisms have gradually defined the relative positions of the two races. As long as they respect one another's rights social life runs smoothly. Open conflict results only when one race or the other fails to observe the unwritten rule, or when, being discontented with the established position, one or the other attempts to force a new basis of adjustment. In the northern states, however, no social adjustments between the races have been worked out. Peaceful relations therefore require a much greater degree of segregation than is necessary in the south. In the north when association chances to become more intimate, it is more likely to break out into open conflict, since it occurs without regulation or reservation.

It appears therefore that when antagonistic elements are present in society, opposition causes a certain adjustment between them and permits a species of social life to continue while the integrity of the opposing elements is preserved. The alternatives are either complete segregation or elimination of one of the groups. Opposition promotes group unity. A third effect of opposition

. is that it promotes centralization or unity within opposing groups, thus increasing the degree of socialization while setting limits to the area of socialization. Just as an individual must concentrate his attention and his energies in combat, so a group must centralize and organize all its resources for a conflict. Disloyalty within a group not only deprives the group of a part of its forces, but hinders the remainder in the performance of their duties. In a normal group minor differences disappear in the face of danger from without. Whenever a group is so divided that it cannot temporarily forget its disagreements, it presents only feeble resistance to outside attacks. Unless a people can organize they cannot engage effectively in conflict. Primitive peoples who have not learned to subjact themselves to the discipline of leadership are not warlike; and conversely the mere threat of war has often been the incentive to the organization of small groups into larger groups. Many federations and alliances were originally merely defensive organizations, and they possessed practically no authority except for war purposes. Indeed, warfare is so commonly a cause of unity that alliances between states are naturally looked upon with suspicion by those outside, even though no cause of war seems imminent.

Conflict between groups requires the greatest possible unity within groups. In times of danger the suppression of disloyalty and the elimination of all views of a compromising or pacific nature is regarded as essential, for intensity of hate facilitates organization and increases ferocity in attack. Peace permits divergent views, discussion, progress. But war calls for centralization, unity, and unquestioned obedience. For this reason many societies have consciously maintained a national sentiment of opposition towards rivals, fearing that any relaxation in that attitude would be followed by disintegration. The Taborites, a