upon sympathy, which grows out of association on a basis of equality; whereas social morality is much more impersonal in its nature. Sympathy may prevent one individual from injuring others with whom he feels a sense of kinship, but no such sentiment would influence his relations with a corporation, or an association, or a commonwealth. In such relations as those, action for social welfare must be prompted by a finer sense of responsibility than is needed when the act concerns an individual. Social morality belongs only to a society containing many associations and having complex social relations. It grows not from sympathy for other individuals, but out of the realization that one is a responsible member of a social group, and that upon the welfare of the group depends the welfare of the members. That social morality is difficult of attainment is only too obvious from the constant transgressions against it. Persons who would scorn the practice of picking pockets may call it only clever finance to abstract money that has been raised through the channels of taxation. Or those who would not think of defrauding others directly may not hesitate to cheat corporations or to gain increased profits by depressing wages. Again, persons who could not conceive of cold-blooded murder will nevertheless take life by permitting unsanitary conditions, or will allow accidents to occur through carelessness or mistaken economy. The growth of impersonal corporations, with the consequent multiplication of indirect relationships, has offered unparallel opportunities for the acquisition of wealth by dishonest means and has been responsible largely for the selfish and unsympathetic attitudes of employers and employees towards each other.

The present low state of social morality can be traced largely to the rise of new conditions requiring social readjustments. With the growth of dealings between individuals and organizations the old sanctions for humanitarian morality have proved insufficient; and they must be supplemented by a deeper sense of responsibility towards groups and organizations. The indirect effects of acts upon the welfare of others must be more fully realized; and the sanctions of public opinion and of religion must be made more vital means of control.

Conclusion. In concluding this discussion of morality it is not necessary to argue the importance of high standards. If morality means the best way of acting for the good of the group, it is evident that a group cannot reach a high form of life if the great majority do not act in accordance with its interests; and the higher the standard of virtue followed, the more comprehensive will be the life of the group. An objective study of morality, however, does not warrant the simple conclusion that healthy life in a society is the result of moral action. The obverse is also true that moral action grows out of a healthy social life. Of course in one sense the former proposition is not open to argument; but it is not the whole truth if it implies merely that conduct is the result of an abstract ideal and is therefore basic in social relations, and that the character of society grows out of it. Moral conduct being only one factor in a network of social relations, it is possible to improve conduct by altering social conditions, just as it is possible to improve social relations by inculcating better ideals of moral conduct. The relative importance of different sources or methods of stimulating high standards of conduct cannot be accurately determined. It is probable, however, that the lower and more physical forms of morality are most affected by social conditions, and the higher and more refined forms are chiefly responsive to suggestion through an ideal. That is, inculcating morality through exhortation will have little permanent effect in a bad environment; but when the fundamentals of morality have been attained, then the individual becomes more responsive to ideals and less dependent upon improvement in the environment, though the latter is never without its influence.

In conclusion it may be said that in so far as society is affected by standards of conduct, its requirements both for survival and for progress will be met if the individual follows these rules:

He should develop his talents and increase his efficiency in every way both physical and mental.

He should preserve and strengthen the family circle for the highest welfare of both parents and offspring.

He should respect both the person and the property of other individuals, so that all may enjoy equal rights and adequate opportunities.

He should not prefer his own interests to those of the commonwealth.

REFERENCES FOR COLLATERAL READING CARVER, T. N., Sociology and Social Progress, Chs. 15 and 23. CONN, H. W., Social Heredity and Social Evolution, Chs. 3 and 4. DEALEY, J. Q., Sociology, Its Development and Application, Ch. 18. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics. DRAKE, D., Problems of Conduct, Chs. I and 2. EDMAN, I., Human Traits, Ch. 15. HAYES, E. C., Sociology and Ethics. HOBHOUSE, L. T., Morals in Evolution. LECKY, W. E. H., History of European Morals. Seth, J., A Study of Ethical Principles, Pt. II. SPENCER, H., Principles of Ethics. SUMNER, W. G., Folkways. SUTHERLAND, A., Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct. WESTERMARCK, E., Origin and Development of Moral Ideas.

The Nature of Art. In a broad sense art means doing or skill in execution in contrast to science, which means knowing. Every science is supplemented by an art and every art must be based upon science or technique. The relative importance of knowledge and skill varies, however, in the different arts, the industrial or mechanic arts being almost wholly dependent upon science, while the fine arts depend primarily upon skill in execution. The present discussion deals chiefly with the fine arts and only touches upon those higher industrial arts which have some of the same effects upon society as the fine arts.

Definitions of art vary according to different viewpoints. The essence of art, from the viewpoint of its effects upon society, is its power of transmitting emotions from one individual to another. Art is then both the expression of an individual and an appeal to other individuals. Yet it is evident that not all expressions of individual feeling, and not all transfers of emotion between individuals, can come under the head of art. Art carries with it an implication of excellence in form. Yet ideals of form vary with peoples and with epochs, and productions of the art of one cultural stage may come to be only historical curiosities at another stage. Even in a particular stage, productions which upon their first appearance impress popular opinion as art, frequently fail to survive the more deliberate judgment of the critic.

The real essence of art may then be expressed in the following definition: Art is such an expression of emotions experienced by one person as will awaken similar emotions in others. This definition is not unlike that of Tolstoi, who says that “art is a means of human activity consisting of this, that one man consciously by means of external signs, hands on to others feelings that he

has lived through, and that other persons are infected by these feelings and also experience them.”

From such a point of view I can see nothing unnatural or injurious in a class art, which Tolstoi so strongly condemns, an art which appeals forcibly to some but does not touch all. The emotions, as well as the intellect, are capable of training and respond readily to differences of environment; therefore it is inevitable that forms of expression which will attract one individual or one class may not be comprehended by others. On the other hand it is quite true that there may also be such a thing as universal art. Human beings are after all so fundamentally alike that the expression of primary emotions, such as parenthood or the attraction of the sexes, should have universal appeal. But the art which aims to be universal must be general in subject matter and simple in expression.

Art as a Social Product. Although art is immediately an individual product, it is in the last analysis a social product, for the artist is himself a product of his social environment and obtains his inspiration from the sentiments and ideals of his time. The highest art is in fact the finest expression of these ideals. This point may be illustrated from the history of any kind of art which has a broad range of expression, such as architecture, painting, and literature. An illustration from architecture may be as simple as any. At an early period of social development, when ancestor worship was in vogue and the idea of immortality was the ruling religious motive, the monumental works of architecture were tombs. In the Middle Ages, when the intellectual life was restricted and the emotional life was highly developed, the church was the dominant influence and again the finest artistic expression took a religious form. But at this later period, in place of veneration of ancestors and family glorification in tombs, the architectural expression of the religious spirit was embodied in the great Gothic cathedrals. At a still later period, when feudalism had declined and the king's power had strengthened, when the state became centralized and enlarged its boundaries, the power and authority of the state became the dominant idea; and then the characteristic architecture represented royal or state power. In France and Spain this architecture expressed