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by the material results obtained, but by the apparent approval or disapproval of spirits, and by the character of any phenomena which might accompany an act. If, for instance, the marriage of relatives, or the performance of a religious ceremony in a particular way, was followed by sickness or death in the tribe, that method appeared to be displeasing to the gods and was not likely to be repeated. But if no harmful manifestations followed an act, it was considered successful; and, even if later similar performances were followed by injuries, the method was not immediately abandoned but the act was performed with more punctilious regard for the proper observance of details. In this way rigid observance of precedent came to be of the utmost importance.

The building up of folkways had in itself no moral significance. They merely marked the beginnings of methodical acts. However, in time it was perceived that some customs more than others conduced to the welfare of the group. Then mere formation of custom was no longer the need. Several modes of action were possible; and the social advantage at this point lay in making a choice between the possibilities on a basis of utility, and then in making customary that form of conduct which seemed most useful. At this point the folkways gave birth to the mores, namely, customs which were recognized as having definite social utility. It must not be supposed, however, that there was in all cases any high perception of social utility in the choice of the mores. Some customs were obviously necessary, others were of negative value, or even harmful in the long run, and others were good, but not the best. Nevertheless, in following the mores an idea of group welfare was present; and it was in this second stage, therefore, that morality in the true sense evolved. But a third stage was reached when, either by the contributions of several persons, or by the work of one person of strong intuitive power, these experiences were definitely formulated into a moral code or law. Thus morality has been the expression of the best in the experiences of a people.

Not all socially desirable modes of action need be embodied into a code. Some harmonize with individual instincts and need no enforcement, while others bring on the conflict of

interests between individual instinct and group welfare, which is inevitable and which necessitates restraint of individual freedom. That individuals shall provide themselves with food and protect their lives are the first requisites of group welfare; but these acts correspond to strong individual instincts, and therefore they are not a part of the moral code. The moral law is not an exhortation to follow useful instincts, but rather a restraining force upon the actions of individuals when they first come into conflict with social interests. At first therefore moral law was a series of negations or restrictions, though later positive action was enjoined as the need for active coöperation was more clearly perceived.

Methods of Social Control are Distinct from the Moral A developed moral code then was a set of rules for adapting individual conduct to social needs; that is, morality was, and still is, an attempt to socialize the individual. Taking individual instincts and desires as the point of departure, the moral law circumscribes and restrains individual action in the interests of society. But while morality sets up rules, it provides no active form of control unless it be the appeal to reason. Moral precepts may be so simple and clear that they impress the individual with their reasonableness, and therefore he conforms to them voluntarily. But ordinarily control through reason does not suffice and society requires more positive agencies to make the individual conform to social needs; and it has found them in the restraints of law, public opinion, and religion. When the precepts of morality are followed it is usually because of one of these forces, rather than because of the mere perception of the undesirable consequences of anti-social acts.

In discussing the provinces of these different methods of control, it will be convenient to distinguish three kinds or degrees of morality. The first consists of those fundamental principles of conduct recognized by the majority as essential to the smooth ordering of the social relations, and these are enforced through the agency of law. The second includes forms of conduct generally recognized as desirable but which from their nature are not easily amenable to law, and the sanction for this class of morals is public opinion. The third class consists

of those refinements of morality which are still in the process of acceptance and adoption. It includes those virtues which are practised and taught by leaders of acute moral perception, but which, though they may be approved, are not recognized by the majority as really indispensable to social welfare. The special sanction for this class of morals is religion. However, the force of religion as a means of control is not limited to the third class of acts. Religion enjoins all forms of morality, but it alone requires the higher forms. In other words, the more refined forms of social control include the lower grades of morality; but the cruder forms of control do not cover the higher grades of morality. Religion and public opinion, as well as law, forbid murder, but the law does not punish selfishness, and public opinion does not require self-sacrifice.

The several forms of social control differ greatly in their character and also in their efficiency. Law is control by means of force. This method is crude because it judges largely by externals and necessarily makes rough classifications of crimes. It is uncertain, because many escape its action, and because it is administered with varying degrees of severity by different tribunals and at different times. Public opinion as a control is inaccurate in its enforcement of morals, because it is prone to judge of externals rather than of motives. In the case of an individual who is successful and who conforms to social requirements in manners and customs, society may condone vices if they are not too aggressive. Religion as a control appeals entirely to a sense of duty. It does not therefore mistake manners for virtues, but it is a force too subtle to appeal to all. Those who already have the inward impulse towards betterment respond to religion; those who are satisfied with their attainments are influenced by public opinion; those who ignore social standards but dread pain are restrained by law; and a few are rebellious to every form of social control.

Reasons for Changes in Moral Codes. If the foregoing description of the evolution of morality is correct, it is evident that morality is merely one of many social products; and, like other social institutions and customs, undergoes a progressive development and changes to harmonize with the evolution of other

institutions and products. Moral codes are usually promulgated with authority, ordinarily that of religion, and they have about them an air of absoluteness and finality which forbids modification with every minor change in social conditions. Ancient precepts, to be brought into accord with minor social changes, are usually at first merely reinterpreted and applied to the new conditions and beliefs. But in the long run new conditons and experiences must necessarily cause changes in or additions to moral rules, in order that individual moral conduct may be properly defined with reference to the new social requirements. These alterations in moral codes are sometimes explained by the advocates of the immutable character of moral law as mere differences in emphasis placed on the virtues, or as changes in the relative position and importance of moral precepts, rather than as modifications or enlargements of the moral code. Furthermore, in support of the claim that moral ideals do not change essentially, they also point out that fundamental evils, such as murder and dishonesty, have always been considered sins, and that moral knowledge has not increased with the ages. As has already been shown this claim is true of some of the simpler virtues, the reason being that human instincts are enduring and social relations have always necessitated the adjustment of individuals to one another. But customs such as polygamy, the sale of children, the keeping of slaves, the drinking of intoxicating liquors, have not always been considered vices. And actually our moral codes have been changed not merely by differences in interpretation of already existing moral rules but by the addition of subordinate rules to the original basic regulations of social life. These changes in moral codes are brought about through the influence of altered social conditions, requiring greater restraint on the part of the individual and more active coöperation for the social good.

The Problem of Moral Attainment. Much more difficult of solution is the second problem connected with the subject of morality, that is, the question of the character of the social conditions under which people realize their own moral standards, and the circumstances in which they seem to depart from them. It has already been said that the sanctions of moral conduct are

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to be found in law, public opinion, and religion; and from this it might be concluded that a people would show a low degree of morality when one or more of these institutions were either undeveloped or decadent. And this theory furnishes a partial explanation of moral deterioration, though it fails to account for all forms of immorality. Sometimes immorality is considerable when repressive laws are adequate, when public opinion is active, and when religious institutions are elaborately developed. In such cases immorality seems to flourish because of a relaxation of moral sentiment resulting in failure to enforce the ordinary forms of social control; and the evil is traceable to disease of the social fabric, rather than to a defect in a particular institution. Laws have become dead letters, religion has become an empty form instead of a vital force, and public opinion has become apathetic towards unruly acts. The special sanction of morality, that is, the perception of cause and effect in conduct, seems sometimes to be strangely lacking; or, if perceived, is viewed with indifference.

A low stage of moral attainment therefore may result from unhealthy social conditions even when moral codes are highly developed. The blatant immoralities of the frontier, or of the mining town, may be traced to lack of organization in the institutions of social control. This situation may be due partly to lack of a sufficient period of time for their development, since social organizations are of slow growth, and partly to the absence of leaders in social organization and social order. In a new settlement economic gain is the object sought and men of action are the first to be attracted, although the lawless naturally drift to places where the law is weak. In such communities control is exercised summarily over disorderly conduct in those cases where the consequences are most evident and most galling, such as horse stealing or the disregard of mining claims; but vices which do not interfere immediately with the freedom of others are ignored, because social organization is undeveloped and social sentiment has not been aroused.

The immorality of an old society on the other hand, like that of ancient Rome, is traceable to an entirely different set of causes. Rome's institutions were well developed, its organiza

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