tion was complete; but in the final analysis its weakness lay in the fact that it had ceased to have any ideal for which to struggle. Its early ideal had been conquest with the end in view of drawing sustenance from subject people. As long as this aim was still in the process of fulfilment the discipline and restraint necessary for its achievement were cultivated and enforced. But when the ideal had been achieved, when world conquest had become a reality, activity declined. Then exertion ceased; discipline was relaxed; and those early virtues, which were still taught by a few high-minded moralists, no longer seemed essential to the average citizen. Nothing was left for which to strive; self-indulgence was tolerated, and it led the way to vice and suicide.

Must we conclude then that morality is merely a characteristic of a society in its youth or middle age while activity is greatest, and that societies must inevitably enter on a period of senescence where effort subsides and discipline and self-restraint decline? Rather should the conclusion be that the moral forces of society are strong so long as a group is still striving towards the fulfilment of an ideal. Therefore social welfare demands that a society should have an ideal so broad and so complete that it can never be wholly attained, - one that will permit improvement but never a complete realization. Such an ideal for a society is to be found only within itself, in the perfection of its social organization and the highest development of its social life. Only such an ideal will furnish an unfailing stimulus to uninterrupted effort and will continue to develop higher types of morality and self-sacrifice. The ideal of Rome, which lay outside herself, was objective and materialistic, and it was achievable. While it lasted it imposed restraints, but when it was realized no other worthy ideal replaced it. Morality then would appear to be, not so much an end in itself, as a means to the attainment of an ideal. A high degree of morality continuously maintained in a society is always the outward and manifest sign of an ideal in the life of a people that is a real and powerful force. The good is the ideal, and morality is the means of its attainment.

Another condition which causes a departure from moral

standards may be traced to a relaxation in the control of public opinion. If a society is in the process of disintegration in whole or in part, or if for any reason the forces of integration are not acting strongly on all its members, those who are isolated are likely to suffer moral deterioration. This principle is well illustrated in the case of immigrants to a new country, or of travelers in any foreign country. Not fully absorbed into the life of the new environment they are not reënforced morally by the accustomed social restraints. Constrained to alter many of their habits, they may at the same time relax their moral practices. Similar effects of freedom from restraint are particularly noticeable in the case of migrants from country to city. Leaving a small circle of intimate associates among whom every act is open and unreserved and submitted therefore to the direct force of social control, they are transferred to an environment where intimate acquaintances are not easily made, where social circles are so numerous and complicated that attachment to any one group yields only a fraction of a complete social life. In the complexities of this city life, the individual has a sense of isolation; and, lacking the friendly influence of intimates, his moral force is likely to weaken.

Another situation in which moral relaxation is apparent is to be found where societies are passing through periods of marked readjustment. At such times the old standards prove inadequate, but cannot immediately be replaced by new ones. Then those whose virtue has been based upon conformity to approved standards, instead of on any real perception of the true meaning of moral conduct, may lose all moral safeguards, simply because those principles or practices formerly accepted are incapable of adaptation to changed conditions. In the absence of an universally accepted code of morals individuals may break away from all restraint on conduct. For instance, when an old ideal of the marriage relation is subjected to criticism, and perhaps to reformation, sexual immorality is likely to increase, because in the transition from old standards to new no particular one is clearly defined and accepted. It is for this reason that occasional outbreaks of immorality occur in societies which are really progressing normally, but which are temporarily disorganized through the process of readjustment to new conditions.

Specific Forms of Morality. The discussion thus far has been confined to a general conception of morality. Now if specific forms of morality be considered separately, the principles determining the nature of moral standards and the forces affecting moral conduct will be made clearer. Virtues may be classified into four groups: those relating to individual development, or personal virtues; those relating to racial development, or family virtues; those relating to other individuals, or humanitarian virtues; and those relating to groups or to society as a whole, which may be termed social virtues. Each of these classes includes numerous specific virtues.

The Importance of Personal Morality. Personal morality consists in so ordering one's life as to ensure the highest physical and mental efficiency. It assumes a hygienic mode of living as an essential condition, and requires the development of courage, self-control, and other manly virtues. If the development of higher forms of life be accepted as the fundamental ideal for the individual, then personal morality must always be considered of paramount importance.

Its attainment ensures not only individual development but maximum efficiency and length of life, and therefore superior social well-being. Notwithstanding its importance, personal morality is often ignored both as a form of morality and as a fundamental condition for the development of other kinds of morality, because we are accustomed to think of morality only in the narrow sense of the relations of individuals to one another. But just as the consciousness of personality arises partly within the individual and partly from a perception of other individualities, so morality arises partly out of the urge for individual development, and partly out of the recognition of a similar right for others. Therefore the highest development of all depends not alone on right social relations but on high individual attainment.

Personal morality in the young is likely to take the form of a desire for physical development and bodily perfection; while in the mature it is more manifest as a desire for increased efficiency. The youthful desire for physical development should be carefully stimulated, not only because it is good in itself, but because it is the early manifestation of a quality which should normally unfold into the complete life of virtue. The youth who disregards physical well-being is not the one to develop mental efficiency or social morality. The cultivation of temperance and self-control, and the avoidance of slothfulness and self-indulgence, are the prerequisites in youth for the full realization of individual achievement and complete social adjustment. Morality is neither the suppression of the individual nor the grafting upon him of artificial characteristics; it is the normal expansion of native traits in a society made up of others with similar traits and similar needs.

Conditions Favorable to Personal Morality. Personal morality is most likely to appear in those societies possessing a strong conscious purpose, although the expression of this purpose may differ with the particular character of the social ideal. If the ideal is economic development, or military conquest, personal virtues essential to these ends will be idealized and generally cultivated. Even when an ideal is unworthy it may develop personal virtues of one kind or another. Patience, courage, and self-control may be strong in a society which is aggressively militaristic; but in that case they will decline when conquest is achieved. In a young society whose ideal demands for its attainment individual activity and physical energy, individual virtues are likely to be developed by its citizens in the course of ordinary pursuits. When a society has become older and more stable and its occupations have become sedentary, individual morality is likely to decline or at least to be held in lower esteem than are the humanitarian virtues. This decline, however, is largely an incident of the readjustment of morality to conditions in which social and mental traits have become relatively important. If a worthy ideal persists through the change, personal virtues will again assume prominence, expressed in a desire for well-rounded efficiency. Inasmuch as the physical basis for morality will not develop so spontaneously where occupations call for little physical activity, it seems natural and desirable for physical training and athletic contests to hold a place of prominence in the social life of an advanced society, stimulating deliberately the physical side of the virtuous life. The fact that personal morality is cultivated in the latter case, though it grows unconsciously in the former, is no proof that it is on that account less virile or enduring.

The assertion that a society must necessarily be militaristic to preserve the personal virtues is erroneous and probably insincere. The personal virtues resulting from militarism are cultivated at the expense of the humanitarian virtues; whereas, fortunately for society, these are not inconsistent, and personal morality may be developed in connection with virtues of the highest social value. Indeed, the two kinds of virtues are mutually stimulating and attain their highest development in harmonious relationship.

The Essentials of Sex Morality. Sex morality bears the same relation to the race that personal morality does to the individual. The need of keeping up a strong and vigorous race is evident; and the means of accomplishing it is by a healthy ancestry, and by intelligent and affectionate care of the young. Sexual morality therefore has for its object the production of a strong and healthy race; and the immediate means for attaining this object is the establishment of permanent and happy family circles. As a preliminary to the discussion of the effect of conduct on the family, the purpose of the family may be briefly restated as the proper mating of the two sexes and the provision of a favorable environment for the young. Those marriages which are necessarily restricted to the first purpose will not be considered here, for the conduct governing them belongs rather to personal than to racial morality.

The morality which safeguards normal family life is generally recognized to be of a twofold nature: that which keeps the relations pure, and that which keeps the group permanent. But in the last analysis both these forms have a similar origin. Permanence in the family relation depends first of all upon suitable sexual mating, therefore intelligence and care in the choosing of mates is a basic form of sexual morality. Hasty and thoughtless marriages are more immoral than some kinds of unchastity; although society, which is prone to judge of externals, is likely to be tolerant when the conventionalities of the marriage relation are observed. Next to the selection of suitable mates, the permanency of the family depends upon continued intensity of attraction between them; and this is achieved by early continence and fidelity after marriage. Enduring attraction between the